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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 24 OCTOBER 1945 No. 1

THE UNITED NATIONS: A PROSPECTUS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

By John Foster Dulles

GOVERNMENT," said Alexander Hamilton, "ought to contain an active principle." Political institutions which advance the welfare of their human constituents achieve an internal state which is cohesive and dynamic and produce an external environment which is sympathetic and receptive. Those are the conditions needed for survival and growth.

The United Nations Organization is charged with positive tasks. That at least gives it a chance to be potent in the world. Whether the chance is realized will depend primarily upon the General Assembly. The rôle of the Security Council is predominantly negative. Its task is to stop the nations from public brawling. But it has no mandate to change the conditions which make brawls likely.

By contrast, the General Assembly, directly or through its Economic and Social Council, is charged: to promote international coöperation in economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields; to assist in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and, in this connection, to establish a Commission on Human Rights; to promote higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development; to coördinate the policies and activities of what the Charter calls "specialized agencies," such as the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization; to promote the development and codification of international law; to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations; to deal with colonial trusteeships for non-strategic areas; and, generally, to discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter — thus assuming the rôle of a "town meeting of the world," where public opinion is focused as an effective force.

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The foregoing list is not complete, but it is enough to give an impression of the vast range of opportunities opened up to the Assembly. Also, it is enough to make apparent that the Assembly is given a tempting invitation to chase rainbows.

The Assembly will have to pick its way carefully if it is to justify the responsibility which the Charter places upon it. It cannot afford the luxury of dabbling pleasurably in experimentation while looking to the Security Council to keep the peace. The tasks given it are, indeed, the primary means to peace. They must be undertaken with sober realization of such basic facts as these:

The Organization as now set up lacks the political powers usually relied upon to assure civic order. It would, therefore, be reckless to let peace depend upon the political functioning of the Organization.

The Organization's lack of political power is a semi-permanent fact. It is not due to an oversight or incompetence on the part of the authors but to basic conditions which the Charter meritoriously reflects.

Peace, accordingly, will depend primarily upon there being such fellowship among the member nations as will prevent the occurrence of a major war, while advancing the time when the Organization can be made into a more adequate political instrument.

Fellowship based on a war coalition usually disintegrates after the enemy's defeat. The way to prevent this from happening to the United Nations is to continue them in combat against the material and spiritual enemies of human welfare. To organize that combat is the primary responsibility of the General Assembly, and to do it successfully calls for a high order of statesmanship.

II

The political inadequacy of the United Nations Organization is obvious. Any political order which eliminates major violence over a long period of time must depend largely on laws defining, concretely and acceptably, what conduct is admissible and what is not. They need to be changed frequently so as to adapt the basic judgments they express to constantly changing conditions and so as to assure an acceptable balance among members of the society who incline to pull in different directions. The achievement of such a body of laws calls for a lawmaking process. And

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to enforce them there is required, in addition to the pressure of public opinion, a judicial system and a police force which will act automatically as the law directs.

At San Francisco these political goals could not be realized. The Charter itself does not establish rules of conduct which the Organization is committed to enforce. It does set forth certain general principles; but these are expressed as self-denying ordinances, not as law which the Organization enforces. The Security Council is under no injunction to move against violators. Some consideration was given to a possible prohibition of "aggression." But, as Mr. Eden observed at San Francisco, aggression is a concept without any precise agreed content. Some expansions and contractions of zones of national influence are reprehensible and some may be desirable. It is not easy to find words which would define and prohibit such exploits as the initial acts of Hitler and Hirohito and yet permit the expansion of the U.S.S.R. from the low ebb to which Russia fell under the Tsars and authorize Great Britain to "erase the sore spots in Europe" as now proposed by Professor Laski.

Of course, there are always people who would like to make change in the world illegal. Some are satisfied and selfish, some are morally shocked at the injustices which too often accompany change. That point of view prevailed in 1919, with the result that the Covenant of the League of Nations, by Article 10, went far toward identifying peace and morality with the maintenance of the status quo. Elihu Root, when he saw that proposed Article, said:

> It would be an attempt to preserve for all time unchanged the distribution of power and territory made in accordance with the views and exigencies of the Allies in this present juncture of affairs. It would necessarily be futile. . . . It would not only be futile; it would be mischievous. Change and growth are the law of life, and no generation can impose its will in regard to the growth of nations and the distribution of power, upon succeeding generations.

The point of view thus expressed by Root prevailed at San Francisco. The Conference abstained from seeking to legislate perpetual peace by a single Article sanctifying for all time things as they are. Yet after that deceptively easy way had been rejected, the problem of legislating was seen as immensely difficult. The nations represented at San Francisco had not yet reached the position where they constituted a true community with common judgments about conduct. Also, many of them did not want the establishment of any law which would be superior

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to their own particular will and conscience. Wisely, then, the Conference did not attempt to write laws for the Organization to enforce. But it recognized that the omission to do this represented a grave inadequacy in the Organization as constituted.

The San Francisco Conference also failed to establish a body to make laws hereafter. There is to be an international court; but courts do not, or at least should not, legislate. The Assembly is directed to encourage the development and codification of international law. But neither it nor the Security Council is given any authority to enact law. The Security Council, although not intended to be a legislating body, might conceivably build up a body of international common law through its reasoned action in dealing with international disputes. In view, however, of the difficulty of the Security Council's taking any action at all, under its voting procedure, it is not likely that an adequate body of law could develop in this way in time to meet the necessities which will face the world.

Obviously, neither the Assembly nor the Security Council was qualified to be a legislating body. The voting procedure in both is so artificial that it could not be relied upon to reflect the predominant will of the world community. In the Assembly, where each state has one vote regardless of size, a small minority of the people in the world could impose its will on the great majority. In the Security Council, a single great state could block action desired by all the others. At San Francisco much was said about the inequity of a big Power like the United States or Soviet Russia having a right of veto. Very little was said about Liberia and Luxembourg, for example, having equal voting power in the Assembly with the United States and Soviet Russia. The fact is, the small powers as well as the big ones are still tenacious of special privileges. So long as that is so, the Organization cannot be politically mature. This was a second grave inadequacy to which the Conference felt it must reconcile itself.

Since the San Francisco Conference was unable either to write rules of conduct into the Charter or to establish a lawmaking process, it could not establish any effective enforcement procedure. Neither courts nor policemen can do much without an adequate body of law behind them. A police force ought to work automatically, as previously instructed by law. With no laws, and with no body to make them, an international force cannot perform in the manner of a police force. No act of violence, however flagrant, will enable the military contingents of the

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World Organization to go into action immediately. In every case they must await the decision of the Security Council. The reaching of that decision is a quasi-legislative process, something like passing a special law which will be retroactive. Many political factors will have to be considered and, finally, the five Permanent Member States will have to concur.

In view of this, many persons at San Francisco felt that the Security Council might prove rather impotent so far as concerned its use of force. That was a third grave inadequacy to which the Conference felt it had to reconcile itself.

III

The political inadequacies described above are not of a kind that can be quickly remedied. It is not a matter of rewording the Charter. Underlying conditions caused the Charter to be what it is. Many went to San Francisco hoping for a Charter worded differently from the one which emerged. Few, at the end, would have had it very different from what it is.

The present Charter represents a conscientious and successful effort to create the best world organization which the realities permit. Of course, anyone who is free to disregard realities and to act only in the realm of theory can write a "better" Charter. A reasonably intelligent schoolboy could do that. The task of statesmanship, however, is to relate theory to reality. Political institutions ought to come as close to theoretical perfection as is consonant with their vigorous survival in the existing environment. Orchids may be the perfect flower. But it is a waste of time to plant orchids in Iceland. That is what many peace planners would do.

The merit of the present Charter is not disclosed if one judges it merely as an abstract political document. That, as we have seen, discloses its inadequacies. The merit of the present Charter lies in the fact that its words correspond with the realities. What in the abstract are defects become in reality merits. The Charter was deliberately made to mirror the hopes and fears, the trusts and distrusts, the strength and infirmities of the human environment in which it must live and work.

Never before has such a project been tested on so tough a proving ground. The Holy Alliance was the exclusive handiwork of three rulers and their personal advisers. Its noble words bore no relation to realities. The Covenant of the League of Nations was essentially the work of five or six men. It was adopted after

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a committee of 20, made up of two representatives from each of five states and one representative of each of ten states, had held 14 meetings. At San Francisco, 12 Committees, each composed of 50 delegates and about 100 advisers and technical assistants, met regularly over a two-month period. Literally hundreds of proposals were considered and every avenue of action was explored. The discussion took place in an atmosphere of freedom and in a spirit of responsibility. There was no compulsion and no veto except that imposed by the good judgment of the delegates.

The result is an honest document. Under present conditions it could not advantageously be made materially different. But some day it ought to be different. The delegates at San Francisco were almost unanimous about that. They gave much thought to how and when the Charter should be revised. Indeed, that was the most debated topic of the Conference. But the most earnest proponents of easy amendment did not want an immediate special Conference to review the Charter. About ten years should elapse, they felt, before a first review of the Charter could usefully be attempted. That was because they realized that what was needed could not be brought about by changing words, but only by changing the conditions which had made the present words inevitable. Such a change of conditions, they saw, would require well-directed efforts over a period of time.

IV

The present war has caused an unprecedented exhaustion, both human and material, and the end has not yet been reached. Even now that Japan has been beaten there may still be an aftermath of disturbances as peoples and régimes seek new equilibriums, internal and external. But the time will probably come when the dominant craving of men everywhere will be for a chance to recuperate and when no important group will tolerate a government whose policies risk a major war. During such a period even an inadequate organization can keep the peace. Exhaustion and fear will be its allies. But, judging by reason and experience, this will be merely an interlude between wars unless the time is used to good advantage.

The San Francisco Conference succeeded in transforming a war alliance into a political association containing the potentialities of growth. As we have seen, however, it was not able to establish an Organization possessing the political powers usually

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depended on to maintain civic order, because the United Nations are not yet sufficiently aware of their continuing interdependence, sufficiently homogeneous and sufficiently trustful of each other to delegate such powers to a new political organism.

We must not accept that condition as permanent. There are certain risks which only an adequate political institution will be able to eliminate. To seek the increased trust and sense of unity which will make the attainment of a more adequate political instrument possible should therefore be the major goal of the next era. Human nature is still such, however, that unity is achieved easily only through common effort for a common advantage. That is why external perils create coalitions and why those coalitions disintegrate when the common enemy is vanquished. That is why the present unity of the United Nations will vanish unless we find new enemies to fight together.

The great merit of the Charter is that it faces up to this reality. It creates an Organization which has "active principles." It brands intolerance, repression, injustice and economic want as common enemies of tomorrow, just as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan have been the common enemies of yesterday. It proposes to its members that they stay united to wage war against those evils.

If this new call to battle arouses the enthusiasm of the peoples of the United Nations, and if they commit their best abilities to waging it successfully, the normal trend toward disintegration can be halted and a trend toward a greater sense of unity and greater friendship can be substituted. Thus can be gradually created the store of trust and confidence which must precede any adequate delegation of power to a world organization.

V

It is the General Assembly which will have to plan the campaign of the United Nations against their newly proclaimed enemies. The Charter offers many possible objectives, not all of which can be pursued immediately. The Assembly must make an orderly choice, and it must take into account not merely the relative merits of the goals themselves but the degree to which the pursuit of them will produce the by-products of increased fellowship between the member nations. Various considerations will need to be weighed in this connection.

It is very important, for example, particularly during the first years when the war coalition will tend to disintegrate, that the

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Assembly choose projects which are likely to succeed. The possibility of preserving unity between the United Nations will depend above all upon a quick practical demonstration that, by staying together, they can accomplish desired results which otherwise would be impossible. A joint success brings co-workers to a generous appreciation of each other, while a failure leads to recrimination and disunity. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the Organization in its early stages should embark on undertakings where success is likely.

It is important, too, that the goals first chosen by the Assembly should include some which will arouse popular interest and backing. Much technical work can usefully be done on an international basis, but the compilation of scientific data on meteorological and hydrographic matters does little to promote the fellowship of peoples. Though such tasks should of course continue to be undertaken, they are no substitute for activities which will develop the enthusiastic loyalty and support of the peoples of many lands and afford a peaceful outlet for their dynamic impulses. The Assembly should seek psychological substitutes for military warfare. It must do some things that will be dramatic.

The Charter recognizes in Article 55 that "conditions of stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations." Economic distress and social maladjustments give evil men the opportunity to gain leadership and to menace the peace of the world. In choosing its objectives, therefore, the Assembly should utilize its grant of authority and act to ameliorate the economic and social conditions which help to breed war.

Future peace depends above all upon accord between the Great Powers. The Charter recognizes this by forbidding the Security Council to take any enforcement measures unless the "Big Five" are in agreement. But while this emphasizes the importance of harmony, it does not assure that harmony will exist. Of course, the Great Powers themselves will primarily determine the character of their relations with each other; but the Assembly can contribute to the accord between them which is necessary if the Security Council is to function. Negatively, it can refrain from using its privileges, notably that of discussion, in a way to exploit and magnify the minor differences which will inevitably arise among the Great Powers. Affirmatively, it can select tasks upon which the Great Powers can readily unite.

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Since the smaller nations control the Assembly, there will be a natural tendency for them to organize its social and economic activities so as to benefit themselves at the expense of the larger members. Of course, the strong must help the weak, if only because their self-interest is served by preventing anarchy. But such help, of which UNRRA is an example, should be left to the initiative of the strong powers. The Assembly should consciously sponsor activities which bring the larger powers to like an international way of life and thereby promote harmony between themselves and the small powers. It will succeed in this if it chooses activities of a kind which will be affirmatively advantageous to all.

Other factors which the Assembly should consider in deciding on its initial program could be mentioned. But even the above tests show how hard its choice will be if it is to be successful. To illustrate:

One mandatory task of the General Assembly is to encourage the development and codification of international law. This is of extreme importance, since, as we have seen, lack of law is a principal weakness of the present situation. However, to achieve a body of written law enforceable against states as such is a most difficult project. "The Federalist" said that thinking men would at once dismiss it "as idle and visionary;" and added: "The principle of legislation for sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker members."

There is, however, an alternative to legislation for states, namely, the adoption of laws to operate upon individuals. This avenue of development is being explored today, when considerations of justice have brought the United Nations to postulate the existence of an international law enforceable against individual Germans. The time is thus propitious to begin to frame international law which will not be merely applicable retroactively but which will operate in the future to deter individuals anywhere from wilfully or maliciously plotting or inciting international disorder. Also, once individual duties are made a subject of international law, it becomes logical also to define the international aspects of individual rights. By promoting that development the General Assembly could begin to give practical content to the affirmation by the peoples of the United Nations of their "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person."

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If an effort were made to develop international law for individuals rather than for states, then the criteria we have mentioned could largely be met. There would be a good chance of some success. The effort would be dramatic and would awaken popular interest. A cause of war might be curbed. The effort would be one in which the nations, large and small, could be expected to work together in harmony. It was the sponsoring Powers which, at San Francisco, by one of their "four-power amendments," unhesitatingly and enthusiastically determined that a major purpose of the Organization should be to promote and encourage "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

Another task for the General Assembly is the solution of international problems of an economic character. The conditions of trade and finance ought to be such that nations can acquire, on a fair exchange basis, the food, raw materials and other products which do not lie within their own resources and which they need for the maintenance of tolerable standards of living. The Bretton Woods plan for a World Bank and Monetary Fund is an effort to solve this problem primarily through its financial aspects. That approach alone will be inadequate, for neither credit nor monetary arrangements can permanently substitute for a near balance in the exchange of goods and services. The Assembly can undertake a broader and sounder approach. The effort probably would not arouse popular enthusiasm. Also it might frighten, even though needlessly, the more productive countries. Nevertheless, a practical success can be achieved along this line, and it ought to be possible to achieve it on a basis advantageous to all. A success here would do much to eliminate some of the underlying causes of war.

The General Assembly is authorized to promote international coöperation in the field of health. Of course, disease is not in a primary sense a cause of war. Indeed, a cynic might say that to reduce mortality from disease increases the risk of war from population pressures. On the other hand, a successful combat against disease, particularly the epidemics which inspire general dread, can arouse popular interest and give a practical demonstration of the advantages of international action. The Rockefeller Foundation, now in its thirty-third year, works in various fields — health, natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities. Its labors which have produced the most tangible results and

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have brought it world-wide good will have been those in the field of international health. The Assembly could, with advantage, consider that experience in deciding what lines of effort can be expected to produce a demonstrable success. The field is one where all the Powers could advantageously work together, pooling for peace the achievements of their scientists, as they pooled them in war to produce the atomic bomb.

Such are some of the problems which the Assembly will face in planning its contribution to peace. The San Francisco Conference was, in a sense, the first meeting of the Assembly. It will now approach its concrete tasks with zeal born of a first success and with discretion born of responsibility. The meeting at San Francisco went far to assure a successful transition from the unity of war to a new unity of peace. Trust and confidence, somewhat in suspense during the early days of the Conference, developed strongly toward the end. Hard, competent work resulted in a good start being made. The Conference can be said to have done much to reverse the normal trend toward postwar disintegration.

It cannot be taken for granted, however, that future meetings of the Assembly will be like that of San Francisco. Success there was due above all to the millions of individuals throughout the world who directed upon that Conference the power of their spirit. They put the immediate participants under the strongest possible moral pressure not to fail. Without that constant pressure the Conference might have broken up on any one of several issues, or it might have ended with merely perfunctory results.

The present danger is that the millions who compelled the achievements of San Francisco will now relax, feeling that the battle has been won and the Organization can carry on alone from this point. That would be disastrous. Organizations are incorporeal; they have no will, no mind, no soul. They live only through human beings who implement them. The individuals whose wills and brains and spirits will animate the Assembly of the United Nations will need the same sort of stimulus that made the San Francisco Conference a success. Their task will not be mechanistic. It will be to select, plan, organize and lead great works of human betterment. They can do that successfully only in response to the expressed wishes and demands of their fellows. Thus, in the final analysis, the peoples of the world will decide their own fate.

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THE SECURITY COUNCIL

By R. Keith Kane

THE Security Council is the organ of the United Nations primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace. Its very name suggests the question which comes first to the minds of Americans as they examine the structure and the potentialities of this new international body: to what extent does it in fact promise "security"? In the new world now being disclosed by science to our startled gaze, the word has a vastly expanded connotation. Security for the United States no longer merely implies a set of circumstances in which we would probably be able to defeat an enemy in the event of war. To our minds today it has significance chiefly in so far as it promises freedom *from* war — freedom from the necessity of wielding the terrible two-edged weapons of modern scientific destruction. Security is no longer a static concept. It is the most dynamic idea in the world; it is now synonymous with life itself.

What will be the immediate threats to our national security when the enemies we have now beaten have been disarmed? There will be two: the possibility of a resurgence of Germany or Japan; and the possibility of a breach of unity among the three greatest Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Obviously, the problems presented by these two dangers are intimately related. The result might in either case be the establishment of hegemony over Europe by a Power hostile to us, so that it might be impossible for us to have normal political, economic and social relations with any European nation. A similar result is possible in eastern Asia. East or west, a closed continent would be a signal that war was likely.

The most significant political facts of the new world emerging from this global war are that there are just three Powers of the first magnitude and that there are no irreconcilable factors in their relations. All three are located outside western continental Europe (for centuries the center of world power), and none is directly contiguous to Germany or Japan. Moreover, their industrial areas are widely separated from each other. If none of the three seeks to extend its "security zone" immoderately; if the strategic interests of each are clarified and mutually recognized;

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if they consult with one another on all matters affecting the security of any one of the three; and if they then proceed to act jointly in the solution of such issues as may arise, they can keep peace anywhere in the world. The conditions indicate the scope of the political problem.

France and China, the other two of the so-called Big Five, are today essentially regional Powers. France, of course, has important interests outside of Europe; but her influence, like that of China, is not strictly world-wide. It is to be hoped that the respective policies of France and China will be directed not only toward the continued disarmament of Germany and Japan, but also toward strengthening the forces in Europe and Asia which are opposed to expansion. In such event their efforts will be harmonious with those of the Big Three.

Since the Moscow Declaration in October 1943, it has been acknowledged more and more generally that "the fundamentals of our future security are essentially political rather than military." [1] Every strategic concept is being altered by the dramatic technological revolution. Future wars will be increasingly waged between laboratories and factories; and the control of these will be less strictly military and more in the hands of statesmen. The principal political problem will be whether the major Powers will continue to collaborate in the discharge of their joint responsibility. It is necessary for us to consider first, then, how the Security Council can help to promote such collaboration.

We should note that for the present the control of the enemy states will be handled outside the Council.[2] The Charter makes specific provision for this. There certainly will be a considerable period of military occupation of Germany and Japan by forces assigned by agreement among the three Powers. The declared purposes are to bring about the disarmament and demilitarization of those countries and the elimination or control of all industry which they could use hereafter for military production. As foreshadowed in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Report, there will also be territorial adjustments. Whatever the precise final terms, it is hardly likely that Germany and Japan will be

[1] Grayson Kirk, "National Power and Foreign Policy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1945.

[2] The Big Three agreed at Potsdam to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers to draw up treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to deal with other specified objects. Other matters may also from time to time be referred to it. The three Governments invited China and France to adopt the text and join in the establishment of the Council; but this invitation was issued without prejudice to the agreement entered into at the Crimea Conference that there should be periodic consultation among the foreign secretaries of the three leading Powers.

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able for the next few years to threaten the peace of the world by their own arms. Probably the crucial period in which Germany might make a new bid for hegemony in Europe would be around 1960. In the Orient, the test of our controls over Japan may well come later.

The responsibilities which the Security Council may have with respect to the enemy states are left for exact determination at a later date. For the time being, the Axis states will not have the right of recourse to any of the United Nations organs. But before any of them is again in a position to threaten their neighbors and the rest of the world, we may hope that the Great Powers will have demonstrated their ability to work together. In such case it would seem logical to deal with the new threats through the Security Council.

Measures taken under the treaties against the Axis states already entered into by the Soviet Union and certain other Powers are likewise exempt for the present from the necessity of prior approval by the Security Council. The core of what might be called this secondary defense system is the Anglo-Soviet Pact of May 26, 1942. Similar treaties have been concluded by the Soviet Union with France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Jugoslavia. They are designed for instantaneous operation when one of the parties becomes "involved in hostilities" with Germany or, in the case of the treaty between Russia and the United Kingdom, any of the states "associated with her [Germany] in acts of aggression in Europe."

The fact remains that when the Powers are consulting in pursuit of common objectives with respect to the enemy states, they will be following a course which will lead them directly to the Security Council, especially since defense pacts and the enforcement of surrender terms are the concern of all the United Nations. An early test of Great Power collaboration will thus lie in their handling of the enemy states. In the very act of dealing with the problems involved they will have the opportunity to set the Security Council on a firm footing.

In the following pages we shall examine, first, the principal executive functions of the Council and certain of the problems which will come before it; second, the question of military sanctions; and third, the relationship of the Great Powers to the middle and small states. Throughout, we shall center our attention on the development of the Council as a *political* instrument rather than as a police agency. Only its development in this direction

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can be expected to promote the international unity which is essential for the maintenance of an enduring peace.

II

The permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Six other states will be elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly at its first session, due regard being paid to the contribution of members to the maintenance of peace and security "and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution." Later on, a retiring member will not be eligible for immediate reëlection.

The Charter directs the Council as soon as possible to negotiate agreements by which member states are to make available the armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the maintenance of peace and security. The Council will also be responsible for formulating plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the regulation of armaments. Another responsibility, and one which the Council may have to assume shortly after the Charter comes into force, will be to consider such trusteeship agreements for strategic areas as may be submitted to it for approval by the states directly concerned. The Council will have many other duties under the Charter, some of them not directly related to the maintenance of peace and security, which need not be dwelt upon here.

States which are parties to a dispute are obligated under the Charter to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice. They are obligated to refer their differences to the Council if they themselves fail to settle them; when necessary, the Council is to call on them to settle their disputes by pacific means. The Council is empowered to recommend terms with a view to such settlement when it sees fit. In other words, it is expected to intervene only by carefully graduated stages.

Some of the questions to come before the Council first will probably involve the liberated states. Thus the dispute between Greece and Jugoślavia relating to Macedonia could properly be referred to the Council. Middle Eastern problems such as the Syrian affair or the control of the Dardanelles may come up for consideration. Since the Charter empowers the Council to investigate "any situation which might lead to international fric-

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tion or give rise to a dispute," it can take jurisdiction even before a dispute comes to a head. Thus it might discuss the status of Tangier, since that involves the security of the Mediterranean basin and the strategic interests of several member states.

Each member of the Council will have one vote; and decisions on procedural matters, and as to whether to call a general conference to review the Charter, are to be made by an affirmative vote of any seven members. The Council's participation in the election of judges of the International Court is by majority vote. It was settled at San Francisco, after heated debate and tense negotiation, that the Council's decision whether or not to discuss a given subject is to be treated as a procedural matter, that is, the veto of the Permanent Members shall not apply. Some may have thought that the question assumed a symbolic importance beyond what the issue itself justified. Nevertheless, completely free discussion within the Council may well prove to be one of its most useful activities; while the fact that in the end the dispute was satisfactorily resolved is evidence that the Powers can work harmoniously when they are in agreement on major objectives. It also demonstrates what a powerful effect world opinion can have on the policies of even the greatest states.

Decisions of the Council on all other issues are to be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, with the proviso that in reaching decisions for the pacific settlement of disputes a party to the dispute is to abstain from voting — a welcome instance of the acceptance of the principle that no nation should be a judge in its own cause. Members without Council seats may participate in the discussion when their interests are especially affected, but may not vote. Even a state which is not a member of the United Nations may participate in the discussion if it is a party to a dispute.

The Security Council is required to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The extent to which it actually chooses to assume this responsibility will probably depend upon the availability of the contingents of armed forces to be provided by member states, under the agreements discussed below; but its authority will exist from the beginning.

The Council will decide what measures which do not involve the use of armed force shall be taken to give effect to its decisions. Where appropriate, its recommendations may involve more than

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the mere attempt to settle a dispute by peaceful means. Before making recommendations, the Council is empowered to call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems desirable. These are not to be regarded as preliminary sanctions, but simply as measures to prevent deterioration of a situation pending a definitive recommendation or action by the Council. If the Council decides upon measures not involving the use of armed force, it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply them; in turn, all members agree in the Charter to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions. No such provision was contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Here is a most significant step forward in the direction of establishing collective security. It can begin to be effective as soon as the Organization starts to function.

The Council's measures short of the use of armed force may include the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Also, on its recommendation, the General Assembly may suspend or expel a member. Thus the Council's functions are broad and its powers extensive. The mere possibility that it will invoke economic sanctions may lead to a prompter and more effective use of the peaceful methods which Senator Vandenberg has referred to as the "real genius" of the Charter. The Council may make its point merely by showing a lively interest in a dispute.

It should be noted that when the Council is determining whether or not there is a threat to the peace, and when it is applying enforcement measures, a permanent member will vote even though it is a party to the dispute. This is a feature of the Charter which cannot properly be judged by the standards and traditions of our domestic policy and private law, but with an eye to the current realities of international politics. It is a necessary recognition of the responsibilities which attach to power. The responsibilities assumed by the Great Powers are so heavy that it would be naïve to expect any one of them to promise to act in consequence of a decision in which it had not concurred.

In San Francisco much discussion was devoted to regional arrangements and their relation to the Security Council. Little need be said on the subject here. The inter-American system is to be formalized by treaty. The Council is to utilize such regional arrangements as the inter-American system or the new Arab League for enforcement action "where appropriate." It also is

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directed to encourage the pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements. However, the Council's authorization is required before enforcement action under such arrangements can be taken. The only exceptions to this rule are those mentioned above — action taken or authorized against any state which, during the current war, has been an enemy of any signatory to the Charter, or action taken by regional agencies against the renewal of an aggressive policy by any such state.

III

The ability of the United Nations Organization to use military coercion in enforcing its decisions has been referred to as the "teeth" of the Charter. Probably its provisions to this effect have been discussed more than any other of its sections. Though they are indeed important, many who have studied the matter closely believe that the political significance of the fact that armed contingents are in existence will prove greater than their stark military importance.

The signatories of the Charter are committed to the principle that they must "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter." They agree to "join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council." They specifically undertake to make armed forces (and rights of passage for such forces) available on the Security Council's demand.

Obviously, any limitations on the area in which the forces could operate, or any restrictions on the authority of a state's representative to act with dispatch, would weaken the Council. An effort to write such limitations into the legislation implementing our membership in the United Nations will be regarded by many people as a thrust at the heart of the Charter. In this they would be quite correct, since the Charter emphasized that the armed forces to be provided shall include "national air-force contingents," and that these are to be held "immediately available" for urgent enforcement measures. What effect the new atomic bomb will have on this provision cannot be foretold, any more than the future of armies and navies can be told. It apparently lies in our power to make available to the international Organization an irresistible weapon with which to threaten aggressors. Here is final evidence that the world's crucial questions are political.

In any event, speed and flexibility are essential in international

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enforcement measures. It is not proposed to set up an international police force. There will, however, be available to the Council a Military Staff Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Council, to make plans for the application of force when needed. This Committee will advise the Council "on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements," including "the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament." The Committee will be responsible for "the strategic direction" of the forces. Presumably a single officer would be placed in command of contingents assigned to a specific task.

The contingents to be provided in accordance with these agreements will not be designed to conduct large-scale warfare but rather to prevent the occurrence of small incidents or to keep little wars from becoming big ones. Once the Council has sufficient forces at its disposal, it may decide, whenever it determines that a threat to the peace exists or that a breach of the peace or an act of aggression has occurred, to take the necessary action by air, sea or land to maintain or restore peace and security. Before so acting, of course, the Council would have concluded that measures not involving the use of armed force have been or would be inadequate.

The Charter does not call on its signatories to renounce force; rather, it seeks to bring force under control by registering agreement on certain purposes and binding the contracting parties to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with those purposes. One such purpose is "to maintain . . . security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." If, despite the preparations taken, an armed attack occurs, the right of individual or collective self-defense remains unimpaired until such time as the Security Council has acted to restore peace. Since the United States looks upon encroachment in any part of the Western Hemisphere as a threat to its own security, such reasonable forces as it maintains to defend the hemisphere will be entirely consistent with the spirit of the Charter, irrespective of the size of the contingents which it is to provide under the special agreements. Beyond these various considerations, however, the Council is responsible, as we have seen, for formulating plans for the regulation of armaments, and all member states are obligated not to use "security" as a pretext for aggression. Thus the

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Powers are committed to work both in and out of the Council to avoid an armaments race.

It seems to this writer that the most important aspect of the commitment to supply armed contingents is the unifying effect which the agreements when actually made will have within the Security Council and among the United Nations as a whole. Unanimity within the Council will discourage aggressors more than will the actual military power of the forces subject to its call. And if the Council members are unanimous, the potential military power of the Organization is almost limitless. In such circumstances, the mere fact that the threat of military sanctions exists should give added strength to the Council's less extreme measures.

The Charter provides that the parties to the Moscow Declaration (plus France, which was not a signatory) shall consult with one another and with other members of the United Nations if joint action becomes necessary before the special agreements on military contingents have come into effect. President Truman at Potsdam referred to this provision in urging Generalissimo Stalin to join in suppressing Japan's aggressive war in the Pacific. The Council is not relieved of its responsibility for dealing with matters threatening the peace during the transitional period; but responsibility is also placed squarely upon the Great Powers, because they alone will have the necessary military strength. Indeed, the end of the Pacific war makes it logical for the Great Powers to proceed at once to earmark forces for joint police action. The size and nature of forces thus set aside (over and above the forces assigned to occupy the enemy states) might provide some indication of what forces should be supplied under the special agreements still to be fashioned; and the action in itself would make continued collaboration among the Big Five easier by making it seem more natural. In the final analysis, it is wholly in the interest of the Big Five to induce the Council to assume full and overriding responsibility. Only so will the small and middle states be committed to share in the burden of enforcing peace and security.

IV

The United Nations Organization is not a super-state, but a political institution possessing specified powers and responsibilities established by treaty among sovereign nations. It is not primarily a military agency. It is not an alliance, although the

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explicit commitment of members to work jointly, in conformity with agreed principles and in compliance with specific decisions in certain situations, makes it appear to have some of the features of an alliance. Nor is it a judicial organ, though the principles by which it will be bound include those of justice and international law.

In its early sessions the Security Council will probably be occupied largely with the problems of its own organization. It may be expected to move rapidly to the negotiation of the special agreements under which member states are to supply armed forces, assistance and facilities to the Council. It also should undertake to formulate plans for the regulation of armaments, including the use of scientific inventions. The first session of the General Assembly will probably offer recommendations to the Council for action on various matters relating to peace and security. If the Council shows an ability to deal effectively with the problems which come before it, member states will then be inclined to find solutions among themselves for such disputes as may have developed at this stage, recognizing that the Council would be strong enough to impose a settlement. Success in disposing of the first dispute referred to it would invest the Council with even greater strength to meet new situations.

The Council will be the executive organ of the United Nations. All its members will be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization, and it will function *continuously*. In addition to remaining in regular session, it will hold periodic meetings at which each member may be represented by a cabinet officer or some specially designated official. Presumably foreign ministers will ordinarily attend such meetings; but in certain cases there may be good reason for the presence of prime ministers or heads of governments. The character of the representatives selected by the Great Powers to sit regularly on the Council will have much to do with establishing its prestige. President Truman has set a high standard in naming Mr. Stettinius, not only because he was so closely identified with the successful formulation of the Charter and is personally so well qualified for the task, but also because he has occupied the highest post in the Cabinet.

The Council's influence will also depend in part upon the importance of the situations referred to it by members of the Organization. Here again the Great Powers will give the cue. One of the reasons for the collapse of the League of Nations was the failure to make full use of its facilities. The Conference of Am-

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bassadors in Paris, the Washington Conference of 1921–22, the Naval Conferences at Geneva in 1927 and at London in 1930, and the discussions leading to the non-intervention agreement with respect to the Spanish Civil War, all dealt with problems properly within the purview of a world security organization. Unless the Powers now show a disposition to discuss major current issues within the framework of the Council, the organ which they have labored to establish will atrophy.

The Moscow Declaration of 1943 departed from the traditional practice of exclusiveness in diplomacy and put consultation definitely on a multi-party and continuing basis instead of leaving it to occasional spectacular conferences. The Charter formalized and broadened the commitment. Consultations on security matters may be expected to proceed at short intervals and at many levels. The Potsdam Report stated, in fact, that periodic consultations of the foreign secretaries of the Big Three are to continue and that the newly-established Council of Foreign Ministers would meet regularly.

Consultation among three or more Powers is usually more fruitful than direct interchanges between two foreign offices. Where a Power is in a strong moral position it is likely to enlist quickly the support of other consulting states; and when such a position has been clearly stated and is firmly held by two or more states, the opposition is apt to weaken more quickly than it would in a bilateral negotiation. Furthermore, national suspicions are less likely to be aroused when there are more than two parties to a conversation. For these reasons, unanimity seems more likely to be achieved among the Big Three if Britain and the United States avoid attempting to come to separate and preliminary understandings, notwithstanding the common traditions of the two English-speaking democracies and their strategic interdependence. The chances of arriving at an agreement with Soviet Russia will probably be improved if they are scrupulous to consult simultaneously with her in all matters relating to security.

World attention will focus on the Council's meetings and world opinion will judge its successes and failures. While Council deliberations will not, of course, be open to the press, the results will be made known and Council reports to the Assembly will be published. All this means that the activities of the Council, and of the auxiliary consultations of its permanent members, will come under much more detailed scrutiny and will awaken much

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more pointed comment than would ever happen with the relatively inconspicuous conversations and correspondence of traditional diplomacy. The effect will be to make the governments concerned more responsive to the popular will. San Francisco confirmed the value of negotiating on vital security questions with an awakened world conscience in full play.

It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that the effective development of the Organization will depend very largely on the willingness of the Powers to utilize it for purposes of consultation with one another in *all* matters affecting peace and security. The Charter definitely requires that these problems be considered by the Council, and the unity of the Big Three will be promoted rather than damaged by joint discussions there. The more consultation in the Council the better, even on matters which are not strictly the concern of the Organization.

V

At San Francisco it was frequently argued that the Big Five were trying to limit the power of the middle and small states. The argument had force when the form of the Organization itself was in debate, but it probably will be heard less frequently after the Organization starts to function. Divisions on concrete problems affecting peace and security are unlikely to develop between states on the basis of their size or because the disputants have permanent or elective membership in the Council. The realities of power will in practice reduce differences to their proper proportions. Various middle and small states may seek election to the Security Council because they desire to be the spokesmen for this or that group of members — the Latin American republics, the Arab League, or a western European bloc. Since they will endeavor to gain the support of the Big Five and of other members for the fulfillment of their ambitions, they doubtless will regulate their policies accordingly. But the very fact that many Powers will have to be satisfied will tend to discourage extreme demands and will make agreements easier to reach. A fair rotation of the middle and small powers on the Council is likely.

Similarly with the voting formula, the subject of such intense discussion at San Francisco. Tests in the Council are not likely to take the form of a line-up of the six elected members against the five permanent members. Nor is it easy to visualize a situation in which four of the permanent members and three or more elected members, differing from the fifth permanent member, would per-

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mit the question at issue to come to a vote. The mere fact that such a vote might be forced, however, would exert an impelling influence toward agreement.

A state not represented on the Council cannot be asked to provide armed forces unless it is given an opportunity to participate in the decisions which would put those forces to use. Moreover, any member not permanently represented on the Military Staff Committee must be called in "when the efficient discharge of the Committee's reponsibilities requires the participation" of that member in the Committee's work. Presumably, this means that a state must receive an invitation to sit with the Military Staff Committee whenever its forces, facilities, or other forms of assistance are to be employed. If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state (whether a member of the United Nations or not) which finds itself confronted with special economic problems resulting from these measures, shall have the right to consult the Council about their solution. Such problems are easy to imagine. They might be caused by the imposition of a blockade against a state with which another nation had enjoyed extensive trade relations, or by the grant of the right of passage to United Nations forces across a member state, with consequent dislocations in the economy of that quite innocent state.

The middle and small states are making many concessions in terms of freedom of action. They are doing so, however, with a clear sense of gain. The six elected members of the Security Council will have an opportunity to play a far greater rôle in the discussion, and therefore in the determination of world policy, than they would ever be able to do in other circumstances. The smaller nations are not, in fact, apprehensive of the joint enforcement of security by the Great Powers. The great danger for them lies, not in the likelihood that the Great Powers will act together, but in the possibility that they will fall apart. The wisest of their statesmen perceive this. As Richard Olney wrote: "When great states agree among themselves as to the international relations of other and weaker states, they at the same time put restraint upon themselves. They virtually check the ambition and aggressiveness of all parties to the agreement and thus furnish a guarantee of the propriety and sincerity of their purposes impossible to be furnished by a single state in the same position."[3]

[3] Richard Olney, "The Development of International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, April 1907, quoted by William T. R. Fox in "The Super-Powers," Harcourt, Brace, 1944.

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The ratification of the Charter by the small states will be evidence of their belief in the necessity, from the point of view of their own safety, of preserving the wartime coalition.

If the leaders of the states which do not hold permanent seats on the Security Council are wise, they will make full use of all the educational resources of the General Assembly and will direct their own work in the Council and other United Nations organs toward promoting agreement among the Great Powers. They should avoid forms of debate and tactics which would tend to sharpen the differences among the Great Powers on vital issues. It ought to be possible for them to pursue this objective without in any way renouncing their valuable right of freedom of discussion, and to promote, at the same time, an ever widening acceptance of those standards of international behavior which carry the best promise of a lasting peace.

The reasonable conclusion from the foregoing is that the Security Council is a political mechanism of great promise. If the Great Powers decide to make full use of it, and if they and the other members conduct their negotiations there and in the General Assembly sincerely and with a decent respect for world opinion, it will be able to promote unity within the United Nations and thereby contribute substantially to world stability in general and American security in particular. The prestige and power of the Council will directly depend, it should be stressed again, upon the degree to which that sense of unity is achieved. The Big Five demonstrated in San Francisco the effectiveness of multilateral consultation. The world's longing for peace, the evident dangers of another war, were enough to ensure that, once Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union had been placed in a position of joint negotiation among themselves and with the other states of the United Nations, their conflicting minor interests would give way to their overwhelmingly important mutual interest. Is it an exaggeration to say that since that Conference ended we have received evidence that the danger is a thousand times greater than we at that time supposed? If, impelled by this realization, the Great Powers do in fact set their faces in the direction of sincere consultation, the Security Council will become an effective instrument for peace.

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AMERICA AT WAR

Victory in the Pacific

By Hanson W. Baldwin

AUGUST 6, 1945, will remain forever a milestone in human annals. On that date the world's first atomic fission bomb was dropped upon Japan. The action may have been necessary for the purpose of saving American lives. But it was not merely another episode in the long history of man's inhumanity to man; and it was even more portentous than the final victory over Japan which quickly followed. For it marked the first harnessing of the sun's power on a large scale, with all the untold consequences for good and evil implicit in the achievement. The new chapter may end in man's reversion to a troglodyte, or it may lead to the establishment of a world brotherhood in which the forces of nature, including man's own passions, are harnessed to the common good.

II

The war against Japan reached its end as suddenly as it had begun, months before most of our military leaders had dared to hope for it. The surprise ending was a consequence of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and of Russia's eleventh-hour entry into the conflict, but it was also a result of our previous sweeping victories in the Pacific. Even before August 6, Japan was hopelessly beaten. The only unresolved question was whether she would continue a futile struggle and make us pay still further in lives and time, or whether her leaders would accept the inevitable and bow in defeat. The atomic bomb speeded their decision; but the strategic situation in the Pacific, especially our capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which unlocked the gateways to Japan, was a decisive factor. Significantly, the first Japanese peace overtures were made to Russia about the time the campaign on Okinawa ended.

The conquest of Okinawa was one of the most dearly-bought of American triumphs. It was not only a land victory, but the greatest and most protracted battle of ships against planes in history. The campaign started well. One Army and one Marine Corps, organized as the Tenth Army under Lieutenant-General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., landed virtually unopposed on the western

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"waist" of Okinawa on April 1. The Marines turned north and quickly mopped up their sector of the island, but the Army divisions encountered major resistance along the so-called Naha-Shuri line. This fortified line extended across the island north of the capital, Naha, and took advantage of the ramparts of the ancient castle of Shuri and of all defensive features of the terrain. The assault bogged down to a fierce step-by-step advance which cost us heavy casualties.

The Japanese strategy then became apparent. Our troops on the island were struggling against a fanatic enemy, in hilly, difficult country, amidst, at times, torrential rains. The Japanese *Kamikaze*, or suicide fliers, who had made their first appearance in force in the Philippine campaign, now attacked our fleet, which was supporting our beachhead. Day after day and night after night, the enemy threw his air power against our sea power. The significance of this struggle largely escaped the American people; but it actually counted for more in settling the fate of Okinawa, and eventually of Japan, than did the fighting on land. Our ships were the key to our operations in the Pacific. They maintained the indispensable supply link which enabled the ground soldiers to operate. The support of naval aircraft from carrier decks, of naval gunfire and of naval landing craft was essential to victory.

The fleet was committed to action in a restricted area within easy reach of the enemy's land bases. The Japanese always knew where to find it, because — if it were to fulfill its mission — it had to be in close proximity to the American-held portion of Okinawa. The resulting struggle between our "C.A.P." (combat air patrol) and our surface ships and the Japanese *Kamikaze* fliers went on, in some periods continuously, for almost three months. In a single day the Japanese made hundreds of attacks, of which our radar picket line of light craft bore the brunt. Hundreds of Japanese planes were shot down. Many of our destroyers were sunk or damaged, and some larger ships were also put out of action. Significantly, in the Okinawa campaign more men were killed in the Navy than in the Army or the Marine Corps. Indeed, Okinawa was the most expensive single campaign in our naval history. When the smoke had cleared, however, it was seen that "the fleet that came to stay" had defeated the suicide fliers. In retrospect, it is apparent that a decision in the whole struggle against Japan had been reached.

The fighting on the island itself proved to be no less exacting. The Naha-Shuri line was one of the best-defended positions that

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

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American troops have been called on to attack in this war. The Japanese fought with tenacity and skill. The Third Marine Amphibious Corps, after mopping up the northern part of the island, wheeled into line beside the Twenty-fourth (Army) Corps, so that at times four and five divisions were attacking the enemy simultaneously. Even with this addition to our strength the going continued hard and costly. Near the end of the campaign, the 8th Marine Regimental combat team — fresh troops of the 2nd Marine Division — "sparked" the final clean-up. The island was declared to be securely in our hands on June 21. Enemy casualties were estimated at 118,000, including some 10,000 prisoners. Our own casualties were heavy: Army, 3,761 killed, 14,415 wounded, and 236 missing; Navy, 4,907 killed and missing, 4,824 wounded; Marines, 2,573 killed and missing, 12,565 wounded.[1]

The Okinawa campaign was fought soundly, if not brilliantly. We made some mistakes. Our original intelligence estimates of enemy strength were too low. After the success of our early landings, the 2nd Marine Division, which had been in floating reserve, was sent back to rear area bases, and none of its elements was used until the final phase. No attempt was made to outflank the enemy by sea, admittedly a difficult operation. Finally, our tanks — as in Europe — were not sufficiently armored and in some instances were not well handled.[2]

The loss of Okinawa persuaded the Japanese to make their first definite peace approaches, through Moscow. Had the war continued, the island would have proved, in our hands, the key to the Japanese main islands.

During and after the fighting on Okinawa we continued our large-scale mopping-up operations in the Philippines. Troops of the Sixth Army (General Walter Krueger) and the Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Robert L. Eichelberger) attacked the Japanese positions in Luzon and concentrations in the jungles of Mindanao. After the enemy was routed out of an intricate system of caves astride the Manila water supply region, the principal fighting on Luzon took place in the Cagayan Valley and the surrounding rugged hills. Here, the Japanese commander-in-chief in the Philippines, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, made his last

[1] The Army figures to July 7; Navy and Marine figures as of the end of the campaign.

[2] On the eve of victory, General Buckner, the Tenth Army commander, was killed by an enemy shell. Lieutenant-General Roy S. Geiger, commanding the Third Marine Amphibious Corps, assumed command for a short period. Then after the island had been declared secure, General Joseph W. Stilwell, former American commander in the China-Burma-India theater, and subsequently commander of the Army Ground Forces, took over.

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stand with a sizeable body of troops. On Mindanao, the fighting in uncharted jungles dragged on well into the summer.

By July 5, however, General Douglas MacArthur was able to announce that the "Philippine Islands are now liberated and the . . . campaigns can be regarded as virtually closed." He estimated that the enemy had employed the equivalent of 23 divisions, and that about 450,000 Japanese had been killed, captured or dispersed. These figures are far higher than the estimates of Japanese strength in the Philippines made before the invasion began, and they probably include Filipino collaborationists. Though we employed only 17 divisions in the campaign, we always were able to oppose superior forces to the enemy because the Japanese were scattered throughout the archipelago; further, our naval and air superiority gave us additional mobility and power. American Army casualties for the entire campaign up to July 7 were 12,035 killed, 1,196 missing and 46,425 wounded. These do not include Navy or Marine casualties. As the war closed, the 38th Division was still mopping up the enemy in the watershed area east of Manila; the 32nd was still tracking down the enemy in the hills of northern Luzon; and the 31st was operating in Mindanao.

The Philippines campaign was the greatest single land campaign of the Pacific. Our casualties, however, were remarkably light. As in the case of our other Pacific victories, our success depended upon our control of the sea; our sea power made our victory certain. On the whole, the campaign was well led and well fought.

Once the issue had been decided in the Philippines, the invasion of Borneo was begun at Tarakan, Balik Papan and Brunei Bay. Australian troops under General MacArthur's command conducted these operations with American naval and air support. They were quickly successful, and by the time the war ended the oil of Borneo was being exploited for Allied use — a factor that would soon have simplified our supply problem.

III

Simultaneously with these great land operations, great naval and air campaigns were under way against Japan proper. The attack was launched on July 10 by the Third Fleet, under Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., and was interrupted only by the end of the war. So sustained and so effective was this attack that it broke all precedents in the annals of naval war. First the area of the

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Tokyo plain was hit by planes. On July 14 this blow was followed by another against northern Honshu and by the first surface-ship bombardment of the main Japanese islands. Then, in quick succession — sometimes with intervals of only one day — the Fleet struck again and again with planes and with the guns of surface ships against widely separated objectives on Hokkaido and Honshu.

The American sea forces thus engaged comprised nine battleships, 16 carriers, 19 cruisers and 62 destroyers. This tremendous sea force was reënforced on July 17 by one British battleship, four British carriers, six British cruisers and 17 British destroyers. The combined fleets put some 1,500 planes into the air. During the 37 days the operations lasted, the ships never once dropped anchor and practically never stopped their engines. They were refueled, re-ammunitioned, and resupplied at sea by the greatest service force of tankers, ammunition ships and supply ships the world has ever seen.

In the last two-and-a-half months of the war (including those epic final 37 days) the Third Fleet wreaked almost incredible destruction in its various attacks on Japan proper as well as on islands in the Okinawa area and on outlying Japanese bases. The enemy offered very light resistance in the air. This was in part the result of a shortage of gasoline, spare parts and trained pilots, in part of a deliberate attempt to conserve planes against the day of our expected invasion. Only an estimated 290 enemy planes were shot down in combat; but more than 1,300 were destroyed on the ground, and another 1,300 were damaged. In all, 48 enemy warships, ranging in size from battleships to landing craft, were sunk and 100 more were damaged. An estimated 529 merchant vessels of all sizes from big freighters to coastal luggers were sunk and almost 1,000 damaged. Major destruction was visited upon factories, industrial areas and airfields. Even if allowance is made for exuberant exaggeration, these figures still are startling; they show how weak Japan really was in the last phase of the war. Japanese ineffectiveness becomes particularly clear when these losses are measured against our own extremely light ones. In the final five weeks, not a single ship of the Third Fleet was sunk, and only one was lightly damaged.[3]

[3] On July 30, however, the heavy cruiser *Indianapolis* was sunk, apparently by a Japanese submarine or mine. The ship was not then attached to the Third Fleet but was near Peleliu, far from the coast of Japan. This final naval tragedy of the war was one of the most costly on record: there were only 315 survivors from a crew of 1,196, and all of these were wounded or near death from days in the water.

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But for men of the United States Navy on every sea the peak of satisfaction was derived from the great two-day raids made by Halsey's carriers against Japan's naval dockyards on the Inland Sea in late July. These raids sank or damaged about 20 Japanese men-of-war and left the remnants of the Japanese Fleet broken and burning. When the smoke cleared away, the Japanese Navy had perhaps one battleship, the *Nagato*, still afloat but damaged, two aircraft carriers still afloat but damaged, and a handful of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Such was the end, in the Inland Sea, far from open water, of what had once been the world's third largest fleet. Pearl Harbor was avenged.

While the Third Fleet was continuing to strike Japan with all its tremendous power, small surface units and planes several times reconnoitered and attacked the Kurile Islands north of Japan and even penetrated into the Sea of Okhotsk. Further south in the Pacific, the enemy-held islands which had been by-passed were attacked regularly by air and occasionally by sea. These attacks kept them thoroughly neutralized, and at the last some of the enemy garrisons — notably that on Wake — began to run short of food.

In addition to these great undertakings, the Navy's Fleet Air Wings, aided by submarines, instituted far-flung blockade operations which in the final phases of the war penetrated the Sea of Japan. Land planes and flying boats, operating from the Ryukyus and the Marianas, swept the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea practically clean of enemy shipping. They made long patrols daily over the coast of China from Formosa to Tsushima, and even penetrated inland and attacked Japanese land communications on the Asiatic mainland. Most important in the blockade, however, was the partial severance of the enemy's lifeline across the Straits of Tsushima. Probably the route was never completely closed, but the waters became hazardous for enemy shipping.

The blockade was aided greatly by the laying of mines, chiefly by the B-29 Superfortresses of the Twentieth Air Force. The Navy planned this campaign, furnished the mines and trained the Twentieth Air Force in their use. Beginning in the spring of 1945, the big bombers laid mines regularly — even in the Inland Sea and Korean ports. In all, more than 12,000 mines were laid in 45 different areas. It was probably the greatest aerial minelaying operation in the history of war.

But perhaps the most effective operations of the last months of the war — certainly the most spectacular — were the great

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assaults upon Japanese cities conducted by our giant Superfortresses based in the Marianas. Between November 24, 1944, and the end of hostilities the B-29's flew 32,612 sorties in 318 missions and dropped 169,421 tons of bombs and mines on about 64 Japanese urban industrial areas, 85 industrial plants, 102 airfields, one railway yard, and various harbor and coastal areas. The first attacks, made at extremely high altitudes with high explosive bombs, were not particularly successful. Major-General Curtis E. LeMay, probably the foremost bomber commander of this war, then sent his planes in at startlingly low levels — 5,000 to 10,000 feet — using jellied petroleum incendiary bombs. These attacks burned out an estimated 158 square miles of Japanese cities and left an estimated 8,480,000 persons homeless or dead. Tokyo, attacked six times in massive fire raids, was more than 50 percent destroyed, and an average of 39.5 percent of all cities attacked were burned out.[4] These massive attacks cost us (from November 24, 1944) a total of 437 combat losses of the B-29's; probably a greater number were lost from operational accidents. The toll in men was 3,267. About 600 men were picked up by rescue planes or naval vessels.

These tremendous strategic air assaults, which were intended to soften up the enemy, would have been greatly intensified after Lieutenant-General James H. Doolittle's Eighth Air Force of Superfortresses, based on Okinawa, joined in the attack. The Eighth Air Force, redeployed at least in name from Europe, was about ready to start operations when the war ended. After the capture of Okinawa, the strategical bombing of the "heavies" was complemented by tactical attacks upon Japanese cities, docks, industries and communications by elements of the Fifth, Seventh and Thirteenth Air Forces, all part of the Far East Air Forces of General George C. Kenney, General MacArthur's air commander. These strikes, too, had still to reach their peak when the war ended.

Japan, then, was subjected during June, July and early August to the gathering might of one of the most tremendous air assaults ever launched against a nation — strategic mass attacks by the B-29's and tactical attacks upon specific targets by carrier aircraft of the Fleet and by the land-based fighters, medium bombers, and four-engined "light-heavies" based on Okinawa and Iwo,

[4] These figures are preliminary estimates made from photo-interpretation, and are subject to later revision. On August 23, the Japanese radio estimated that 260,000 persons had been killed, 412,000 injured and 9,200,000 made homeless by all our air attacks, including the Navy's carrier-based strikes and our atomic bombing.

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plus the blockade operations by the Navy's Fleet Air Wings and aerial mining. There is no doubt that even by the middle of July Japan was in a much weakened state. Her air and maritime power were dwindling and some of her raw material shortages were becoming serious.

To Japan's other troubles were added major troubles in China and southeast Asia. Early in the summer it became apparent that the British Southeast Asia Command was preparing (with considerable American supply help and some staff assistance) an assault upon Malaya as soon as the monsoon season was over, with Singapore as the objective. In the spring the Japanese had been forced to begin withdrawing men from parts of China in order to provide more troops for their "inner defense zone" — the main Japanese islands, Korea, Manchuria and north China. This movement now became pronounced. China's fighting strength meanwhile increased steadily as supplies poured in by air "over the Hump" and by the Stilwell Road. The Chinese Combat Command, reorganized by Lieutenant-General Albert C. Wedemeyer after General Stilwell's departure, trained, stiffened and greatly aided the Chinese troops. By the summer of 1945, perhaps 15 to 20 Chinese divisions were equipped with all types of arms up to and including artillery, though not with tanks, and an equal or greater number were partially equipped.[5] The Chinese-American composite wings of the Air Force, largely manned by Chinese trained in the United States, were also functioning well. Meanwhile, American air power in China was being reorganized and strengthened, though the old veteran, Major-General Claire L. Chennault, resigned just before the end. Until the summer of 1945, most of the battle "victories" won in China were actually the result of deliberate Japanese withdrawals. Only then did our prodigious efforts to supply China commence to bring their reward. But the full reward was not to be reaped.

IV

Such was the general situation in the Pacific when the representatives of the three Great Powers met at Potsdam toward the middle of July. The carrier strikes and air assaults had revealed Japan's great air and naval weaknesses. Strategically, she knew that far, far worse was yet to come, as our air power slowly switched its major attention to her land communications and prepared the way for invasion. She had already indicated her

[5] Chinese divisions vary in size, but usually are less than half as large as an American division.

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awareness that the struggle was hopeless by approaching Soviet Russia in June and, in effect, asking her to mediate. This move came to nothing. The Potsdam Conference opened with Japan strategically defeated but still capable of prolonged resistance (particularly by her land forces) and still able to inflict heavy casualties upon us.

At the Teheran Conference, Marshal Stalin, questioned by President Roosevelt, had indicated his intention of entering the Pacific war. At Yalta, President Roosevelt had raised the question again, and Stalin had agreed (though probably not in writing) to enter the Pacific war either "within" or "about" (the exact phrasing is not known publicly) three months after V-E Day. Stalin is said to have wanted this interval for the redeployment of 30 divisions and their supplies [6] from Europe to Siberia; certainly three months was a minimum for the proper handling of the major supply problem this would have involved.

Much of the first part of the Potsdam Conference was occupied by a discussion of the Pacific war and the question of Russia's potential entry into it. President Truman, following his predecessor's policies, pressed Russia to set a definite date. Probably he hoped that Russia would sign the Potsdam Declaration, subsequently signed by Britain, China and the United States, outlining the acceptable terms for Japan's surrender. In this observer's opinion, it was a major diplomatic mistake to have stuck to the policies adopted in this connection at Teheran and Yalta. The circumstances at the time of the Potsdam Conference were entirely different. The war against Japan had been strategically won, and it was certain that Russia would enter it without urging on our part. We should have refrained from asking her to come into the Pacific war, simply showing that we considered the decision hers to make, in the light of her own interests.

In any case, Premier Stalin declined to declare war on Japan during the Potsdam Conference. Just prior to Potsdam he had been consulting with Premier Soong of China about Russian-Chinese problems, and he made clear that he wished another meeting with Soong before beginning operations. Tentatively, he set August 15 as the date for the Soviet entry into the war in the Far East. While these deliberations were in progress the great strike of our Third Fleet against Japan began. The tempo of the B-29 attacks was stepped up. Presently — something new in

[6] It is believed that Soviet Russia's Far Eastern Armies in the short-lived campaign consisted of about 60 divisions.

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warfare — General LeMay announced to the enemy the names of their cities which would be bombed forthwith.

In the midst of these developments, President Truman received word of the successful test of our first atomic fission bomb experiment in the New Mexico desert — the product of years of combined scientific effort of several nations and of the expenditure of two billion dollars. Apparently he realized the full significance of this event, for the intense effort to persuade the Soviets to declare war quickly was then abandoned. Stalin was told that we had developed a new and terrific explosive; but he seems at first not to have comprehended the import of the disclosure. The Potsdam Declaration, outlining the meaning of unconditional surrender for Japan, was then published, without Stalin's signature.

On August 6, while President Truman was on his way back to the United States, the first atomic fission bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. On August 8, exactly three months after V-E Day, but one week before the date set at Potsdam, Russia entered the war. On August 9, a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. On August 10, Japan indicated her willingness to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The exact degree of destruction wrought by the atomic bombs can be determined only by inspection on the spot.[7] Probably, however, most of both cities was destroyed. The effect on morale was of course tremendous, and Russia's declaration of war compounded it. The hopelessness of Japan's position was now even more painfully obvious to the Japanese Government.

There followed a period of limited operations and exchanges of messages. On August 14, United States time (August 15, Japanese time), the United States and British Governments announced that Japan had accepted the Potsdam terms, with the understanding that the Emperor would be left on the throne, though subordinate to the orders of the Allied commander-in-chief of the forces of occupation. General Douglas MacArthur was appointed commander-in-chief for the Allied Nations to receive the surrender and to direct the occupying forces. In the following period our first occupation forces entered Japan and surrender terms were arranged. These finally were signed on September 2 aboard the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay. Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz signed for the United States.

[7] The Japanese radio declared that 60,000 persons were killed, 100,000 wounded and 200,000 made homeless in Hiroshima; and that 10,000 were killed, 20,000 wounded and 90,000 made homeless in Nagasaki.

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V

The forces that won victory in the Pacific need no accolade beyond that which they will receive from history, and it is still too early to identify their component parts completely. The principal units, with the names of their commanders, were:

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
AND ALL NAVAL AND MARINE FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

Fleet Marine Force	Lieutenant-General Roy S. Geiger
Third Marine Amphibious Corps	Major-General Keller E. Rockey
Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps	Lieutenant-General Harry Schmidt

Marine Divisions

First	Major-General De Witt Peck
Second	Major-General LeRoy P. Hunt
Third	Major-General Graves B. Erskine
Fourth	Major-General Clifton B. Cates
Fifth	Major-General Thomas E. Bourke
Sixth	Major-General Lemuel C. Shepherd

U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

General Douglas MacArthur

Armies

Sixth Army	General Walter Krueger
Eighth Army	Lieutenant-General Robert L. Eichelberger
Tenth Army	General Joseph W. Stilwell

Army Corps

First	Major-General Innis P. Swift
Tenth	Major-General Franklin C. Sibert
Eleventh	Major-General Charles P. Hall
Fourteenth	Lieutenant-General Oscar W. Griswold
Twenty-fourth	Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge

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Airborne Division

Eleventh	Major-General Joseph M. Swing

Infantry Divisions

Americal	Major-General William H. Arnold
First Cavalry (on foot)	Major-General William C. Chase
Sixth	Major-General Charles E. Hurdis
Seventh	Major-General Archibald V. Arnold
Twenty-fourth	Major-General Roscoe B. Woodruff
Twenty-fifth	Major-General Charles L. Mullins, Jr.
Twenty-seventh	Major-General George W. Griner, Jr.
Thirty-first	Major-General Clarence A. Martin
Thirty-second	Major-General William H. Gill
Thirty-third	Major-General Percy W. Clarkson
Thirty-seventh	Major-General Robert S. Beightler
Thirty-eighth	Major-General Frederick A. Irving
Fortieth	Major-General Rapp Brush
Forty-first	Major-General Jens A. Doe
Forty-third	Major-General Leonard F. Wing
Seventy-seventh	Major-General Andrew D. Bruce
Eighty-first	Major-General Paul Mueller
Ninety-third	Major-General Harry H. Johnson
Ninety-sixth	Major-General James L. Bradley

AIR FORCES

U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces	General Carl Spaatz
Twentieth Air Force	Lieutenant-General Nathan F. Twining
Eighth Air Force	Lieutenant-General James H. Doolittle
Far East Air Forces	General George C. Kenney
Fifth Air Force	Lieutenant-General Ennis C. Whitehead
Seventh Air Force	Brigadier-General Thomas D. White
Thirteenth Air Force	Major-General Paul Wurtsmith
Eleventh Air Force	Major-General John B. Brooks

CHINA THEATRE

U. S. Army Forces, China Theater	Lieutenant-General Albert C. Wedemeyer

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U. S. Army Air Forces, China Theater
Tenth . . . . . Major-General Howard C. Davidson
Fourteenth . . . . . Major-General Charles B. Stone, III

VI

Japan's surrender marked probably the first time in history that a great nation had capitulated before an invading soldier had set foot upon her home soil. As a matter of fact, however, our plans for the actual invasion were well advanced and were being pressed to completion. Our "target date" for the invasion of Kyushu was November 1, and the Tokyo plain area was to be invaded March 1, 1946 (though of course these dates were subject to postponement of a few weeks in case of supply difficulties). Japan's unexpectedly quick collapse saved many lives. But the continuing belligerent actions and unrepentant declarations of the Japanese continued after August 10 and were a cause for much disquiet. Some observers felt that, from the political and psychological points of view, the war had ended too soon. The bulk of the Japanese Army was still unbeaten; the Potsdam terms accorded Japan a "softer" peace than we had given Germany; and we had temporized with the Emperor, the fountainhead of the whole militaristic-feudalistic system in Japan. The enemy made it clear in the interval between August 10 and final surrender that he was doing his best to perpetuate that system, and that even though this war had been lost he had hopes for a comeback and was resolved to try to make it. If we allow this trend to continue after we enter Japan, we shall have saved some lives now only to spend more lives later in another war in the Pacific.

The introduction of the atomic bomb dwarfs in importance even the end of almost six years of global warfare. We have entered a new technological age. The harnessing of atomic energy carries implications too vast to be comprehended fully as yet, or to be discussed as yet in detail. Suffice it to say that, strategically and militarily, as well as economically and politically, the world we live in has changed fundamentally.

The greatest war in which the United States ever fought came to an end as suddenly as it began, and with stunning surprise. It had cost us over a million casualties — dead, missing and wounded — and 300 billion dollars in money. But it left the United States incomparably the world's most powerful nation — with or without the atomic bomb. Upon American shoulders lies the terrible responsibility of that power.

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FLYING BOMBS AND ROCKETS

This Time and Next

By Nigel Tangye

THIRTY-FIVE years ago the English Channel had not yet been crossed by air. Now the crossing of the Atlantic by airplanes is a commonplace. One of this war's sensations was the cross-Channel bombardment of England by flying bombs and rockets. If there is another world war, will the transatlantic flight of bomb and rockets become a commonplace also? There is every reason to believe so. The technical problems involved are not so great as those which had to be overcome by the men who invented and perfected the airplane. A few years from now it probably will have become technically possible to bombard the United States from European bases, and vice versa. And the nature of the bombs so carried may be, as we now have had confirmed to us, terrible beyond any previous imagining.

Both British and Americans have a tendency to hide their concern over some unexpected move on the part of an enemy by scoffing at it. The flying bomb, or V1, was at first greeted in Britain as a great joke. *Flight*, one of the leading British aeronautical journals, commented on June 29, 1944, 16 days after the attack had begun: "One would have to search diligently through the records of warfare to find a more telling case of substituting futility and propaganda for true military measures than the recent employment of the air torpedo." That scoffing attitude was dangerous then. We should be putting ourselves in extreme peril if we persisted in taking the same sort of attitude toward the future development of these and other new weapons.

The fact is that V1 gave the Nazis real and substantial military gains. At a time when the Allies were engaged in the mightiest military undertaking the world had ever known — the invasion of the Continent — the British, aided generously and indispensably by the Americans, had to deploy large forces for the direct and indirect protection of London. Several squadrons of fighters had to be drawn away from the operations on the Continent in order to cope with V1. In the period of greatest activity, at least 30 fighters were constantly in the air, around the clock. A belt of heavy and light antiaircraft guns 20 miles deep was set up; and, as a final obstacle, as many as 2,000 balloons were put to

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use. To provide communications for this force, 5,000 miles of telephone cables had to be laid and a fleet of 3,000 vehicles was employed continuously. This tremendous defensive expenditure was made at a time when our full force should have been concentrated on the offensive.

Moreover, for nine months before the V1 attack began, and during all the time it lasted, the Allied Air Forces were engaged in reconnoitering and bombing German experimental stations as far east as Peenemünde, as well as the hundred and more launching sites which the Germans were constructing on the Continent. This involved a tremendous diversion of photo reconnaissance and photo interpretation effort, besides imposing a heavy strain on our intelligence services. Hitler's most substantial gain, however, lay in the extent to which the Allies were forced to divert their bombing efforts from German homeland targets in order to concentrate on the cleverly camouflaged launching sites set up in the French countryside. More than 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped in the effort to knock out these sites, and in these operations 450 British and American aircraft were lost.

Thus even if the flying bomb offensive had failed to register hits on important objectives, Germany would have found it militarily worth while. And, in fact, it did inflict substantial damage on London and throughout southern England. In a period of 80 days and nights, the V1 damaged nearly a million houses and caused thousands of casualties. In the last 12 months of the war, three million Londoners had their homes destroyed or damaged (an estimate which presupposes only three people to each home).

There is reason to believe, however, that the Germans expected a very much greater proportion of their missiles to get through the defenses than actually did so. During the early summer they had staged an experimental operation before high officers of the German Air Staff (Milch was reputed to have been present) at Vicenza, in northern Italy, in the course of which 20 fighters, including one captured Spitfire, endeavored to shoot down flying bombs. The results led the German Air Staff to believe that we could bring down only 10 percent of their bombs in actual operations. And, indeed, there were good grounds for this conclusion. The V1 travelled at 350 miles an hour and it generally flew at a height of 2,000 to 3,000 feet. This height was far below the rated altitude of fighters, and the flying bomb was difficult to see from above. With its 1,870-pound warhead, moreover, it was an extremely dangerous target for a pilot to shoot at. In addition, since

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it flew so low and so fast, it presented great problems to the AA predicators as developed at the time.

Fortunately, the estimate of the Germans proved over-optimistic. Although they increased the difficulties of the defense by sending the bombs over when weather conditions were favorable, *i.e.* when there were low clouds, 33 percent of the missiles were destroyed in the first week. By dint of great efforts, the defenders increased this figure until on August 28 they brought down no less than 97 out of 101 flying bombs. Much credit for this was due to the magical development in AA fire during the period, and to the invaluable practical and technical assistance given by American AA units. In the first week that the AA batteries were deployed, they shot down 17 percent of the bombs; in the last week this figure had risen to 74 percent. The American gunners brought with them a new technique which the British were not slow to admit was better than their own.

Londoners are particularly grateful for the aid given by American flying and ground units in what was, from one point of view, a "domestic" operation. The author may perhaps be permitted to record that during the summer he was on occasion engaged in photographing the flying bomb sites from high altitude. Being a Londoner, he felt a most acute interest in his work. He never failed to be moved by the sight of American comrades setting out on the same task with no other motive than duty willingly undertaken in furtherance of the common cause.

The V1 carried 1,870 pounds of explosive a distance of 150 miles at a speed of 350 miles an hour. There was nothing startlingly unexpected about this. Even during the First World War the idea of a crewless airplane carrying explosives had appealed to the imagination of strategists, and for years subsequently inventors had been trying to produce one. They had been unable, however, to solve the fundamental problem of designing a craft simple enough to be put into comparatively large-scale production.

After the defeat of the Luftwaffe in 1940, Germany's need for a long-range weapon to bombard London became so acute that great pressure was put on German scientists and manufacturers; and in the end they succeeded in producing the desired simplification of the power unit. They discarded the orthodox reciprocating gasoline engine containing a large number of precision-made parts and in its place devised an entirely new form of simple reaction-propulsion unit, developing some 600 horsepower. The unit consists of a welded steel tube 11 feet, 3 inches, long,

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mounted above the rear of the fuselage. Fuel is fed to the engine from a tank in the fuselage, by means of air from compressed air bottles, through a pipe in the forward supporting strut of the propulsion unit. This article does not pretend to go into mechanical detail. Suffice it to say that this engine has about one quarter of the weight of an equivalent gasoline reciprocating motor; but its fuel consumption is eight times greater.

The overall length of the flying bomb is slightly more than 24 feet and the wing span 17 feet, 6 inches. Its loaded weight (with 130 gallons of gasoline) is 4,700 pounds. Once in flight, it is controlled by four gyroscopes which govern direction and pitch, while an aneroid barometer operating to a pre-set figure governs height. Only some 3 percent of the bombs launched were fitted with radio transmitters. The course of these could be plotted by means of direction-finding receivers. Forecasts which had been made as to the velocity and direction of the wind could then be checked, and bombs launched subsequently could be more accurately directed. The range was controlled by an air-log driven by a small air-screw which was revolved by an air stream. When the set distance was reached, the air-log, by means of an electrical impulse, automatically exploded the detonators attached to the tailplane; two tabs were forced into a down position and the flying bomb was thrown suddenly into an almost vertical dive. The engine would then cut out.

By destroying a hundred or more launching sites, the Allied bombing operations delayed for many months the beginning of the V1 offensive against London. These sites were being built on fairly solid lines. As a result of the bombing, the Germans evolved a launching ramp that could be erected in a little more than a week and which lent itself to camouflage. It was from these modified sites that the flying bombs were finally launched against England and also against our lines of communication behind the western front. The ramp is nothing more than a catapult driven by compressed air. The bomb is assembled in nearby sheds, and is hoisted onto the catapult by a derrick. The controls are then pre-set and the propulsion unit started up. The catapult carrier, on which the bomb rests, is then carried up the ramp at a fierce rate of acceleration. The minimum powered flying speed of a missile is 170 miles an hour, so that the launching speed is extremely high. At the end of the ramp the flying bomb instantly detaches itself and climbs at a gentle rate to its operating height of from 2,000 to 3,000 feet.

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II

Hardly had the Londoner recovered his breath from intensive bombardment by flying bombs than the threatened long-range rockets, the V2, started to arrive. There also continued to be a bombardment by flying bombs launched from airplanes, but it proceeded on such a reduced scale that, everything being judged comparatively in this world, Londoners barely noticed them. V2 was something new, something with added devilment. It betrayed no sign of its approach, but simply arrived from nowhere and exploded with even worse results than V1.

Although rockets in various elementary forms have been used spasmodically in warfare for hundreds of years, they did not come into favor on any considerable scale until the present war, when the Russians began to fire them from aircraft against ground targets. They have since been used extensively by aircraft in all theaters and they have yielded large dividends in tactical operations. But rockets fired from aircraft have little in common with the giant V2 rockets which the Germans so skillfully developed. V2 is the outcome of at least 20 years of extensive German experimentation with all forms of rocket propulsion. It is not clear at the time of writing when the Germans concentrated on the production of this long-range weapon, but it would seem to have been about 1942.

The V2 rocket is a streamlined projectile 46 feet long, 5 feet, 6 inches, in diameter, with a sharply pointed nose. It carries at the rear four large external stabilizing fins at right angles to each other. It has an explosive warhead of 2,000 pounds in the nose; and when it is filled with fuel the whole rocket weighs about 12 tons. The fuel is carried in two large aluminum tanks, one holding 7,500 pounds of alcohol, the other 11,000 pounds of liquid oxygen. Since, therefore, the rocket does not depend upon external air for combustion, it can operate equally well at low or extremely high altitudes. In actual fact, its flight carries it to a height of 60 miles above the earth's surface.

V2 is considerably more complicated in design and manufacture than the flying bomb. Its radius of destruction is comparable, but it is apt to cause more casualties, since it gives not even a half second of warning before the actual explosion. This is because it falls at a speed greater than sound travels; one hears the tremendous rumbling roar of its headlong rush through the air only after the explosion has occurred.

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The launching and operation of V2 are simple. The rocket is placed in a vertical position on a concrete platform or hard surface. A flat road is suitable. Within the rocket is a turbine, driven by superheated steam produced by mixing very concentrated hydrogen peroxide with calcium permanganate solution. This mixture is ignited electrically from a distance, whereupon the rocket takes off. Throughout the flight the turbine drives the pumps which force the liquid oxygen and alcohol into the combustion chamber. The products of combustion are forced out at a high speed through the orifice in the rear end of the venturi as a jet of very high gases. One set of control vanes is in the path of this jet stream. The other is fitted externally on the edges of the stabilizing fins. The rocket starts climbing vertically, but a gyroscope control within the projectile comes into play to operate the control vanes, and this causes the rocket to curve away from the vertical toward the target. The combustion of the gases and their ejection through the venturi creates a thrust of about 26 tons. It is this which propels the rocket forward.

When the fuel is exhausted, V2 is pointing upward at about 45 degrees and is travelling at a speed of about 3,000 miles per hour. It continues upward, following the same path that would be taken by a shell fired at this angle. The maximum range at present is 220 miles. If the target is within that range, the fuel is automatically cut off at the appropriate moment. Descending through the atmosphere from a height of 60 miles, the projectile is slowed down by the resistance of the air to about 1,600 miles per hour; and at the same time it becomes heated by friction to such an extent that it has been observed glowing a dull red. Sometimes the overheating results in a premature explosion in the air.

No one can deny that V2 is a most remarkable technical achievement. In its development the Germans had to find a solution to two hitherto insurmountable problems. The weapon would have been of little value if its construction had involved the use of rare metals; and considering the high temperatures and pressures involved, this might well have been the case. Since the jet is the part which has to bear the highest temperature, the Germans contained in it a liquid-cooled jacket of mild steel. The second big problem was to provide adequate directional control. The stabilizing surfaces are gyro-controlled and, as previously mentioned, one of the two sets of surfaces is placed in the jet stream itself. In this way the rocket can be controlled immediately the jet stream is ejected. It is this device which enables

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the rocket to take off from the simplest of bases. A half dozen lorries can hold all the equipment necessary for launching.

The only possible form of defensive action against the rockets was for fighter bombers to attack their bases, storage depots and lines of supply. A V2 base is such a mobile affair that it was extremely difficult to spot. When intelligence provided information on the storage depots nearby, however, attacks on these could interrupt the flow of supplies. A number of ways were developed by which a V2 base could be plotted and placed within a comparatively small area. Attacks on bridges, railroads and transport would then help to isolate that area and disrupt the supply line from the factory to the operating base. In the end, the sites near The Hague were completely cut off from the supply area; but this was possible only because of the close proximity of our armies to the firing area in the final stages.

London was only just within range of the robot bombs fired from the nearest enemy territory. This meant that the V2 bases operating against London were close to the front line, which simplified the task of our fighter bombers. In addition, the invasion towns in France and Belgium in the rear of our front line were subject to rocket and flying bomb bombardment. In these cases, the enemy was able to choose whether to put his bases near his front line and thus, by firing at short range, improve the accuracy of his weapons, or whether to reduce our attacks on his bases by withdrawing them well into his own territory, out of easy reach of our attacking aircraft. He chose a compromise, and arranged his bases in depth. London was not intensively bombarded by V2; but the rockets prolonged the strain and anxiety of life in the capital after the buzz-bomb no longer menaced it acutely with death from the skies.

III

The flying bomb and rocket have come into military plans and strategy to stay. Londoners have had only a grim preview of what the future can hold for the population of every city in the world — unless, that is, the destructive possibilities of these weapons are brought under control by the agreement of all the nations. In view of this, a brief recapitulation of London's experiences may be relevant at this time.

Bombardment by rocket is generally agreed to be not so trying to the nerves as bombardment by flying bomb. The rocket arrives unheralded; there is a vast explosion; and there is a wide area of

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devastation. If one is still alive, one knows that another rocket is hardly likely to land in exactly the same spot, at any rate for some time. But though the rocket does not have the psychological impact of the flying bomb — which one listens for and gauges the course of, and which comes over in sufficient quantities to make second and third explosions at nearly the same spot possible and indeed likely — it is potentially more accurate. From a strictly military point of view, therefore, it is a more important weapon.

As a flying bomb approaches a great city it brings a warning of death to the ears of millions. When all was quiet in London at night you could hear a flying bomb approaching for three minutes before it came overhead — three minutes of mounting anxiety. You heard it for probably two minutes before you could say safely that it was not going to pass within three miles of you. The sound of its engine is indescribable — a vulgar, roaring noise, rather like the rapid, flapping vibration of giant obscene lips. No one can listen to it without alarm.

After some experience, you could decide with some certainty whether an approaching bomb necessitated taking shelter. Normally, there were a few final seconds of warning of imminent danger between the time you heard the engine cut off overhead, which happened when the flying bomb was thrown into its vertical dive, and the moment of impact. According to some authorities, this warning silence was not expected by the Germans. It occurred because the sudden movement from the horizontal to the vertical threw the gasoline in the tank away from the feed-line and caused the engine to cut, thus preventing the bomb from diving with engine still running. This cutting out of the engine must have saved hundreds of lives by giving people a split-second opportunity to get clear of glass.

Unfortunately, the German missiles had irregular tricks. Enough of them did manage to strike the ground with their engines still running for it to be unsafe to await the dying away of the motor before taking shelter. Furthermore, you could not relax with complete assurance after the wave of anxiety — mounting as the bomb approached, reaching a peak as it came overhead, and normally diminishing as it passed on — for some bombs turned round in a circle before crashing to earth. Others cut out at 3,000 feet and, instead of diving, came down in a gentle glide, striking the ground eventually some four miles away. In such cases, people on the spot had no prior warning. If the flying bomb fell in a built-up area, probably 20 houses were totally

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destroyed and several hundred more were damaged. Human life vanished in a flash which shook the ground and rent the heavens.

The author may in part have owed the invitation to write this article to the fact that the editor, who was in London the latter part of last year, was given particular reason to reflect on the potentialities of V2. One evening as he was preparing to go to bed, the mansion in which he was staying suddenly bounced violently up and down and from side to side, and he was left prone and dazed, his ears ringing with the grotesque noise of a dozen express trains roaring past and away into the night. A rocket bomb had exploded a couple of hundred yards away. It was not surprising that he thereafter displayed an enlarged interest in the future of this weapon. That particular explosion, which wrecked several blocks on Oxford Street, took, it is reported, 64 lives, among them the lives of a number of American soldiers, serving their country thousands of miles from home. Their compatriots will (or at any rate should) demand to know precisely what are the potential future uses of these flying bombs and rockets.

The flying bomb is likely to be used in future against the shorter-range targets. Its range will be increased, but it will not be as accurate as the rocket, since it has to fly in the lower altitudes and its speed and direction are, therefore, subject to the action of the wind. The airplane has to have a wing area sufficiently large to enable it to land safely; the flying bomb, however, requires only a large enough wing area to permit it to stay in the air at high speeds. The wing area can be considerably reduced simply by increasing the speed of the bomb at the moment it reaches the end of the launching ramp. We may therefore expect to see the lifting surfaces become smaller and smaller and the bomb become more of a conventional artillery weapon — a self-propelled shell rather than a flying bomb.

The range of the rocket can be increased up to some 2,500 miles without employing any new principles beyond those already introduced by the Germans. This range would be obtained by a two-stage rocket, *i.e.* two rockets in one. The first would drive the second a certain distance and then disintegrate, leaving the second to start up automatically at that point. Some years will elapse before such projectiles are perfected, but there is nothing Wellsian in the prediction that they will be perfected. Existing scientific knowledge makes them practicable. We should remember, moreover, that the power of explosives is likewise increasing enormously and will perhaps reach a point where destruction

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from a single charge spreads over such a vast area that it could not be dropped from aircraft operated directly by men if the men were to live. Robot-bombs will be the only means by which a charge of that nature could be poured upon an enemy.

Such are some of the facts about flying bombs and rockets, as we know them to be and as we can expect them to become. The Germans will certainly continue to be interested in the new weapons they developed and will wish to carry their achievements further at some later date. Are we going to keep up our interest also, both in the weapons as such and in what the Germans may wish to do with them? The idea of discharging destructive rockets to a distant portion of the world by merely pressing a button may still sound in some ears fantastic. But it is in the realm of fact. Is it too much to hope that there can be one law and one controlling authority in a world any part of which can be laid waste by the pressure of a single finger?

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THE CRITIC TURNS ACTOR

By James B. Reston

THE United States has changed overnight from the rôle of observer at international conferences to the rôle of leader. After sitting in the stalls for twenty-five years complaining about the play, the players, the music and the general confusion, we have suddenly been shoved up on the stage and given the opportunity to help name the play, direct the music, and pick some (though definitely not all) of the players.

Fortunately, before the war ended, we had a little practice in the new rôle. We ran the Food and Agriculture Conference at Hot Springs, the first session of the UNRRA Council at Atlantic City, the Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, the Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago, the preparatory security conference at Dumbarton Oaks, and the United Nations Security Conference at San Francisco.

Like all ingénues, we had our troubles. At Hot Springs we opened the play before either we or the cast were ready and we surrounded the theater with military police and kept the critics out of hearing distance. At Bretton Woods, we were pretty good to the critics. We not only let them in to hear the play but let them wander around backstage where they could see the wheels and pulleys and all the professional tricks; but we didn't get all our own players together for a rehearsal before the opening night and we neither prepared for enough guests nor had adequate facilities for those we expected.

At the Chicago Air Conference, the other players got the impression that we hogged the stage, gave out our own version of what was going on, and generally messed things up until, in the closing days, with astonishing abruptness, we fired our leading man (in this case Adolph Berle) and sent both the audience and some of the players home wondering if we were ever going to become professional.

Finally, at San Francisco, we got a good theater, learned our lines pretty well, struggled through a somewhat noisy and unruly first act, but came out in the end with more prestige and experience than we had had before.

As the location of these performances indicates — Hot Springs, Bretton Woods, Washington, Atlantic City, San Francisco — we have, of course, been touring the provinces. The big show is

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now coming on. The war is ended. The rehearsals are over. We are moving into the "big time." The action now will be concerned not with machinery but with life. Mistakes now will not simply mar the structure of an organization or affect the prestige of individuals or of nations; they will settle the question of life or death for millions.

What have we learned, first as observer, and then as ingénue? What mistakes have we made which we might be able to correct? Might we not be able to use up our good players less prodigally? Where are we going in this new rôle?

II

We have learned, in part at least, some of the lessons of 1919. We have learned, for example, not to try to crowd too much into one big peace conference. The statesmen at Versailles tried to deal simultaneously with all the complex and controversial questions of boundaries, reparations, colonies, relief and collective security. This time, even before we have called a peace conference, we have established our league of nations, set up an international bank and an economic and social council to deal with the economic causes of war, created an international relief organization, determined the principles which will guide our treatment of the defeated nations, and, with varying degrees of efficiency, created organizations to deal with food, labor, health and social problems. In addition, we have reached an understanding with some of our Allies about certain boundaries — those of Poland and Finland, for example.

Secondly, we have learned how to recruit some of our players. We have achieved at least a basis for understanding among our two major political parties on the broad objectives of our foreign policy, and we have proved beyond any shadow of a doubt that McKinley's practice of taking representatives of the Senate along as members of the American delegation to international conferences was right, and that Wilson's decision not to take them along undoubtedly helped lose him the necessary support of the United States Senate. All that has to be done to prove this point is to make a cursory study of the *Congressional Record* during the period of the Senate debate on the San Francisco Charter. It is perfectly clear from this debate that whenever the Charter seemed to be getting into any difficulty at all, it was the testimony of Senator Tom Connally, Democrat, of Texas, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Arthur H. Vanden-

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berg, Republican, of Michigan, which was decisive. Their support was not achieved merely by putting the two Senators on the San Francisco delegation; they and other Senators had been consulted by Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles, and later by Secretary Stettinius and his assistants in the State Department, in the effort to give the Charter a form which they believed would be acceptable to the Senate. It may be argued that they formed the Charter too much to meet the desires of the Senate; but in any event they did not impose on the Charter anything which the executive branch did not want. Similarly, Senator Connally and Senator Warren Austin, of Vermont, like Senator Vandenberg a Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, had been members of the American Delegation at the Mexico City Conference earlier in the year.

We also sought and found other methods of insuring support for American action at these conferences in addition to seeking the aid of representatives of the United States Senate. For example, we learned that to take along to San Francisco as "consultants" the representatives of the most influential non-political trade, religious, research, labor and farm organizations also broadened the general understanding of the Administration's policy and facilitated its acceptance. Their presence at San Francisco induced conviction, and their conviction produced support throughout the country which was reflected in the overwhelming ratification of the Charter in the Senate.

These are points of advance which will be understood by our own people perhaps better than by nations which do not have our sharp separation between the authority of the legislative and executive branches of government. However, those of our Allies who remember what happened to the League of Nations under the two-thirds rule of the Senate will not be inclined to dismiss them as mere technicalities.

In other respects, too, we have shown progress in the conferences held in this country before the end of the war. For a nation which not only has no widely accepted tradition of civil service but which sometimes acts as if there were something distasteful about public service as such, we did remarkably well in getting together at San Francisco a secretariat capable of making all the complex physical arrangements for such a conference; and, after a slow start, this secretariat functioned extremely well in getting out the heavy paper work of the Conference. Also, we showed at

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both the Inter-American Conference in Mexico City late in the winter and at San Francisco in the spring a capacity for improvising and compromising in extremely difficult political situations.

But all this having been said, it must be added that it is not good enough, these days, to prove that we have done better than we did in 1919, that we have made progress in solving some of the domestic aspects of the conduct of our foreign affairs, and that we have retained our democratic capacity for improvising and compromising. For the problems confronting us now are obviously much more complex than they were in 1919, and we failed so miserably then and must do so much better this time that the comparison loses most of its meaning.

Furthermore, we have not learned all the lessons of the last Peace Conference; and some of the lessons that we have learned have been put to good use at some conferences and ignored at others; and sometimes, even in the same conference, we have carried out sound principles with regard to one important question and violated them with regard to the next. This needs to be illustrated because it is the heart of the problem and suggests certain points of interest for the future.

III

Just before the Versailles Conference, some of the best minds in diplomacy tried to suggest a few simple rules of conduct, most of them dealing with the necessity of preparing for the conference in detail before it was called, arranging a careful agenda for it ahead of time, and sticking rigidly to that agenda. They are just as applicable now as they were then.

The French Ambassador in Washington in 1919, M. Jusserand, for example, wrote a careful memorandum on this subject for the Supreme Council, in which he proposed that a set of preliminary terms be imposed on the defeated enemy, drew up a sort of priority list of problems facing the Big Four of that time, and prepared an agenda for the conference.

Even before M. Jusserand put his precise Latin mind to work on this problem, Sir Ernest Satow, one of the best authorities on diplomatic procedure of the day, wrote an admirable little book on the lessons of previous peace conferences for the British Peace Conference delegation, and urged them, above all things, to prepare carefully, to agree on the purpose and procedure of the conference, and to stick to their agreed formula. "Experience demonstrates," Sir Ernest wrote, "that, in order to ensure the

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success of a Congress or Conference, a distinct basis or bases ought to be agreed upon beforehand; and the greater the definiteness with which the main points of the basis are formulated beforehand, the greater is the likelihood of a general agreement being reached. In past history, when Congresses failed to attain a definite result, the failure was generally due to the ground not having been adequately prepared beforehand."

The Big Four rejected these suggestions, partly because they suffered from the great man's weakness for relying too much on his own abilities and partly because Mr. Wilson did not like M. Jusserand's curt, if accurate, description of the Fourteen Points. At any rate, when the Conference was over, Colonel House, after long reflection, concluded that "the great fault of the political leaders was their failure to draft a plan of procedure."

It cannot be said that we have ignored this advice. The very fact that so many conferences were held before the fighting ended demonstrates the improvement in our preparation for this peace. Wilson wrote the first draft of the League Covenant after the last war while he was en route to Versailles, whereas first the Moscow Declaration and then the United Nations Charter began to be formulated by a special Advisory Committee in the State Department in 1942, and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were published over six months before the end of the German war. Again, there was a preliminary conference of the major Powers at Atlantic City to arrange a basis of agreement for the Bretton Woods Conference just such as had been suggested by Jusserand and Satow at the end of the last war. In other respects, also, the principle of careful preparation has been carried out by our public officials, often in collaboration with specialists from outside the government, recruited for the purpose.

But while conceding that preparation must always be a relative thing, and that we have made great strides toward learning the lessons of past conferences, one must also admit that we certainly have not learned the lesson of the necessity of preparation as fully as we might.

The Mexico City Conference of February and March 1945 illustrates the point. The two most important decisions of that Conference were the decision to negotiate a general pact of mutual defense and security (the Act of Chapultepec) and the decision to clear the way for Argentina's return to the Pan American system and her entrance into the United Nations. Neither of these subjects came up as a surprise. The general security pact

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had been proposed by the President of Colombia to the late President Roosevelt during a visit to the White House in 1943; it had been approved by Mr. Roosevelt in principle; and our delegation had seen the Colombian resolution which raised the question. Yet despite all this advance information, our delegation was not ready with a policy to meet it and the Colombian resolution came to the very point of going through the Conference in a form which would have been rejected out of hand by the United States Senate. In fact, it was stopped merely because Senator Austin, who was not normally on the commission dealing with the subject, happened to be in attendance at the moment when the vote on it was being taken and asked for more time to consider it. Having thus stopped it, the delegation got in touch with President Roosevelt and worked out a resolution which produced a fundamental change in our conception of hemispheric defense.

Similarly, the delegation went to Mexico City with two completely different views on how to treat with Argentina, and sharply divided in opinion on how to relate the Pan American security system to the world security system. In this connection we proceeded to demonstrate the risk of assuming that a problem postponed is a problem averted, and the danger of our tendency to deal with situations only when they are so serious that we can no longer avoid dealing with them.

At Mexico City, one of our leading delegates was Adolph Berle, United States Ambassador to Brazil, and another was Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, special assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of problems relating to world organization. Mr. Berle argued at Mexico City that while it was essential to protect the possibility of creating a security system which would be strong and universal, it was neither necessary nor wise to give that organization the power to prevent the Pan American system from taking action against an aggressor in this hemisphere. Dr. Pasvolsky contended that the Mexico City Conference should do nothing which would restrict the freedom of action of the San Francisco Conference, scheduled to open in a few weeks, and that the world security organization should have power to prevent action by the Pan American system if it felt this to be necessary. The latter view prevailed at the time, despite the fact that there clearly was strong opposition among the Latin Americans to giving the world organization power to paralyze action by the Pan American system. It was decided to postpone the problem until San Francisco.

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There was, admittedly, a case to be made for not anticipating the action of the San Francisco Conference or restricting the freedom of action of the United Nations at that Conference. The point is, however, that even after the Mexico City Conference we did not work out a formula for relating the two security systems, but, despite the pleas of both the press and the Latin American countries, waited until this problem became critical at San Francisco and then took an extra week at the Conference, in the most urgent and difficult atmosphere, to confirm the supremacy of the world security system without destroying the right of the American nations to exercise their collective right of self-defense against an aggressor.

It can be argued that it was not possible to work out this problem with the Latin American nations except under urgent pressure like that applied at San Francisco. Surely, however, it would have been possible for the State Department to think this problem through and to state its policy clearly to the American Delegation before the Conference started. As it was, the American Delegation, which should merely have been attempting to carry out a fixed policy on so fundamental a matter, was in fact endeavoring to define policy and negotiate with the other interested nations at the same time. The result was that almost everybody in the Delegation developed his own "formula" for solving the crisis; and it was finally solved only when one delegate went to the Secretary of State and told him that the time had come for the Administration itself to make up its mind as to what it wanted.

Improvisation was not perhaps as common at San Francisco as it appeared. Our Delegation had not expected the Russians to raise the question of bringing in the Ukraine and White Russia as members of the Conference. President Roosevelt at Yalta had simply agreed to electing them eventually as members of the future World Organization. We had agreed with the Latin American states, also, to keep the Argentine question out until the later stages of the Conference. But in the circumstances of the moment we decided to support Argentina's admission to the Conference for a variety of reasons, some connected with the demands of Soviet Russia regarding the admission of the Ukraine and White Russia, some connected with the politics of this hemisphere, some connected with the prestige of our officials. Later, of course, we at least had the good judgment to wish that we had been more loyal to our original agenda than to the emotions of the moment.

On several occasions, no doubt, we have improvised success-

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fully. There was, for example, no agreement before the San Francisco Conference on a trusteeship system for the new league of nations. One was worked out there, largely through the diligence of Harold Stassen; and while limited in many respects, it represents an advance over the old League mandate system.

But more often than not when we have improvised, the results have not been satisfactory. At San Francisco we improvised in the selection of committee chairmen, choosing them by country instead of as individuals. As a result, some of the committees worked well because the chairmen were excellent, while others were a tedious scramble. We foresaw the language problem at Bretton Woods, and consequently the proceedings there were conducted with a minimum of translations, and committees were able to function smoothly. But we went to San Francisco prepared to translate documents into three languages, and finally decided to translate into five. This necessitated fundamental changes in the organization of the secretariat. We also agreed to translate all committee speeches not only into French but into Spanish as well, which turned the committee meetings into a series of prolonged translations and made deliberative study of questions extremely laborious. Some difficulty on this score cannot, of course, be avoided, but considering the technical efficiency of this country there is nothing to prevent our doing what was done at Geneva, namely, having earphones at every committee chair and translators speaking from booths as the speaker addresses the committee. In this way, each member can plug in on the translator he wishes and the tempo of the proceedings and the understanding of the delegates are improved.

At almost every one of the conferences held in this country, the problem of dealing with the press and radio correspondents has been improvised from one crisis to the next. It is a strange fact that the United States, which has elevated public relations into something between a science and philosophy, should find it so difficult to produce officials who can deal effectively with the press at an international conference. Yet it is generally conceded that this is a fact.

Admittedly, the problem presented is a tough one. Under our constitution the press is given a freedom which is little short of license. Certainly, too, it is true that we have our quota of reporters and commentators who either expect everything to be handed to them without any "digging" on their part or who find it more convenient (and unfortunately more profitable) to move

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in a realm of dogmatic opinion, unencumbered by too many ascertained facts.

At San Francisco it was also true that the sheer bulk of over 1,500 accredited "correspondents" was overwhelming and that the handling of them was a terrible responsibility. Many of them were merely there to see the San Francisco show through the courtesy of some benevolent publisher. Others represented official news agencies or government organs and consequently were "reporting" not so much to the public at home as to their officials, and were asking questions not in order to seek the views of the speaker but to propagate the views of the principals to whom they themselves really were responsible.

But all this is merely another argument against improvising our press relations at international conferences. Our officials are well aware of the habits of American newspapermen. Yet they establish machinery to deal with the press as they would like it to be rather than as it is. Thus, they knew before the San Francisco Conference started that the major decisions there would be taken in the meetings of the sponsoring nations. What they did not take account of was that because of this fact the American press would concentrate on the meetings of the Big Five rather than on the committee and commission meetings of the Conference, which dealt with major questions only after the Big Five had dealt with them in Secretary Stettinius' penthouse in the Fairmont Hotel. American officials thought the press should wait to report and comment on the decisions of the Big Five until they had been transmitted to the whole Conference. They therefore did not make adequate provision to release information from the Big Five meetings. The consequence was, as any working reporter could have told them, that the news "leaked" out of the Big Five into the newspapers before it ever got to the rest of the Conference. The official press organization attached to the Conference secretariat was very seldom the source of any real news.

Now some members of the press undoubtedly are inclined to underestimate the difficulties there would be in persuading the Russians, and even the British, to give out the news currently as it develops at international conferences. But it also seems to be true that our officials often cite those difficulties as an excuse for their own failure to work out an adequate press policy for the newspapers and the radio.

For example, at Dumbarton Oaks, Mr. Stettinius was persuaded that if he allowed the press to have any more access to the

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Conference than they had (which was virtually none) the Russians would walk out — a view which, if true, does not bode well for the future of the security organization, but which, fortunately, few others who were at that conference support. At San Francisco, the press was promised a "liberal" policy. This turned out to be access to the plenary sessions, where nothing of great significance happened, and to the commission meetings, which did not meet until all the important decisions had been taken in the committee meetings. When the committee chairmen felt like it, of course, they would come down and report to the press on what had happened, or, more accurately, on that part of the developments which they thought the reporters were entitled to know. The fact remains, however, that there really were two conferences going on at San Francisco: the conference of The Five and the conference of The Rest. The vital decisions were being taken in the meetings of the former, but, as noted above, no adequate provision was made to advise the public regarding them.

Fortunately, even the regulations supporting the system of secrecy were improvised and finally broke down. When this happened and it was found — as it is almost always found — that the policy of secrecy breeds the very atmosphere of rumor and suspicion which officials seek to avoid, the system was finally modified and attempts were made to "leak out" to the reliable reporters some of the current developments of the Conference.

The problem of determining what is said to the press of the world by governments with vastly different political and social systems is, of course, one of the most difficult the major Allies have to deal with. Volumes might be written about it. For the purposes of this article only one or two observations need to be made.

The first is that unless the conference is held in a compound, as at Potsdam, the policy of secrecy does not work. It does not work because, at a fulldress conference, the information has necessarily to be very widely disseminated and too many people do not believe in the policy of secrecy and do not abide by rules they consider unnecessary.

The second is that the problem will never be solved until the presence of the press is looked upon by the conference officials as an opportunity rather than a nuisance. Admittedly, delicate negotiations cannot be carried on in the headlines of the world's press; the London Poles were the last to try it, and with melancholy results. But that does not mean that far more facts and

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background material on the matters under discussion cannot be released during conferences than is habitually the case. After all, on the general understanding of the people the success of these conferences will eventually depend.

The reason for some of the mistakes made at conferences is not difficult to find. In the first place, the planning for each conference has usually been done by a different official. In the case of Bretton Woods, the Treasury and the State Department fought for control; the planning for the Mexico City Conference was done by the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs; the preparations for San Francisco were in still different hands.

Thus, the promising American ingénue has not progressed from one play to the next, gathering experience and strength at each performance. What we have been doing is giving one group experience at one conference, then scattering it and calling in a new company for the next performance. This prodigal turnover of personnel in the American delegations is true not only at the level of civilian advisers and assistant secretaries but at the very top as well. Since the Dumbarton Oaks Conference ended, we are now operating through our third Secretary of State. This means that another new team, minus a great deal of the experience picked up by other men in the past two years, will carry much of the burden in the forthcoming discussions and conferences, including the vital conferences of the five foreign secretaries at which the peace treaties with the vanquished enemy states are to be written.

The lessons of the conferences which have been held to date are nevertheless there to be observed, and they have just as much validity whether the team is old or new. One of these lessons is that, now that the fighting has ceased, these conferences furnish one of the major means by which we can hope to grope forward toward the necessary understanding between Russia and the west. Another lesson is that the difficulty of reaching an understanding with Russia only emphasizes the need for the most careful preparation before undertaking discussions with her. For it is already clear from our experience of the past two years that we cannot "explore" a question with the Russians as we can do with the British or the French. The Russian does not like to sit down and "think out loud" or "exchange views." He tends to look on this pleasant, if casual, western habit with suspicion and thinks that we ought to come to conferences prepared to

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negotiate on the basis of a fixed policy, more or less as he thinks he does (though actually, of course, this doesn't always turn out to be the case).

We have made great progress since 1919. But it is not enough for us merely to be better now than we were then. The problems this time are so much more complex that any comparison with last time really has very little meaning. This time peace is not going to be decreed in a final peace conference. Peace will be attained, if attained it is, not by an act but through a process. Nor should the peace be planned, if it is to last, by a very few men, as was the case with the preparatory decisions taken at Casablanca, Teheran, Quebec, Yalta and Potsdam. It should be thought through, with all the expert help available and all the careful documentation procurable, by the men who have to negotiate it; and it should be negotiated, with as full publicity as possible, by the men who will have to operate it. For the peace will be not an arrangement merely between governments but between peoples, and they must understand and support it if it is to last. These premises are accepted by most of our officials intellectually; they should be accepted by them as guides to action also.

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THE OTHER CHINA

By Gunther Stein

AS THESE lines are written an earnest effort is being made to compose the long-standing differences between the Communists in China and the Kuomintang Government of Chiang Kai-shek. The good offices of United States representatives have been made available to assist in these negotiations, and the recent action of Soviet Russia in making an alliance with the National Government and in agreeing not to interfere in the internal affairs of China has led to the fresh attempt at compromise to ward off a civil war. No one can predict what turn the negotiations may take. But whether the Communists are brought into the National Government, or whether they remain a dissident faction, they have come to stay as a force of great political importance not merely to China but to Asia and the world.

The reasons for this conclusion, reached after five months of critical investigation in Communist-controlled China and developed against the background of four years' experience in Kuomintang territories, are set forth in the following pages. They are not offered as a survey of all the factors in the twenty-year struggle between Kuomintang and Communist parties in China; that complex chapter of history has often been told from varying points of view. My effort here is simply to set forth why I contend that the Chinese Communist movement is now so strong, and has its roots so well embedded in economic and political realities in China, that it could not be destroyed even in a civil war.

The Communists are entrenched in their former "Anti-Japanese War Bases" in the north and center of China proper, with their capital in the small cave town of Yenan, in the province of Shensi. It is estimated that the extent of this area, which the Communists have been liberating and defending against constant Japanese counterattacks during the last eight years, is some 300,000 square miles. The Communists claim to have 910,000 regular troops, and 2,200,000 militia auxiliaries. These troops are inferior in equipment to those of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. But they are probably equal in numbers and on the whole superior in health and morale. When one compares the military strength of the two sides, consideration should be given to the fact that certain of the Central Government's divisions have obtained equipment and valuable training at the hands of American officers, and

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to the possibility that the Kuomintang may obtain more of the arms the Japanese are leaving behind than the Communists get.

The Communists claim to control a civilian population of 95,000,000, and to have been able to mobilize them more successfully for the war against Japan than the Kuomintang could do because their "New Democracy," unlike the system of the Kuomintang, operates on a basis of United Front coöperation between all social strata and of freely elected local self-governments (in which Communists occupy only one-third of all seats). They assert that their "New Democracy" has developed a considerable capacity for economic and social progress in the people of the area, and has made them reliable supporters of the régime under which they live. Finally, they claim that their military, political and economic achievements have gained them the sympathies of a large number of people in the Kuomintang areas who are in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's Government.

The terms on which China would achieve national unity — equally desired by the Communists and Kuomintang — have been only one of the two great issues between the two factions. The other, which came to the fore after the Japanese surrender, has been the wish of both to strengthen themselves by gaining control over vital parts of China which had long been under enemy occupation.

Chungking and Yenan have approached the problem of national reunification in diametrically opposite ways. Chungking has insisted that the armies and local administrations of the Communists submit to the Central Government, dominated by the Kuomintang. Yenan has demanded the creation of a coalition government in which the Kuomintang would share power with the Communists and the small democratic parties, on a basis to be determined by free elections, under universal suffrage, in both parts of China.

Negotiations between the two parties were renewed last year, but the ensuing deadlock last spring made clear the irreconcilable character of their positions at that time and increased the danger of an armed conflict between the old opponents. Some elements in the Kuomintang undoubtedly desired a final armed showdown, despite Chiang Kai-shek's declared decision to seek a peaceful solution; and although the Communists stood to gain more by peaceful development than by an armed struggle, they indicated that if necessary they would certainly fight for their program with all their strength and would endeavor to enlist the active

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support of the still unorganized opposition to Chiang Kai-shek in Kuomintang China.

But it is chiefly the desire for control of the vital Japanese-occupied positions which has threatened China with civil conflict. The main Anti-Japanese War Bases of the Communists form a circle around Peiping and Tientsin in the north, and some others are close to Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow on the Yangtze; most of the railroads of north and central China are flanked by them. As this article is being written, Communist forces are cutting off the Kuomintang troops from Russian-occupied Manchuria. The vast bloc of Yenan-controlled territories stretches from both banks of the Yangtze into the southern fringes of Manchuria and from Inner Mongolia to the China Sea. American transport planes are now to help the Kuomintang armies penetrate into that far-flung network of Communist-held positions, disarm local Japanese garrisons and claim the cities and railroad lines held by the defeated enemy.

United States policy will continue to exert enormous influence on the Chinese situation. In the writer's opinion, the survival of Chiang Kai-shek's régime depends primarily upon one condition: that every conceivable kind of American assistance be extended to it. This fact makes it impossible for the United States to disavow interest and responsibility for the domestic policy followed by the government which it is supporting. Until the fall of 1944, when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek demanded and obtained the dismissal of General Joseph W. Stilwell, his Allied Chief-of-Staff, American policy seemed to be based upon a desire to promote coöperation between Chungking and the Communists. Thereafter, however, it apparently became American policy to pay less attention to the existence of the Chinese Communists and to give Chiang Kai-shek a maximum of military, economic, financial and moral support. The hope seemingly was that American aid would increase the Kuomintang's offensive strength against Japan but not its power of waging civil war against the Communists. (The futility of the hope was indicated in a recent press statement issued by Lieutenant-General Albert C. Wedemeyer, in Chungking. He said the claim of the Chinese Communists that the Kuomintang troops fighting them near Yenan in July had used new American arms was "probably true," implying that such arms, delivered for use against Japan, must have reached these troops through irregular channels.)

The argument in favor of such a policy was a legalistic one —

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that the Chungking régime is the only recognized representative of the Chinese nation, and that hence Chungking's wish for non-interference in its domestic affairs must be respected. The customary analogy cited in support of this view was that the Government of the United States would not tolerate an American Communist party that had entrenched itself, say, in Wyoming and neighboring states, maintained its own armies and local governments, issued its own currency, and demanded that the Democratic Party establish a coalition government in Washington. In such a situation, the argument continued, the United States Government would certainly reject foreign criticism of its conviction that those Communists were rebels with whom the Administration had the right to deal according to its own judgment.

But this analogy obscures the realities of the situation in China. There is no parallel between the political development of the United States and China today. China is still in the formative period of modern nationhood, as America was at the time of the Declaration of Independence. General Chiang Kai-shek himself suggested this in a talk with Representative Mansfield last winter, comparing "China today, with its dissident elements and the revolutionary soldiers of George Washington's time." The fact is that China's revolution, dragging on painfully into its fourth decade, is still in progress, unwon and undecided.

II

Early in June 1944, a group of foreign newspapermen (of whom I was one) succeeded in obtaining permission from the Chungking Government to visit the Yenan area, which had been blockaded since 1939. Six weeks later an Observer Section of the United States Army followed. The difference between conditions on the Kuomintang and Communist sides was striking, even at first sight; and it became more so after close investigation. The Yenan régime seemed to have solved many of the vital military, political, economic and social problems which Chungking considered insoluble under the circumstances of war. The fact is that, unknown to the world, a second China has grown up behind the blockade wall with which the Kuomintang tried for five years to hide it.

The system of political democracy established by the Yenan régime, while under the general guidance of the Communist Party and still primitive, is genuine; and I believe it is making steady progress. The Communist Party, anxious to enforce its basic

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United Front principles, does not permit its members to stand for election to more than one-third of the seats in any self-government council. Elections seem to be based on free and universal suffrage.

I watched the meetings of self-government organizations on various administrative planes: village, municipality, county and regional. In these councils two-thirds of all seats seemed in fact to be held by non-Communists. They included popularly elected delegates of the non-party majority of the population, representatives of former Kuomintang organizations in the Yenan-controlled regions which Chungking disowned because of their United Front coöperation with the Communists, and persons who sympathize with, or belong to, China's small democratic parties.[1] The realism of the factual discussions in those meetings, and what I heard from individual members both in public and in private interviews, was fully confirmed by what I saw of life and work in the Border Region. The same type of intelligent farmers, patriotic landlords, merchants and liberal scholar gentry who, in the Kuomintang regions, either have no political rights and duties or cannot assert them against the traditional rule of more or less corrupt village and town bosses, have been activated on the Communist side and have been instrumental in overcoming age-old backwardness and old class disharmonies.

The success of the "New Democracy" imposes on the Communists the obligation of adhering to their course, whatever may happen in the future. A return to the political methods of the period of the Civil War is almost unthinkable for several reasons. In the first place, the "New Democracy" proved infinitely more suitable to the country than the Chinese variety of the "Soviet" system which had become grimly radical during the ruthless Civil War years. Secondly, a relapse into their former policies would cost the Communists the invaluable coöperation of the "bourgeois" United Front elements whose genuine acceptance of the Communist-sponsored "New Democracy" has contributed so decisively to its growing strength and prestige. Thirdly, the Communist Party itself has changed since 1937 from an uncompromisingly revolutionary group of 70,000 or 80,000 hardened Civil War veterans to a well-disciplined but fundamentally reformist organization of 1,200,000 rural people with predominantly nationalistic, petty-bourgeois background. These Communists are

[1] The overall organization to which these parties belong, the Democratic League, still leads a semi-illegal existence in Kuomintang territories.

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mainly "middle" peasants who own private property, and their economic status is improving with the rising prosperity of the Yenan-controlled region. They see nothing wrong in their desire for a further improvement of their economic well-being based on private enterprise, nor in any form of "capital accumulation." On the contrary, the growth of privately owned capital is fostered by Yenan's economic policies because it is considered necessary during that "prolonged stage of democratic development" which is to lay the foundation for a future transition to Socialism.

These men and women joined the party in the course of liberating and defending their homes, fighting side by side with the original party members; and they have shared in the process of introducing reforms of a fundamentally democratic nature. They seem as firmly convinced as the leader of the party, Mao Tse-tung, that China is not yet ripe for Socialism but that this goal — and beyond it the eventual goal of Communism to which as Marxists they aspire — can be achieved in slow peaceful progress. The precondition of such progress, it is held, is practical coöperation between a strong and politically responsible Communist party and other groups.

On the upper level, the Yenan régime is not yet controlled by the people. The directing positions of the army, the press and the political organs which determine overall, long-term policies for the 18 self-government units of "Liberated China" are still held by the leaders of the Communist Party. They are responsible, not to a popularly-elected assembly, but to the party-elected Central Executive Committee. This, too, is to be changed; a congress of elected representatives of these local self-governments under Communist control in north and central China is to meet in Yenan late this year to establish a "Chinese People's Liberation Union." A committee, with a maximum Communist membership of one-third the total, is scheduled to take over central control from the Communist Party. When Mao Tse-tung told me in October 1944 about this impending completion of the "New Democracy," he expressed the opinion that the assembly should not insist upon constituting the proposed committee as a full-fledged Chinese Government. At that time he still hoped that an understanding between Chungking and Yenan could prevent China from being split into two separate halves through the co-existence of two national governments.

The "New Democracy" of Yenan is based on economic and financial policies which have succeeded in raising production and

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improving the standard of living of the people. The Communist-led troops are the best fed and most popular in China. Chungking leaders of various Kuomintang factions confessed to me on my return from Yenan that the Communists had surprisingly sound achievements to their credit in the economic field. For the first time in modern history, some of China's great economic problems seem on the way to solution. That is one of the great sources of strength of the Communist régime and a portent for the future. To overlook it is to run the risk of an inaccurate analysis of present and future forces in China.

Firstly, the long-overdue land tenure reform has been introduced. It follows the line marked out by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 — a general reduction of the tenants' rents to a maximum of 40 percent of their crops. This reduction of rent is supplemented by local-government guarantees to the landlords that the rent will be paid. (The measures contrast sharply with the Communists' Civil War practice of confiscating landlords' holdings in favor of the tenants.) Secondly, the farmers have been induced to pool their own labor, their draft animals and tools in voluntary, village-wide "labor exchange brigades." Without prejudice to their members' individual ownership in land and crops, these teams work their fields collectively in a much more intensive and productive manner than before and gain time for the collective reclamation of waste land, for increased production in industrial coöperatives and cottage handicraft, and for the manifold political and social activities. Agricultural production has been increased to twice its original level in Yenan's northwestern border region. Thirdly, the traditionally heavy taxation has been reduced through various administrative reforms which prevent "squeeze." Government officials are provided with a sufficient livelihood and at the same time are made responsible to popular control. The need for taxation has also been reduced by an arrangement which enables all troops, government and party officials, and pupils and teachers of schools and colleges to use a certain part of their time for productive work in agriculture or handicraft. This measure was instituted as Yenan's reply to the blockade instituted by Chungking and its stoppage of pay for the Communist-led armies early in 1941. Army garrisons, administrative offices, and educational institutions in the Border Region now cover, on an average, two-thirds of the cost of their upkeep out of the production of their members.

The social and cultural policies of Yenan make the "New

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Democracy" a logical and workable whole. The administration of justice is largely based on the progressive law codes elaborated but never enforced by the Kuomintang. The public health services are primitive but surprisingly effective. The all-embracing educational efforts aim at old and young, the illiterate and the old-style intellectuals, the politically backward and Communist Party members. The promotion of popular art and culture has an important place in the program. In all these fields revolutionary radicalism has given way to sound reformist attitudes, and whatever Russian influence there may have been in the past has vanished before an earthbound, thoroughly Chinese approach. The aims of these organized mass movements are concrete and practical. The people have awakened to a surprising consciousness of new rights and duties. The degree of popular enthusiasm displayed for victory over the Japanese and for social progress was impressive. I thought it something new and heartening in China.

III

Many observers have noted that a major source of weakness in the war effort of the Chungking Government lay in the gap that separated its large but ill-supported professional army from the unorganized and politically unawakened population. The Central Government tried to bridge this gap, but the great potentialities for democratic coöperation between the soldiers and the masses of the people have not yet been realized. The strength of Yenan's war effort, on the other hand, derived from the fact that the population itself was made an integral part of the fighting forces, was mobilized to support the Communists in every conceivable way, and was at the same time given a stake in victory over Japan by the promising beginnings of political, economic and social reforms.

Of the approximately 95,000,000 people in the Yenan-controlled war regions, 16,000,000 were members of the Self Defense Corps, trained for important auxiliary services to the fighting forces and available for use in the very front line whenever offensive or defensive operations required. The élite of the Self Defense Corps, primitively armed but experienced in actual warfare, were 2,200,000 militia. The armies themselves grew out of these militia fighters. The Eighth Route Army increased from 80,000 in 1937 to 321,000 in 1944 and to about 600,000 in the summer of 1945; and the New Fourth Army from 15,000 in 1938 to 154,000 in 1944 and to about 300,000 in the summer of 1945.

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With their fighting forces deeply anchored in the population, with an aggressive strategy that was not hampered by any need to wait for foreign support and supplies, and with their ingeniously developed guerrilla tactics which made great use of locally-manufactured hand grenades and land mines, the Communists inflicted great damage on the Japanese. The claims of the Communists cannot be checked in detail, but the estimate that their forces, during the last seven and a half years, killed and wounded 511,000 Japanese and 458,000 "puppets" and captured 313,500 rifles and 5,770 machine guns seems plausible. It should be remembered that these statistics represent the sum total of a vast number of defensive and offensive skirmishes and ambushes along thousands of miles of front line, in which, it is claimed, an average of three Japanese soldiers and six or seven puppets were killed and wounded, at the cost of about two casualties on the Communist side.

The Communist-led forces denied the Japanese the economic exploitation and the political consolidation of most of the conquered areas in north and central China. They unceasingly disrupted Japanese communication lines, tied up more and more enemy troops, and ate deeper and deeper into the domain of the Japanese. The effectiveness of Yenan's war effort was confirmed by American pilots forced down in those areas.

The Japanese themselves never ceased to complain about the harm the Communists were doing them. Here are some typical enemy utterances: [2]

From figures on the results of Imperial Japanese Army action against the Chungking and Communist armies since December 1941 it is clear that the major hindrance to peace in Eastern Asia is no longer the Chungking Government but the Chinese Communist Party. The stubbornness of the Communist troops has far surpassed that of the Chungking troops.

The Imperial Japanese Army and the forces of the New [puppet] Government of China fight the Communists incessantly.

The Communist armies mean fatal injury to North China. They hold vast villages, encircle our strongpoints, and prevent them from obtaining supplies. They disturb incessantly the rear of the Imperial Japanese Army and disrupt communications in order to isolate and blockade the cities, so that supplies and replenishments of the Imperial Japanese Army are hampered by them.

They are clever in relying upon guerrilla tactics and political offensives in

[2] Quoted in sequence from the following Japanese and "puppet" newspapers and magazines: *Asahi Shimbun*, Tokyo, January 15, 1944; *Domei Home Service*, February 14, 1944; *Mainichi Shimbun*, Special Supplement, no date; *Tang Chen Monthly*, Vol. 7, No. 1; *Hsin Chung Kuo*, Shanghai, July 10, 1944; *Wen Yo*, Shanghai, April 1944; *Yung Pao*, Tientsin, January 7 and 18, 1944 (two quotations).

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harassing us. They absolutely hold the initiative in fighting and always maintain the offensive.

To break through the material difficulties created by our military and economic offensives and the breakup and isolation of their bases, the Communists strove to raise the efficiency of their army and to simplify their administrations.

The Communist Party is extremely stubborn, and this is especially true of its leading groups which are rich in experience, thorough in reviewing operations and studying tactics, and quick in realizing and readjusting their faults and weaknesses.

The Communists are instigating national consciousness and seeking decisive battles against the Imperial Japanese Army in North China.

The Communist bandits are the only hindrance now existing to the revival of China and the defense of Eastern Asia.

Tokyo tried continuously to picture the Chinese Communists as more dangerous enemies of Chiang Kai-shek's régime than the Japanese themselves, their purpose apparently being to instigate the right wing elements in Chungking to civil war, and to sabotage the sporadic negotiations between Chungking and Yenan. For example, the *Kokumin Shimbun* in Tokyo wrote:

Chungking is surely worried over the increasing influence of the Chinese Communists. Japan is in the same boat as far as this is concerned. . . . Reckless activities of the New Fourth Army . . . are becoming a menace to peace. . . . The Tientsin-Pukow Railway [Japanese-occupied] has been hard hit in its transportation. Activities of the Eighth Route Army are penetrating into North China and forming a cancer to the maintenance of peace. . . . The Chiang [Kai-shek] faction is now in a dilemma. . . . It is not altogether unimaginable that Japan, too, may be seriously affected by the Communist influence if Chungking is not able to pacify the Communists.[3]

More recently, at a time when the United States was trying to bring Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists to an understanding, a Domei broadcast received by the Federal Communications Commission quoted the complaint of the Tokyo newspaper *Mainichi Shimbun* that "the activities of the Yenan régime have become more vigorous in coördination with America's Pacific offensive," and that "Communist attacks on the Imperial Japanese Army have been especially marked in Central China," where, for example, "the New Fourth Army is swarming into the Anhwei sector." The broadcast continued with an editorial from the *Nippon Times*, expressing sympathy with Chiang Kai-shek because of the American pressure for an understanding with Yenan, and warning Chungking that, "The United States pretends that a Chungking-Yenan rapprochement is necessary for

[3] Quoted from the American-owned *Japanese Advertiser*, Tokyo December 27, 1940.

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the prevention of civil war in China, but a compromise sponsored by the United States would only make civil war inevitable."

Finally, I obtained evidence in Yenan that the Japanese militarists, in working out long-term plans for a comeback after the defeat they then already envisioned, made all possible preparations for the incitement of internal strife in China at the time of their own collapse. Their Chinese "puppet" armies, equipped and trained as an anti-Communist fighting force, were to be ready to serve the rightist elements in the Kuomintang in the prosecution of a prolonged civil war which might lead, first to coöperation between a weakened Kuomintang and a "moderate" Japanese postwar government against leftist elements in both countries, and eventually to a revival of Japanese influence on the continent.

In case of civil war, could the Kuomintang armies hope, even with American support, to achieve more against the Communists than did the Japanese? While probably able to prevent the Communists from occupying and holding most of the strategic positions formerly held by the enemy, could they uproot them in their vast rural strongholds where the Japanese fought them in vain?

In my opinion, they could not. The Japanese have fought the Communists relentlessly with perhaps 300,000 to 500,000 well-equipped, well-led and politically incorruptible troops, and with up to 800,000 Chinese puppet auxiliaries, of which more than one-half are former Kuomintang units which had been indoctrinated against the Communists. It seems also illusory to believe that the Kuomintang could count on the support of "class enemies" of the Communists inside the areas of Yenan's "New Democracy." During the Civil War, landlords, merchants and gentry supported the Kuomintang inside the "Soviet" territories, but it is very unlikely that these groups would show hostility to the present Communist régime. I talked to many bona fide landlords, merchants, members of the old-style gentry, and to former officials and military officers of the Kuomintang who are now active in Yenan's United Front. All of them agreed that not only would the ordinary people support the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies, or even fight on their side, if Kuomintang troops tried to seize any part of "Liberated China," but that the large majority of men of their own class would do likewise.

IV

Chiang Kai-shek's decision to call a National Assembly at the end of this year, and to have it endorse the Draft Constitution,

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did not brighten the prospect for national unity. The Communists, the small parties, and the other opposition groups inside and outside the Kuomintang interpreted this decision as a bid for the perpetuation of the Kuomintang dictatorship under a democratic disguise, and as an attempt to mislead foreign opinion.

The Communists objected strongly to this National Assembly because its members, who have never met before, were arbitrarily appointed by the Kuomintang almost a decade ago, during the Civil War. They pointed out that, according to a Chungking statement, the replacement of those who have died or gone over to the enemy, as well as "all questions concerning the powers of the Assembly," are to be left to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. Ostensibly, they argued, the National Assembly was being called to subordinate the Kuomintang Party to the will of the Chinese people, but the composition of the Assembly made this a fiction. They also objected to the Draft Constitution of the early 1930's on the ground that it was exclusively a Kuomintang product, devised at the height of the Civil War to legalize the power of the party. The Constitution proposes that the National Assembly shall meet for one month every three years. Its grant of powers to the President of the Republic would make him a virtual dictator; for though it contains elaborate guarantees for civil liberties, they are qualified by the ominous phrase used in the Japanese Constitution, "except in accordance with law."

The Communists and the other opposition forces have held out for their demand for a coalition government, to be chosen immediately by a conference of delegates representing all political parties, the Kuomintang, Communist, and semi-autonomous provincial armies, and the local governments in the Kuomintang and Communist areas. The coalition government would function until a truly representative National Assembly to draft a constitution could be chosen by free elections throughout all of China.

I found no indication in Yenan that the Chinese Communists were supported, guided, or even influenced by their Russian comrades during the Sino-Japanese war. It even seemed questionable whether there was much political contact between Yenan and Moscow. And the Chinese Communists, although outspoken in their adherence to Marxism and in their sympathies for the U.S.S.R. — "as for all fighters against Fascism and reaction" — impressed me primarily as being Chinese nationalists, men whose 18 years' practical experience in guiding large armies and admin-

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istrations had made their minds independent of outside influences. They considered that their demand for a genuinely representative government in China reflected the desire of the vast majority of the Chinese people. They held that it was a matter of political principle, permitting no compromise. They said that they were willing to give up their armies and their local administrations to such a government, but to no other.

The direct bearing of the new Chinese-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on China's precarious domestic situation should not be overrated. By assuring Russia's non-interference in internal Chinese affairs, Russia's support and assistance for China, and Russia's recognition of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's National Government as the only central government of the country, it allays suspicion that Moscow is implicated in the conflict between Chungking and Yenan. In the writer's opinion, that suspicion has never had any foundation in fact. The Pact merely reaffirms the continuation of Russian policies of long standing.

Yenan cannot feel abandoned by Moscow, for the Chinese Communists never received Russian support; and they were always in dread lest the Chinese national unity which they were trying to achieve in a purely domestic struggle for the establishment of a coalition government might be jeopardized by a civil war fanned by a foreign power.

Chungking, on the other hand, cannot regard Moscow's assurance that Russia is interested in a strong and friendly China as a green light for a Kuomintang attack on the Communists. For the Chinese National Government must realize that, even though the published agreement is silent on the subject, the Russian promises of support and assistance will materialize only if China makes progress toward internal peace and national unity.

Indirectly, however, the text may come to exert a beneficial influence on the Chinese domestic situation by making it quite clear to skeptics in America that Russia's attitude toward the problem of Chinese unity is fundamentally identical with that of the United States. Washington has been encouraged once more to offer its good offices for a settlement between Chungking and Yenan, and through Ambassador Hurley has brought Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung together for negotiations. Probably both Chinese parties will now feel more than ever that America, in its efforts to reconcile them, is speaking in the name of the United Nations.

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THE NEW WORLD COURT

By Manley O. Hudson

THE United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which had not given their support to the old World Court, will participate in maintaining the new one. The fact warrants hope for a significant advance in the pacific settlement of international disputes. Fifty states of the world now essay a fresh effort in a movement which has been in progress for a century and a half. In contrast with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Charter of the United Nations ascribes a place of eminence to the World Court. The principal theme of the Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security, and the Court is conceived to have a rôle in the discharge of this function. It is therefore listed as one of the principal organs of the United Nations and characterized as its principal judicial organ. The Statute of the Court is made an integral part of the Charter. Hence all Members of the United Nations will, by the very fact of membership, be parties to the Statute.

The conception of the judicial process as one of the methods of bringing about the peaceful settlement of disputes does not exaggerate the part which a court may play. Experience has shown that judges on the bench, operating within the severe limitations of the judicial process, can deal effectively with certain types of disputes between states. So long as the disputants are willing to live within the law, a court can supply solutions which will bring an end to their controversy. To that extent, it can serve as a bulwark of friendly relations. If situations arise in which states wish to go outside the law, however, other agencies are needed, manned by men who are not restricted by judicial limitations, who are accustomed to gauging currents of public opinion, and who possess sufficient authority to bring about the results which the community interest may require.

An appreciation of this need led the framers of the Charter to charge the Security Council with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace. The Court's contribution to that end will necessarily be less direct and perhaps less spectacular.

II. WHY A NEW COURT?

The draftsmen of the Charter had a great advantage over those who framed the Covenant in that they did not have to begin at

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scratch. The Permanent Court of International Justice, created in 1920, was at hand for their rebuilding. Its Statute had been ratified by 51 states, and almost all the states of the world (all save Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Vatican City and Yemen) had taken some part in concluding the hundreds of treaties which vested the Court with jurisdiction. It had functioned satisfactorily over a period of 18 years, from 1922 to 1940. Many of its cases had been of major importance; its decisions had commanded universal respect; and its jurisprudence had become a new storehouse of international law. It was indeed a world court, though its activity was largely confined to disputes of European origin.

The San Francisco Conference was faced with two alternatives, set out in the proposals emanating from Dumbarton Oaks. The Permanent Court of International Justice could be continued with such modifications of the Statute as would be required by the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations; or a new Court could be created, with a statute based upon that of the old one. The first alternative had commended itself to a large part of the legal profession. The American and Canadian Bar Associations had issued a joint statement on April 4, 1945, proposing the retention of the existing Court, stressing the need of continuity, and urging that the treaties and agreements relating to the Court's jurisdiction be preserved. In some measure, however, the latter objectives could be accomplished by action between states, even if a new court were created.

In choosing the second alternative, the Conference at San Francisco was moved by political rather than juristic considerations.[1] Precedents established in times of turmoil might have been invoked to justify taking over the old Court without the consent of all the states which had maintained it. The more orderly process would have been to introduce modifications in the existing Statute. But this would have required consent from every one of the member states, since no procedure had been agreed upon by which amendments could be adopted short of unanimity. This process might have entailed some delay, and it raised a problem regarding the participation in the new Court of some of the states which had been parties to the old Statute.

Of the 51 states which were parties to the Statute of the Permanent Court, three had ceased to exist and 15 others were not

[1] The decision carried no implication of criticism of the old Court's record of achievement — indeed, no criticism was expressed either at the preliminary meeting of a Committee of Jurists in Washington or at the Conference in San Francisco.

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represented at San Francisco. The United Nations had no direct relations with the eight states which were arrayed against them in the war, and some of the neutral states were suspected of having given aid to enemies of the United Nations in the war. Moreover, some of the states represented at San Francisco were not parties to the 1920 Statute; and as the Statute was subject to acceptance only by members of the League of Nations and states named in the annex to the Covenant, they could not have become parties to it as things stood. Under these circumstances, the Conference thought that the simpler and more expeditious course was to say that the principal juridical organ of the United Nations should be a new Court, and that it should exist under a fresh Statute modelled on the old one.

This decision did not close the door to states not members of the United Nations, however. Such states may have access to the new Court as litigants on conditions to be laid down by the Security Council. They may become parties to the new Statute, and thus join in maintaining the new Court, on conditions to be determined by the General Assembly acting on the recommendation of the Security Council. As parties to the Statute, non-member states may be permitted to participate in the elections of judges and in the adoption of amendments to the Statute. Under these circumstances, the new Court will not be exclusively an organ of the United Nations.

The creation of a new Court was, in reality, little more than a re-christening and a reorientation of the old one. The substitution of the name International Court of Justice for Permanent Court of International Justice had been foreshadowed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The adjective "permanent" had served to distinguish the old Court from temporary tribunals which states are always free to create, but it has a prophetic ring which history tends to deaden. In some quarters, it was also thought that "justice" was too sweeping a word to be qualified by "international." Yet these rationalizations were not determining. Once a new Court had been decided upon, the change of name served merely as a device of convenience.

The Statute of the new Court is substantially the same as the one drawn up in 1920 and revised in 1929. To facilitate reference to past interpretation and application, the numbering of the articles has not been changed. Of the 68 articles of the old Statute, approximately 50 were retained either without any modification or with only formal or stylistic variations. Some of the changes

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were merely substitutions of the names of organs of the United Nations for those of the League of Nations. In some instances, deadwood was eliminated from the Statute, and in the light of experience some lacunae were filled. Apart from the addition of two articles on amendments, however, only a few innovations were introduced, and they did not disturb the economy and integrity of the former instrument.

In broad outlines, the chain of continuity has not been broken. The new Court will not differ from the old either in its composition, its organization, its jurisdiction, or its procedure. It will be able to profit from the solutions given in the past to the many practical questions which confronted the old Court. It may avail itself, to the limited extent possible in international jurisprudence, of the precedents established by the old Court and it will be in a position to carry on the same high tradition.

The International Court of Justice may, therefore, be said to be the successor of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The succession is expressly envisaged in a provision in the new Statute that, as between parties to the new Statute, treaties conferring jurisdiction on the existing Court shall be taken to confer the same jurisdiction on the new Court. As concerns states not parties to the new Statute, the succession must await the renegotiation of several scores of engagements. It now remains for the parties to the old Statute, a large majority of which were represented at San Francisco, to take the necessary steps for the liquidation of the old Court. The Preparatory Commission may make recommendations on the subject.

III. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE STATUTE

Does the new Statute incorporate any improvements? After the 18 years of experience, some were to be expected. It would be an exaggeration, however, to say that the improvements made are either very extensive or very significant. Both the Committee of Jurists at Washington and the Conference at San Francisco gave protracted consideration to the method of electing the judges. The difficulty of solving this problem had wrecked the effort to create a Court at The Hague in 1907. The difficulty was overcome in 1920 through the abandonment, by large states as well as small, of insistence on the representative character of the judges. The 1920 system of election has worked well, and there was general agreement at San Francisco that its main features should be kept. In the future as in the past, then, candidates will

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be nominated by national groups of jurists, not by governments, and each group will have the privilege of nominating both its own nationals and nationals of other countries. The dual system of election will be retained, with the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations replacing the Assembly and the Council of the League. In both bodies an absolute majority of votes will be required in an election, and in the Security Council no distinction will be made for this purpose between the permanent and the non-permanent members. The single innovation will be the provision for staggering the nine-year terms of judges, so that five judges will be elected each three years. Each judge will continue to have a responsibility to the community of states, and not to the state of which he is a national.

The 1920 Statute provided for two special chambers of the Court, to deal respectively with labor cases and those relating to transit and communications. Neither of these chambers ever functioned, and there was no reason for continuing them. Instead, the new Court will be empowered to create chambers as need may arise, to deal either with particular categories of cases or with particular cases. Such chambers may even be regional in scope. This change, clearly based on experience, may lead to a wider use of the Court, though perhaps too much should not be expected in this regard.

The new Court, like the old, will be open only to states as litigants. The idea of opening it to individuals has often been discussed in recent years, but no proposal to that effect was made in the course of the revision of the Statute. The only change made in this connection was to amplify the privilege of public international organizations of furnishing information to the Court, and in some cases of receiving copies of the written proceedings.

The jurisdiction of the Court was the subject of an acrimonious debate in 1920. The debate was rehearsed in 1945 with emphasis on what had happened in the interval. The 1920 Statute was merely constitutive. It made the Court available to states desiring to use it, but did not obligate any state to submit to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. A useful clause provided, however, that States desiring to do so might confer on the Court compulsory jurisdiction over certain types of legal disputes. From 1921 to 1940, a large number of States, 45 in all, opted to confer such jurisdiction on the Court as between themselves, in some cases for limited periods of time and in many cases subject to reservations. Some of the declarations are still in force. More-

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over, numerous separate treaties concluded in this period conferred a limited compulsory jurisdiction on the Court. So remarkable was the progress thus achieved, that hopes were engendered that the way had been paved for further advance.

Many of the delegates at San Francisco, indeed a considerable majority, insisted that the Charter of the United Nations should obligate all of its members to submit to the Court's jurisdiction over legal disputes in which they might become involved. For this to be possible, obviously, all the participating states would have to be prepared to go that far. The delegations of some states, notably those of the United States and the Soviet Union, declared that their governments might have difficulty in taking such a step, and they urged that more substantial progress was to be expected if the option of the old Statute were continued. In deciding upon this course, the Conference also adopted a resolution urging states to proceed promptly to make declarations investing the new Court with compulsory jurisdiction. The new Statute therefore embodies the old provisions with respect to the option to confer jurisdiction. It adds that declarations made under the old provision, and still in force, shall be deemed, as between parties to the new Statute, to relate to the jurisdiction of the new Court.

The term "compulsory jurisdiction," employed in the Statute, is in some degree misleading. It means merely that a state which has accepted it is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court without the necessity of giving its consent in the particular case. In such a situation, the Court will be competent to give a judgment, whether the respondent "is present or absent," and the judgment will be binding on all states parties to the case. The term carries no implication as to the enforcement of the judgment.

Numerous suggestions have been current in recent years that provision should be made for the enforcement of Court judgments, and some of the proponents have even gone so far as to advocate that the power of enforcement should be conferred on the Court itself. An international tribunal has no sheriff, no marshal, no gendarmerie at its command. Its judicial function is exhausted when it has formulated the rights and duties of the parties before it in a judgment. As a matter of history, in the vast majority of cases states have complied with judgments handed down; the authority of the Permanent Court was never flouted by any losing state. If provision is to be made for the exceptional case, power to enforce should be vested in a political

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body, not a judicial one. This was appreciated in the drafting of the Covenant, which provided that "in the event of any failure to carry out an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto." Though that provision was invoked in only one case during 20 years, it may have had some psychological value in other cases. A similar power is now conferred on the Security Council.

No departure was made from the old Statute with respect to the law to be applied by the Court, though the new Statute states more explicitly that the function of the Court is to decide disputes in accordance with international law. The 36 articles of the 1920 Statute which relate to procedure were also taken over into the new Statute, with little more than verbal changes. They had been largely borrowed from the provisions in the Hague Convention of 1907, and they served merely as a basis for the Court's rules of procedure. No state appearing before the old Court ever raised objection to the procedure which was followed.

IV. ADVISORY OPINIONS

The League provision permitting the Court to give advisory opinions on any dispute or question at the request of the Assembly or the Council led to a considerable activity of the old Court. From 1922 to 1935 it gave 26 opinions, and once declined to give an opinion. Its exercise of this function gave general satisfaction; only in the United States was serious objection raised against conferring such a power on the Court, and this despite the fact that advisory opinions have a long-established place in Anglo-American legal history. No proposal to discontinue this advisory jurisdiction was made either before the Committee of Jurists at Washington or at the San Francisco Conference; on the contrary, a disposition to extend it was manifest.

The first question considered at San Francisco in this connection was where the power to make requests to the Court for advisory opinions should be lodged. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals contained a reference to the possibility of requests by the Security Council for "advice" on certain types of disputes only. A proposal by the Committee of Jurists that both the General Assembly and the Security Council should be authorized to request opinions on any legal question was adopted at San Francisco without hesitation. In some quarters it was desired to confer a similar power on international organizations; this was in line with a long-standing desire of the International

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Labor Organization. The final decision was that the General Assembly might authorize other organs of the United Nations, and specialized agencies, to make requests for opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. There was also some disposition to permit the parties to a dispute to make direct requests, but a proposal to this effect was not adopted.

The practice of the League of Nations failed to establish definitive rules with regard to the nature of the vote required for making a request for an advisory opinion, nor is the new Charter explicit on the matter. A decision by the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion was not classed among the "decisions on important questions" for which a two-thirds majority is necessary; but possibly that classification can be made later. In the Security Council, the request will require an affirmative vote of seven members; whether it is to be classed as a "procedural matter" is not too clear from the text of the Charter, and if it is not so classed, the affirmative vote must include the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council. Where the proposed request relates to a dispute, however, it seems that parties to the dispute must abstain from the vote. The power of the Court to give advisory opinions is made more explicit in the new Statute, but no substantial change has been made in the procedure to be followed in advisory opinions. Now, as before, an advisory opinion is not to possess the binding force of a judgment. The procedure is judicial, but the opinion does not thereby lose its advisory character.

V. AMENDMENTS AND VERSIONS OF THE STATUTE

The 1920 Statute contained no provision for its amendment. This was the more striking because such provisions were inserted both in the League Covenant and in the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. When various amendments to the Statute were proposed in 1929, unanimous consent of the states which were parties to the Statute had to be sought; in consequence, the amendments did not take effect until 1936. The new Statute is a part of the Charter and can be amended by the same procedure required for the amendment of the Charter. This, however, is subject to the possibility that states which are parties to the Statute but not members of the United Nations may be permitted to participate in the adoption of amendments to the Statute. An amendment of the Charter must be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, or by a two-thirds

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vote of a general conference held to review the Charter, and must be ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council. An amendment of the Statute adopted and ratified in the same way might thus be binding even on states which fail to support it. Moreover, the Court itself may propose amendments. Some liberalization of the amendment process is thus achieved, and a lacuna in the 1920 Statute has been filled.

The texts of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the 1920 Statute consisted of versions in English and French. While the use of two languages helped clarify the meaning of the text, the departure from the classic system of a single version in only one language immediately raised the question of using others. As the texts of the Charter and of the new Statute consist of versions in five languages — Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish — a more complicated situation may arise as discrepancies reveal themselves. Of course there are good reasons for all these versions. As a language of international intercourse, Spanish ranks almost equally with English and French. And if Chinese and Russian are less widely employed in diplomatic relations, each is the language of so many millions of people that, apart from any question of *amour propre*, its use would seem to be justified. English and French were employed as the working languages in drafting the Charter and the new Statute, and this fact may still give these versions some primacy for purposes of interpretation. In the work of the Court, English and French will continue to be employed as the official languages.

VI. THE PRESENT OUTLOOK

A remarkable advance was made in the field of judicial settlement of international disputes after the last war, and we are justified in believing that it can be continued after this one. The nations of the world are now generally agreed upon the nature of the judicial process. Full opportunity for each party to a dispute to present its contentions; careful weighing of the views of all the parties by trained, independent and impartial judges; judgment according to the applicable law of the international community — these are everywhere admitted to be essential to adjudication by an international tribunal. Nor is general agreement lacking on the provenance of the law which such a tribunal should apply. In some measure, the law stems from custom and from the general principles which enshrine past wisdom; to a

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larger degree, it derives from treaties and agreements. The conclusion of conventional arrangements by states has been the outstanding feature of international relations during the past hundred years; indeed, at any given moment many thousands of treaties are in force. Not merely are they in force as a matter of law, they are also observed in daily life. For *pacta sunt servanda* — the principle that agreements must be kept — is more than a juridical concept. It is a moral precept which serves as the foundation for friendly relations among peoples. The holocaust of wars has not destroyed the world's treaty law.

The Charter now offers an opportunity for a revitalization of international law. International legislation, so greatly extended during the past quarter of a century, must now proceed at quickened pace, and it may push out in fields which have hitherto lain fallow. A resumption of the effort to codify parts of international law may also be in the offing. In the main, however, gradual rather than episodic progress must be our chief reliance. And just as courts have served to fill the interstices of the Anglo-American common law by broadening it from precedent to precedent, international courts may serve as catalytic agencies for shaping the international law of the future.

Here, then, lies the promise of the International Court of Justice. Eighteen years of experience with the Permanent Court of International Justice has paved the way for it. Most of the 50 states represented at San Francisco, including all of the countries which wield great influence in the world of today, will doubtless support it from the start, and ways should soon be opened for other states to collaborate. There need be no cause for discouragement if the time of the new Court is not overoccupied for a while. Much remains to be done before its jurisdiction will be as extensive as could be wished. Other courts may have to be created alongside it; and if states prefer to make use of temporary tribunals, so much the better.

If the peoples of the world are truly "determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," the Court can be a powerful aid in that endeavor. It can furnish solutions of many international disputes which, if left to fester, might jeopardize the world's peace. Even a perfect tribunal will not serve this end, however, unless there be a willingness among men to seek justice and to abide by its dispensations. That willingness depends less upon the structure of the temple of justice than upon the spirit in which it is visited.

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IMPORTS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

By Percy W. Bidwell

"EXPORT or die" is a challenging phrase, but like so many catchwords expresses only half the truth. When Hitler told the Germans in early 1939 that they must export or die, and when *The Economist* several years later used the same words to describe England's postwar situation, neither nation was overburdened by its own productive capacity and neither was in the position of having to dispose of surpluses abroad or see its economic life stifled by their weight. Actually, "export or die," as they used the expression, meant "import or die;" it meant that a highly industrialized country had to buy from abroad each year large supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. Lacking these supplies, millions of its factory workers would lose their jobs and millions of its closely packed urban population would suffer actual starvation. Furthermore, cut off from outside supplies of strategic materials, its military potential would be drastically reduced. Thus, for a nation to stop the inflow of goods might so reduce its economic and political strength as to cause it to lose its status as a Great Power. States in this situation must have imports to survive, but they can get imports only by exporting; hence in this sense it is true that they must export or die.

Americans are not in the habit of listing their country among the have-not nations. Traditionally, we have taken great pride in our "inexhaustible resources," our vast area of arable land, our great forests, and our abundant and varied deposits of minerals. We are accustomed to think of ourselves as self-sufficient, as not dependent in any critical degree on a large and uninterrupted flow of goods from abroad. It is true that wartime shortages of rubber and tin and many other metals jolted our complacency, but most Americans still would consider "import or die" a ridiculous exaggeration if applied to their own country. A poll on the question, "Are imports vital to the American economy?" would probably show that a majority of Americans considered them of minor importance. But if asked whether exports are vital to us, most Americans would reply emphatically, "Yes."

The accent on exports is one of the ideological relics of seventeenth and eighteenth century mercantilism which still beclouds

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our economic thinking and distorts our economic policy. We glorify exports as a means of producing employment at home and of carrying American culture and prestige into remote parts of the world. Imports have no such glamor. In the popular view, in fact, importers are engaged in a somewhat dubious occupation. They bring in foreign goods which seem to displace an equivalent amount of domestic products, thus creating unemployment and sabotaging the national economy. But, as a matter of fact, neither of these views can be accepted as a general rule of national policy. There is no magic in exports or imports by which either of them inevitably promotes prosperity or creates depression. Just now the fear of postwar unemployment is responsible for ambitious plans for pouring American goods into foreign markets. But unless the goods are to be given away — and probably a considerable amount should be thus disposed of — the boosting of exports will mean a corresponding flow of foreign goods into American markets. An old truth is at long last making its impression on American thinking: Since our purchases abroad furnish the dollars with which foreigners buy goods from us, exports and imports really are two sides of the same coin. Our policy, therefore, toward both branches of foreign trade must be consistent. We cannot logically bless one and curse the other.

Apart from the interdependence of exports and imports, what can imports, in and of themselves, do for the American economy? What are some of the positive benefits which we might obtain by more liberal purchases of the products of foreign countries?

The most significant thing that can be said about importing is that it is the means of getting goods cheaper than we ourselves can produce them. This is the basic advantage of all trade, whether it be between the United States and England or between New York and Indiana. Foreign trade is a means whereby Americans can draw on the natural resources of all the countries of the world; it is the peaceful method by which we persuade their outstanding technical experts and skilled laborers to work for us, with mutual benefit. But in addition to this long-recognized general advantage, imports can make certain special contributions to the American economy in the years that lie ahead. (1) Imports of foreign raw materials, particularly minerals, can help safeguard our economy against the too rapid exhaustion of our natural resources. (2) Imports can help break up monopoly situations and keep American business functioning on a free-enterprise basis. (3) Imports of foreign consumers' goods can, by educating consumers'

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tastes, stimulate American manufacturers to raise the artistic quality and technical excellence of their output.

II

The Second World War, even more than the First, has made Americans think about imports — particularly about those raw materials which military men call strategic. In 1941 and 1942 we were terrified by shortages of tin and rubber which threatened to strangle our rearmament and war production effort in its infancy. In the pinch of war's necessity, the not unfamiliar facts that we produced no quinine, rubber, quartz crystals and other strategic materials took on new significance. The appearance of the atomic bomb turns our attention with dramatic force to our meager sources of supply of uranium. A great many people now understand why conservationists and military men have been preaching for decades that, for the United States, the idea of self-sufficiency in raw materials is a dangerous delusion.

Dr. Pehrson, in the July issue of this magazine,[1] showed how narrow is our margin of supply of certain minerals. Domestic production of tin, antimony, chrome, nickel and industrial diamonds is either nonexistent or else deposits are so small, or of such poor quality, as to be negligible either in peace or in war. In a second group containing important non-ferrous metals and ferro-alloys — copper, lead, zinc, manganese — our commercial reserves might possibly last for two to 35 years at the 1935–39 rate of consumption. Our iron ore is good for somewhat over a century, but the most accessible deposits, the open-pit mines of the Mesabi Range in Minnesota, may be exhausted in a decade. Our supply of bituminous coal seems practically infinite, but the end of our petroleum and natural gas seems definitely in sight; proved reserves of petroleum have an estimated life of 18 years, assuming 1935–39 rate of consumption.

These estimates, as Dr. Pehrson and other engineers readily admit, have no iron-clad validity. Some previous pessimistic predictions have proved to be wrong. The Conservation Commission of 1909, for example, far overestimated our future consumption of timber, iron ore, and coal; and its predictions of the early exhaustion of petroleum and natural gas were upset by unexpected new discoveries. But the advance of geological science in the past generation, and the wider range of explorations, give greater validity to present-day estimates and diminish the pros-

[1] Elmer Walter Pehrson, "Our Mineral Resources and Security," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1945.

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pects of important new discoveries. Furthermore, we may expect that in postwar years our industrial economy, geared through a policy of full employment to expanding domestic and foreign markets, will devour raw materials at a prodigious rate.

In view of these facts, the expression "import or die" begins to make sense. No one can now deny that in wartime imports are vital. In peacetime, also, the dependence of key industries on foreign sources of supply is a hard economic fact. In 1937 American factories used a billion dollars' worth of imported raw materials. Of these, something like three-fourths were non-competitive; the remainder supplemented inadequate domestic supplies. We might, of course, insist that American engineers produce automobiles and airplanes, radios and telephones, exclusively from domestic materials, but by so doing we would block technical progress in these industries and put an end to their ability to compete in foreign markets.

The need for conserving our declining reserves of metallic minerals and our fuel resources would seem to point logically to the reform of our tariff policy on minerals. "We should make every effort," according to William Batt, Vice Chairman of the War Production Board, "to import all we can of the critical materials and use as little as possible of our own precious remaining supplies." Tin, antimony, chrome, nickel and industrial diamonds are properly on the free list. But imported copper, lead, zinc, tungsten and manganese pay duties varying from one-third to three-fourths of their foreign values. On economic grounds, protective tariffs on the products of an extractive industry such as mining have been particularly hard to justify. The argument that they are infant industries does not apply, for these industries were never young, in the sense that radio or television is young. A mine, from the beginning, is an aging industry with wasting capital assets. Import duties may help a newly introduced branch of manufacturing to overcome the temporary handicaps of lack of skilled labor or of "know-how." But the handicaps of the high-cost American mines are not temporary; they are in the order of nature: narrow veins, refractory ores, bad location. Tariff protection, no matter how high or how long continued, cannot overcome these disadvantages. No import duty can widen a vein of copper in a Montana mine or bring it a mile nearer Detroit.

A lower tariff policy which permitted larger imports of minerals would mean cheaper raw materials for American manufacturers. It would concentrate domestic production in the low-cost mines;

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imports would supply that part of domestic consumption formerly supplied by marginal operations. Such a policy would also conserve national resources, even though some of the closed mines might have to be permanently abandoned. If a certain amount of domestic production, in addition to that which can exist without tariff support, were considered necessary on military grounds, it should be supported by direct government subsidies, chargeable, like expenditures for the Army and Navy, to the costs of national defense. In emergencies we should rely principally on stockpiles and on imports from allies and friendly neutrals. This amounts to saying that for the United States the wartime supply of critical materials is a *political* problem. Our safety is to be found not in adopting a program of economic self-sufficiency actually impossible of fulfilment but in an adequate Navy and merchant marine and in a farsighted foreign policy.

Mine owners, particularly in states in the inter-mountain area, may be expected to cling stubbornly to protection; but their opposition to lower tariffs is less united, less confident now than in the halcyon days of Hawley and Smoot. Some of the mineral industry's closest advisers already are pointing to handwriting on the wall. The *Engineering and Mining Journal*, for example, calls attention to a national drift toward reduced tariffs and warns: "Unless there is a definite about-face in public thinking, it seems hopeless to plan on tariff increases [on minerals], or even on retaining present margins of protection. . . . The most a protectionist can expect under the present outlook is that reductions of tariff will be gradual." [2]

III

Americans have been brought up to believe that active competition among businessmen is the dominant principle of the free-enterprise system. They have been accustomed to defend that system on the ground that competition keeps prices and profits at a reasonable level. But among businessmen the tendency to combine has often proved stronger than the urge to compete. Hence our history is studded with anti-monopoly movements and laws against restraint of trade. When, after the Civil War, the development of a great national market revealed the economies of large-scale production and management, industrial combinations grew to such dimensions that federal action was taken to restrain them. In the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and later legislation, Con-

[2] Evan Just, "A National Mineral Policy," *Engineering and Mining Journal*, April 1945.

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gressmen reflected the strong anti-monopoly sentiments of their constituents. They wanted to protect the small producers and distributors against the menace of big business and to protect the consumer against monopoly prices.

But Congress and the people, suffering, as it were, from a split personality in their economic thinking, thought they wanted something else, something contradictory; they believed they needed to protect domestic manufacturers against foreign competition. Hence we find protective tariffs growing up side by side with anti-trust laws. On the one hand, Americans denounced and penalized restraint of trade, and on the other, by shutting out foreign competition, created conditions favorable to combination among domestic producers. Woodrow Wilson saw the connection between the trusts and the tariff. "For a long time . . . we have sought in our tariff schedules," he told the Congress in 1913, "to give each group of manufacturers or producers what they themselves thought they needed in order to maintain a practically exclusive market against the rest of the world. Consciously, or unconsciously, we have built up a set of privileges and exemptions from competition behind which it was easy by any, even the crudest, forms of combination to organize monopoly. . . ."

Most economists would deny that the tariff has been the sole or even the primary cause of business combinations. Conceding that the tariff might be the mother of some of the trusts, they ascribe the paternity of all of them to the newly discovered economies of large-scale production and large-scale management. But Taussig, the leading tariff authority of his day, found definite evidence that the drift toward monopoly conditions was "promoted" by protective import duties. In the case of sugar refining he found that the monopoly had been "both easier to bring about and a source of greater profit, because of the protective duty. . . ."

Within the past decade the long struggle against business monopolies in the United States has moved into the area of foreign trade. Thurman Arnold, becoming in 1938 the head of the Department of Justice's anti-trust division, launched a series of indictments against American firms which had participated in international cartels. Since that time the Department has initiated more than 50 suits charging that cartels have restrained American export and import trade by fixing prices, by restricting production, and by dividing world markets. The Department's charges have not been sustained in all the cases which have come to trial, but enough admitted facts have been spread on the record to in-

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dicate that a substantial part of American foreign trade, somewhere between 15 and 20 percent by value, has been conducted under agreements controlling competition between American and foreign firms.

In reviewing the cartel cases, one is struck by the frequency with which the protective tariff is connected with this new aspect of our monopoly problem. In 1940 Clair Wilcox, in an investigation for the T.N.E.C., found evidence of American participation, either direct or indirect, in international cartels controlling the sale of aluminum, copper, dental supplies, electric lamps, ferromanganese, lead, leather, paraffin, potash, quinine, railroad cars, rayon, rubber thread, steel tubes, sulfur, tin plate, titanium and zinc. With two exceptions, potash and quinine, the producers of all of these items are beneficiaries of tariff protection. Corwin Edwards, a few years later in a report prepared for the Kilgore Committee, listed 105 cartelized commodities or groups of commodities, of which 90 were dutiable when imported into this country. Anyone conversant with tariff history will recognize at once among the indicted firms the names of companies that for years have fought energetically and successfully to secure high import duties for their products — for example, matches, plate glass, rayon, dyestuffs, optical instruments.

This interrelation between cartels and tariffs is not fortuitous. As Professor Walton Hamilton pointed out in the July issue of this magazine,[3] cartels are one method by which businessmen with international interests have attempted to make their adjustment to autarchic restrictions on trade imposed by the tariff laws of many countries, including those of the United States. A rather different view was held during the optimistic 1920's. Then European publicists were advocating cartels as a substitute for tariffs. According to this notion, businessmen, if allowed to set up their own controls of international trade, would cease to demand that national states should control it by import duties. But the course of events was different. Actually, cartelized industries — iron and steel, chemicals, rayon and aluminum — have continued to demand that tariffs in their respective domestic markets be maintained at a high level. They have found tariffs useful as a bargaining weapon when new cartel negotiations are in progress. Also, when cartels break down, as frequently happens, they cling to the tariff as a secondary line of defense against the competition of their former business associates. It is true that

[3] Walton Hamilton, "Cartels, Patents and Politics," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1945.

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in some international business agreements in which American firms have participated our tariff has not been a large factor. In copper and electrical appliances, for example, American firms have dominated the domestic market and have been strong contenders in foreign markets. But in general it will be found that cartels supplement and reinforce the restrictions on foreign trade imposed by import tariffs and do not replace them. This truth is now being recognized in the Administration's foreign trade policy, which by a simultaneous attack on both cartels and tariffs aims to cure our economic schizophrenia.

A more active import trade, induced by lifting cartel restrictions and reducing tariffs, would help directly in the perennial American struggle against monopoly. Indirectly, freer imports would help to perpetuate the class of small businessmen which constitutes such a valuable element in our democracy. In the past few years some of the larger department stores have expanded their sales of imported goods and are planning to carry this policy further as soon as more foreign products become available. But it is still true that the importation of consumers' goods such as watches, linens, laces and embroideries, and fancy groceries, is typically a small business, often carried on by a single entrepreneur using his own capital and aided by only a small staff of employees. Furthermore, the foreign goods which he handles become in turn the stock in trade of small shops in all parts of the country.

For the enterprising small retailer, imported goods provide new and distinctive merchandise which are a valuable supplement to the standardized mass production articles of domestic manufacture. Before the war small department stores, women's ready-to-wear and specialty shops, gift shops and linen shops sold Irish and Czech linens, French, Chinese and Belgian laces and embroideries, Swedish and Bohemian glassware, German and Japanese chinaware. Retail jewelers, who make their living chiefly by selling watches, found Swiss wristwatches a fast-moving item. Imported whiskies and other liquors were sold at retail largely by small dealers. Neighborhood delicatessens carried a varied stock of imported fancy groceries, Portuguese sardines, Japanese tuna fish and crab meat, Russian caviar, Polish hams, and cheeses and honey from a dozen foreign countries. When, after 1940, imports from most of Europe were cut off, importers made a vigorous attempt to supply their trade with substitute merchandise from other parts of the globe, chiefly from Latin America.

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IV

Historically, war and trade have been the principal mediums by which culture has been diffused from centers such as ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome to distant lands. In school and college we were taught to marvel at the rapidity with which traders in olden times scattered the knowledge of new fabrics, new metals, new industrial arts over the world; but we are less well aware that foreign trade still has an important cultural function. It is easy to see that the exportation of American sewing machines and refrigerators into central Africa, or the mountains of Bolivia, or the jungles of the upper Amazon helps to raise standards of living in those areas. But the United States can receive as well as transmit culture through foreign trade; even in an advanced industrial country like our own, imports exert an energizing force on cultural standards. Textiles afford numerous illustrations of this process. Embroidered handkerchiefs imported from Switzerland add variety and color to American women's wardrobes, for example. But the imports do not supply nearly the total demand; as soon as a design has proved popular it is immediately imitated in quantity by American manufacturers and sold at a somewhat lower price than the imported articles. Next season the Swiss send over new designs, and so the process of innovation and imitation continues. Velvet imports had a similar history. When plush velvets went out of style importers introduced chiffon velvet, and domestic firms promptly copied it. Driven out of that line by domestic competition, importers developed an erect pile velvet for the American market. When that also was successfully copied, they brought in a third product, transparent velvet.

The process of enriching American life through imports is taking place constantly in a great variety of forms. The ribbed woolen hose so popular with men were first introduced from England, as were also gabardine trench coats. An American manufacturer regularly advertises the fact that his shoes are so faithfully copied from English models that even the most discriminating purchaser cannot detect the difference. For generations American manufacturers of women's hats and dresses have followed the style leadership of the Parisian couturiers.

But, it may be asked, why must we import French fabrics, English shoes, or Paris gowns in order to get the benefit of foreign pioneering in styles? Why not let representative American shops and factories procure the designs abroad and do away with im-

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ports? That is possible and is occurring constantly, but it is risky business. The design may look promising, it may prove popular abroad, but will it "take" in New York, Chicago or Kansas City? That question is usually answered by the importer; he takes a chance, brings in a limited supply of the novelty, repeats his order if he makes a killing, and is always prepared to introduce new designs as soon as domestic competition catches up with him.

Most Americans, on reflection, would agree that in clothing, house furnishings, and interior decoration this country has benefited and can still benefit from foreign — particularly European — leadership in style. In invention and machine design, on the other hand, Yankee ingenuity has often given us leadership. Yet even here we can learn from foreigners. We are apt to forget that the gas-engine automobile was originally developed abroad and that even after its successful domestication on this side of the Atlantic, American manufacturers took over various improvements which had first been tried out by French, German and English producers. The recent progress of the British in the development of radar, television and jet propulsion indicates that in engineering Great Britain may still make great contributions to our civilization.

Swiss watches show how foreign trade facilitates a cross fertilization in engineering and design. American factories first demonstrated that interchangeable parts of watches as well as clocks could be made by machinery, and the Yankee dollar watch, really a pocket clock, was exported to a wide market. The Swiss watchmakers, taking a leaf from our book, soon developed a cheap timepiece of their own which competed in third markets. But in making good, low-cost, 15-jewel watches the Swiss showed real competitive superiority. They were responsible for taking the American businessman's watch out of his vest pocket and putting it on his wrist. Importers of Swiss watches also first introduced into this country a practical small wristwatch for women's use and also pioneered in rectangular, oval and other non-circular movements and non-magnetic, waterproof and shockproof watches. All of these innovations were eventually adopted by domestic manufacturers after the importers had demonstrated that they added to the saleability of the product.

V

The outlook for a liberal import policy is now much brighter than after World War I. At that time economic isolationism,

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partly induced by the collapse of the postwar boom, and partly a sympathetic response to the political philosophy that rejected the League of Nations, replaced the low rates of the 1913 tariff with the record-breaking tariffs of 1921 and 1922. This time, we have many proofs of the willingness of Congress, reflecting strong popular sentiment, to go along with a well-defined program of international coöperation. The extension of the Trade Agreements Act, the approval of the Bretton Woods monetary plans, the decision to join the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, and finally the ratification by the United States Senate of the Charter of the United Nations — all these indicate an attitude far different from that which prevailed a quarter of a century ago.

The action of the 79th Congress in extending the life of the 1934 Trade Agreements Act for a new term of three years, with an important amendment substantially enlarging the President's powers, places the responsibility for postwar tariff policy squarely upon the Executive. Should President Truman be disposed to use his new powers to the limit, he could cut in half all the tariff rates as they existed on January 1, 1945. Taking into account reductions already made in 11 years of tariff bargaining, he would be able to reduce many import duties to only 25 percent of the rates fixed in the Hawley-Smoot Act. The power is there, but no one expects that the President will use it so drastically. In fact, the danger lies in the opposite direction, for Mr. Truman has given the Congress explicit assurance that he will make no trade agreements which would endanger industrial, agricultural or labor interests. This blanket commitment, it is hoped, will not prevent the Department of State from negotiating new agreements on a broader basis, especially with the United Kingdom and Canada. Such action would probably find strong support in public opinion, for radio and newspaper comment, as well as Congressional hearings and debates, show a new tactical situation. The low-tariff team now has the ball; the protectionists are on the defensive and, in industrial areas at least, are steadily losing ground. Important sections of American industry no longer tremble at warnings of competition from "pauper labor," and this confident attitude is shared by the workers. James Carey, Secretary-Treasurer of the CIO, recently told the Senate Finance Committee that in 1940 less than 2,000,000 out of 45,000,000 gainfully employed men and women were working in industries benefiting from tariff protection.

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The pattern of Congressional voting on the extension of the Trade Agreements Act may indicate a new geographical line-up on the tariff. With but few exceptions, representatives from districts in the country's great manufacturing centers, clear across the continent from New York and Philadelphia to Seattle and Los Angeles, supported the low-tariff policy. Boston and the industrial cities of eastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island, according to these votes, seem to be the last urban strongholds of uncompromising protectionism. It would, of course, be a mistake to interpret the Congressmen's votes simply on the basis of the economic interests of their constituents. Party allegiance was no doubt a large factor, though it is difficult to tell where party politics stops and economic influences begin. It is possible that the Democratic Party's control of the principal industrial cities rests in part upon popular approval of that party's low-tariff program.

Although tariff reduction has gained ground on a broad industrial front, isolated pockets of resistance still remain, in communities manufacturing woolen textiles, gloves, glassware, chinaware, watches, cutlery and hardware. Singly, or even in combination, these interests are not strong enough to reverse national policy in the direction of protection, but they may become formidable if supported by allies in the agricultural and mining areas. In these areas, excepting the Solid South, Congressmen consistently voted against the enlargement of the President's powers to reduce tariffs.

To assure a generous flow of imports into the United States tariff reduction is essential. It is true that imports, particularly raw materials, follow the curve of national income. If we can keep our industries operating at full capacity in the postwar years, we may expect that they will purchase abroad large quantities of foreign minerals, textile fibers, and fats and oils. But there will be no dollar-for-dollar relationship between increased income and increased imports. Compared with countries like Canada and the United Kingdom, our "marginal propensity to import" is small; according to de Vegh's calculations [4] the addition of a dollar to our national income gives rise to only seven cents' worth of additional imports. Moreover, the expansion of our national income principally stimulates imports of raw materials. To stimulate imports of consumers' goods, government action is needed to reduce

[4] Imre de Vegh, "Imports and Income in the United States and Canada," *Review of Economic Statistics*, Vol. 23, 1941, p. 133.

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import duties, to simplify customs formalities, and to make commercial intelligence available to importers.

But first let us see what the importers can do to help themselves. Studies of the Tariff Commission and the Treasury have called attention to the high costs of marketing imported merchandise, the mark-ups being regularly higher than in handling domestic trade. Traditionally, importers of consumers' goods have been content to bring in small quantities of high-priced specialties to be sold to a limited clientele. For this situation high import duties which tended to limit imports to luxury goods have been partly responsible. But just before World War II disrupted trade, a few large department stores had discovered the possibilities of mass merchandising of foreign-made bicycles, chinaware, men's furnishings, and food specialties, and as soon as V-E Day had been announced their buyers were in Europe planning the resumption of a vigorous import campaign. The economical handling of foreign goods, however, is not limited to large business units; small specialty stores in various parts of the country have found that by forming buying syndicates they can considerably reduce the costs of importing.

The Department of Commerce's announcement late in 1944 of a policy of active assistance to importers is revolutionary. Hitherto, the importer had few friends in Washington outside the State Department, which was responsible for negotiating trade agreements. The Tariff Commission went to the importers for information, but could offer little comfort in return, being bound by the impossible requirements of cost comparisons. The Treasury officials, while not actively hostile, considered it their duty to protect the revenue. That meant giving the government, not the importer, the benefit of the doubt wherever the law permitted any discretion, and in general administering with uncompromising rigor a mass of intricate customs regulations. The Department of Commerce has long had a Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, but in this connection "foreign" has meant only "export." Mr. Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce and later as President, spent millions in building up a large corps of commercial attachés and trade commissioners who provided American exporters with effective aid in marketing their goods abroad, but long-established policies strictly limited the help these officials might give to American importers. Now it appears that the Department has abandoned this one-way conception of its foreign trade functions. Secretary Wallace wrote recently: "If we

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are to avoid the mistakes of the twenties, it is important that we start now specialized research to discover just what types of imports will best help the economy of the United States. We must learn to look on imports as a benefit to the United States, not as a damage." When legislators as well as administrators adopt this way of looking at imports we may expect that foreign goods will be allowed to make their full contribution to national welfare.

VI

Americans will not die, nor will the United States cease to exist, if we fail to increase our imports. But we shall not live as well as we might, nor as safely. This is a rich country. The high productivity of our industry gives us abundant supplies of purchasing power in foreign markets. Unlike Britain, we are under no pressure to restrict imports in order to bring our international accounts into balance. On the contrary, we cannot hope to balance them without expanding our purchases abroad. Yet, with all our riches, we have persisted in playing the miser, spending in normal years less than one percent of our national income on consumers' goods of foreign manufacture. Instead of reaching out for the useful, appetizing and beautiful things which foreigners are so eager to supply, we put up tariff walls to protect ourselves against prosperity and abundance. If we will adopt a new attitude toward imports, if we will accept them and make the most of them, we shall increase national security, we shall provide the competitive stimulus necessary to maintain our free-enterprise system at a high pitch of efficiency, and we shall enable our people to attain the high cultural standards befitting a rich and powerful nation.

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THE AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE WORLD ORGANIZATION

By Ezequiel Padilla

On the day our plenipotentiaries exchange their full powers, an immortal date will be inscribed in American diplomatic history. When, a hundred centuries hence, posterity explores the origin of our public law and recalls the pacts that consolidated its destiny, it will record with respect the Isthmian protocols. In them, it will find the plan for the first alliances which project the course of our relations with the rest of the world. — *Simón Bolívar, 1824.*

BOLÍVAR wrote these prophetic words more than a century ago, when he invited the American Governments to take part in the Congress of Panama. The Liberator, like all geniuses, was ahead of his time. The nations of the New World were not ready to put Bolívar's noble vision into practice. The farsighted provisions of the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation signed at Panama in 1826 remained only phrases on paper.

The tradition of inter-American consultation was renewed in 1889, and was subsequently buttressed by the decision to hold conferences periodically. The first timid endeavors of those conferences fell far short of the provisions of the Treaty of Panama, which had been designed to strengthen continental solidarity and to assure the total defense of America. Little by little, however, the republics of the hemisphere began to march firmly along the path pointed out by Bolívar and by President Monroe, who, in his time, had traced it clearly, even though from the start his ideas were marred by being expressed in terms of unilateralism and later on were distorted.

Nevertheless, it was not until last February, when the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace met in Mexico City, that continental instruments were devised to carry Bolívar's program into effect. When they have been fully developed, they will convert the inter-American system into a real association of nations, surpassing in many respects the most ambitious dreams of the Liberator. This association should constitute an effective guarantee of peace and cordiality among the nations in the western hemisphere and make possible their cooperation with the other nations of the world for the maintenance of world security. It would be impossible to analyze in a short article all the instruments adopted by the Chapultepec Conference. I shall therefore limit myself to examining briefly two of

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them which seem to me of the greatest importance for the completion of our regional organization: the one dealing with the Reorganization, Consolidation and Strengthening of the Inter-American System, and the one relating to Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity.

The statute of the Union of American Republics which was in effect at the time of the Chapultepec Conference (and which will continue in force until the new arrangement has been put into operation) was set forth in two resolutions dealing with the Pan American Union, approved by the Fifth and Sixth Inter-American Conferences. That statute represented only a relatively limited advance beyond the original instrument adopted in 1890 by the first conference, which decided to set up an International Union of American Republics with the modest objective of carrying out "the prompt collection and distribution of commercial information." In actual fact, however, inter-American relations have progressed enormously since then, thanks to the community of democratic ideals and the mutual respect for the personality of each state which have characterized the international policy of the American republics. Their splendid solidarity when confronted with the Second World War is proof of this development and consolidation of interests.

We must recognize, however, that the Pan American Union as constituted still bore marks of the conception that the American states were not really equal and of the tendency toward North American hegemony which long marred the relations of the United States with the Latin American republics. It is therefore proper that the form of the Pan American Union be modified and improved in order to bring it into harmony with the basic maxims of the Good Neighbor Policy. Such a reorganization is particularly needed in view of the development of inter-American jurisprudence. This movement, initiated at Montevideo and strengthened at Buenos Aires, Lima and the three subsequent consultative gatherings, reached its culmination at Chapultepec and took shape in the solidly-rooted principle of absolute juridical equality. From this principle flow the other important principles of non-intervention, continental solidarity and coöperation for economic and social progress.

The resolution for the Reorganization, Consolidation and Strengthening of the Inter-American System was devised to turn these ideals into practice. The following actions which the resolution authorized deserve particular emphasis:

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(1) The establishment of a Governing Board of the Pan American Union, composed of delegates *ad hoc* with the rank of ambassador, who are to enjoy the privileges and immunities inherent in their office, but who "shall not be part of the diplomatic mission accredited to the government of the country in which the Pan American Union has its seat."

(2) The increase in the powers of that Board, which, in addition to its present functions, will take cognizance of "every matter that affects the effective functioning of the inter-American system and the solidarity and general welfare of the American Republics." The Board will summon the ordinary consultative meetings, as well as extraordinary meetings, and will be entrusted with the supervision of the inter-American agencies connected with the Pan American Union.

(3) The establishment of a system for electing the Chairman of the Governing Board and the Director General of the Pan American Union. The former will be chosen annually and shall not be eligible for reëlection for the term immediately following. The latter will serve a ten-year term and shall not be eligible for reëlection. An outgoing Director must always be followed by a Director of a different nationality.

(4) The reduction to four years of the interval between Inter-American Conferences. The ordinary consultative meetings shall be held annually.

(5) The creation of an Inter-American Economic and Social Council to take the place of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee — the emergency body which has been functioning during the war.

(6) The intensification of cultural relations among the American nations, through the Division of Intellectual Coöperation.

(7) Lastly, the drawing up within a specified period of time of a draft constitution for the new Inter-American Organization which is to contain, in the first place, a "Declaration of the Rights and Duties of States," and a "Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man." In the constitution, provision will also be made for the strengthening of the inter-American system on the bases outlined above, as well as "by the creation of new agencies or the elimination or adaptation of existing agencies, specifying and coördinating their functions as among themselves and with the World Organization."

The second and equally important instrument referred to above is embodied in Resolution VIII of the Final Act of the Mexico

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City Conference, entitled "Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity." This is officially known as the Act of Chapultepec. It was definitely not an improvisation. The principle of inter-American solidarity in the face of any outside threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of an American state has roots which go back to the time of Bolívar.

It was given formal expression for the first time, however, at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936. A convention signed there provided that in case the peace of the American republics was threatened, their governments should consult among themselves for the purpose of coördinating their efforts for the common defense; and it was explicitly stated in the Declaration of Principles that "every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one" of the American republics.

The Eighth Inter-American Conference repeated and added to the previous declarations, emphasizing, in the Declaration of Lima, the common interest of the republics of the hemisphere and their determination to make their solidarity effective in the face of any external threat. This principle attained final juridical stature in Declaration XV approved by the Second Consultative Conference at Havana in 1940, which stated emphatically: "That any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against the States which sign this declaration."

Nevertheless, there still remained two serious lacunae in the American system of reciprocal aid. First, the agreements applied solely to threats from states outside the hemisphere; they passed over in silence the possibility that threats to peace might come from within this hemisphere. Secondly, there was no mention of specific means to be employed to carry out the agreements.

The Act of Chapultepec satisfactorily filled those two gaps. As far as the first was concerned, the Conference asserted that "the security and solidarity of the Continent are affected to the same extent by an act of aggression against any of the American States by a non-American State, as by an act of aggression of an American State against one or more American States." In short, the Conference extended the provisions of Declaration XV of Havana to *all* international attempts at aggression, whether by a non-American or an American state.

With respect to the second weakness in the earlier agreements,

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the republics of the hemisphere which took part in the Mexico City Conference (and the Argentine Republic also, when it subsequently adhered to the Final Act) undertook, during the war now just ended, to adopt such measures as they deemed necessary in support of the principles embodied in the Act of Chapultepec. Those enforcement measures were specified, on an ascending scale, as the withdrawal of the chiefs of mission and rupture of diplomatic relations, the imposition of economic sanctions, and the use of military force. Considering a provisional agreement insufficient, moreover, the Conference recommended that the governments of the American republics later conclude a treaty making the wartime obligations assumed in the Final Act permanent.

The need of concluding this treaty at the earliest possible moment has been intensified by the decisions regarding regional agreements taken at the San Francisco Conference. I should like now to touch upon this question of the relationship of the inter-American system and the Organization of the United Nations.

III

America has never attempted to constitute a unit separate from the rest of the world. Bolívar himself, although the most decided champion of continental solidarity, had no such intention. The states which in 1826 signed the Treaty of Panama — drafted for the purpose of setting up an American Confederation — took care to append an article to that instrument containing the following declaration:

> Whereas the contracting parties ardently desire to live at peace with all the nations of the universe and avoid any cause for displeasure which might grow out of the exercise of their legitimate rights in peace and war, have further agreed that as soon as the ratification of this treaty is obtained, they shall proceed to fix by common agreement all those points, rules, and principles that are to govern their conduct in both cases, to which end they shall again invite all friendly and neutral powers to take an active part in such negotiation, should they deem it advisable, and meet through their plenipotentiaries to adjust, conclude, and sign the treaty or treaties that may be made regarding so important an object.

If the American republics eschewed any tendency toward isolation even in that period, when the ocean barriers were so formidable, still less could they be isolationist in our time, when the airplane, the radio and the other discoveries of modern science have annihilated distance and convinced even the most skeptical that the nations of the world are truly interdependent.

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No sooner were the Dumbarton Oaks proposals made public a year ago than the nations of this hemisphere began to offer amendments and suggestions designed to forestall any impairment of the inter-American system erected so painfully during the last 50 years. This did not in the least mean that they desired to form an entity apart from the world concert of nations. On the contrary, they were moved by a proper desire to promote better coöperation with the projected World Organization.

To be sure, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals clearly asserted that the general World Organization was compatible with regional organizations having purposes and principles which — as in the case of the inter-American system — were similar to its own. They likewise suggested that the Security Council "should *encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements* or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council." Nevertheless, the Dumbarton Oaks plan proposed that, when compulsory action had to be taken, the Security Council should utilize regional agreements "where this practice might be desirable." This, in reality, left this most important matter to the discretion of the Council.

The limitation was probably due to the fact that when the Big Four were drawing up the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the international union of American republics did not yet have at its disposal any juridical instrument able to provide for the application of preventive measures or sanctions. That hiatus, however, was filled by the Act of Chapultepec. This having been accomplished, the delegates of all the Latin American republics left for San Francisco prepared to fight determinedly to preserve the inter-American system within the world organization which was about to be born.

Their efforts were rewarded by the stipulations relating to regional agreements included in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 52 explicitly asserts the compatibility of regional agreements and organs with the World Organization; and it obligates the members of the United Nations and the Security Council to make use of them in the pacific settlement of disputes. This is clear from a reading of the first three paragraphs of Article 52:

> 1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action,

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provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

The phraseology of Article 53 is similar to that of the Dumbarton Oaks plan in regard to preventive measures and sanctions. It states that "the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority." Taken literally and separately, this might be interpreted as carrying the same meaning as the corresponding provision in the Dumbarton Oaks plan, that is, that the Council may decide whether or not it will have recourse to the regional arrangements for enforcement action. However, the basis for any such interpretation disappears if the text is related, as it should be, to Article 51, immediately preceding, and reading as follows:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

If we refer to the stenographic minutes of the committee and subcommittee of the Third Commission which were entrusted with the study of this subject, further evidence is found that the organization and operation of the inter-American system were intended to be fully safeguarded in the Charter of the United Nations. This does not mean that the Charter does not place supreme responsibility for the maintenance of peace upon the United Nations Organization. None of the states of this hemisphere ever sought to place it elsewhere. To have done so would not merely have been absurd in itself, but would have been at variance with the high traditions of world coöperation always nurtured by the American republics.

On May 27, Secretary of State Stettinius, after consulting President Truman, drew up a balance sheet of the results achieved

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by the San Francisco Conference. He said, among other things, that the United States shares the desire of the other American republics for the maintenance of the inter-American system intact and that this system had been brought, through the Charter, within the larger framework of the World Organization. He continued: "The United States intends to negotiate in the near future a treaty with its American neighbors which will put the Act of Chapultepec on a permanent basis, in harmony with the World Charter."

The treaty, it has since been announced, will be negotiated in the Brazilian capital toward the end of this year. What are the essential points which it should cover?

Fundamentally, it seems to me, the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro should provide for two things. First, it should reaffirm the principles incorporated in the first three paragraphs of Part I of the Act of Chapultepec, stressing especially those of juridical equality, of the individuality and independence of each state, and of collective security. Secondly, it should establish, with all precision and detail, either in the body of the Treaty itself or in special technical annexes, a fully efficacious mechanism, paralleling that of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, clearly stipulating the form in which application shall be made of the diplomatic, economic, commercial, financial and military measures foreseen in the Act of Chapultepec; how and in what degree each of the American republics shall contribute to such application; what shall be the special inter-American organ to direct the military measures, etc. This mechanism, paying strict regard to the basic principles mentioned above, should enable the inter-American system to resist any possible act of aggression from outside the hemisphere as well as to reëstablish the peace (in the unlikely hypothesis that it should be disturbed) among the American republics.

Such action will signify that decisions in this connection will be taken almost always in this hemisphere, by an organ of the inter-American system in which all interested states participate equally, and not outside this hemisphere, by an organ — the Security Council of the United Nations — from which, as it is to be constituted, the great majority of the American Republics will always be absent.

One must not forget that in conferring "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" upon a Security Council composed of only 11 members, five of whom

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enjoy special powers, the United Nations Charter establishes a system which from a democratic point of view is much inferior to that of the absolute juridical equality of the inter-American organization. Decisions of the inter-American system, whether reached in a conference, a consultative meeting or the Governing Council of the Pan American Union, are always taken with strict regard to the equal rights of all the states of the hemisphere and with their direct participation. To point this out is not, of course, to reproach the United Nations Organization, which must function under the complex and difficult circumstances of an abnormal transitional period following a great war. I cannot stress often enough that the desire of the American republics for a complete and efficient system of continental organization does not originate in any selfish isolationism but in the determination to be in a position to collaborate more effectively with the World Organization.

This far-flung hemisphere, privileged as it is in so many ways, lives with its windows open to the future, free from the historic virus which has brought so many evils to Europe. All its peoples cherish the conviction that they have a sacred debt to discharge toward humanity. Part of their duty is to bring to the Organization of the United Nations the experience of a functioning regional system. That system can and will help in the creation of a peaceful world based upon justice, economic development, respect for the fundamental freedoms and the progressive evolution of the rights of man.

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BAGEHOT AND THE FRESH EYE

By Byron Dexter

THE leading literary critic of the Victorian age foreshadowed the most brilliant political reporting of modern times in a letter to the editor of the *National Review*, dated October 12, 1856. In this letter Matthew Arnold concluded: "It was only a day or two ago that I read the article on Shelley in the last number; that article and one or two others (in which I imagine that I trace the same hand) seem to me to be of the very first quality, showing not talent only, but a concern for the *simple truth* which is rare in English literature as it is in English politics and English religion — whatever zeal, vanity and ability may be exhibited by the performers in each of these three spheres."

The hand — and the fresh eye — that Arnold had shrewdly noted were Walter Bagehot's. In that day Shelley was seldom approached save in a mood of adulation or abuse, but the essay which Arnold had read was curiously cool. Its author was concerned to describe the nature of a real though very unusual man; and he made clear at the outset how he intended to proceed. The method was a practical one. Though as yet we have no accurate details of Shelley's life, said Bagehot, "we know something — we know enough to check our inferences from his writings." It was this straightforward report on the evidence which won Matthew Arnold's accolade: "the simple truth."

Besides the essay on Shelley, three other articles by Bagehot appeared in the *National Review* that year — one on Gibbon, one on Macaulay and one on Sir Robert Peel. They belonged to no literary school. Indeed, they were almost aggressively unliterary; the author was downright impatient with Macaulay, for example, because of his love of books. The essays were full of wit and high spirits. Gibbon, remarked Bagehot, did not know the difference between himself and the Roman Empire and "narrated his progressions from London to Buriton and from Buriton to London in the same majestic periods that record the fall of states and empires;" and since Gibbon's autobiography, though fascinating, gave but a vague idea of its subject, he added drily, he would attempt a description of the historian "in plainer though less splendid English."

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For all the unheroic tone, Bagehot was ambitious to make his mark in the world. His approach was the journalist's. The way to win the favor of posterity, he had noted, was "to give vivid essential pictures of the life before you; to leave a fresh glowing delineation of the scene to which you were born, of the society to which you have peculiar access." Bagehot was delighted by the ways of the world, "the whole inevitable conditions of real life," and by the men, the women, the laws, the institutions — above all, by the systems of government — which he saw in it. And this young banker (he was then struggling to learn bookkeeping in Stuckey's Banking Company at Langport, Somersetshire) was looking at them with his own eyes.

The remarkable fact was that Sir Robert Peel's world was a new one. The bases of British wealth were no longer anchored on the land, but in the bricks of smoking chimneys. A new class was coming to power. Peel, "the business gentleman" and the constitutional statesman, the man of common opinions and uncommon abilities, Prime Minister after the Reform Act of 1832, the son of a Lancashire factory owner, was the herald of a new dynasty. Though the nobility and the gentry continued to set the tone of English social life, and though the House of Commons was still the stronghold of the landed proprietor, a broader conception of government by public opinion was in the air and political arrangements in Britain were changing.

The essay on Peel was packed with politics, but it was not until nine years later that Bagehot, by that time editor of *The Economist*, began to publish the series of magazine articles on the British political system which, republished under the title "The English Constitution," reversed the accepted thought of the time on the subject and became a classic almost overnight. Woodrow Wilson read it as an undergraduate at Princeton and was decisively influenced by it. As he later said, Bagehot offered an account of the actual workings of parliamentary government "so lucid, so witty, so complete . . . that it made itself instantly and once for all a part of every man's thinking in that matter."

Bagehot said that the British system was the opposite of what everyone assumed. The assumption, hallowed by the authority of Montesquieu, Locke and Blackstone, was that the essential feature of parliamentary government was the separation of powers. It was thought that British freedom was a result of a balanced system of co-equal estates in which the monarchical element (the Crown), the aristocratic element (the House of Lords) and the

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democratic element (the House of Commons) checked one another. In particular, this "literary theory" of the Constitution (as Bagehot scornfully called it) held that the executive branch was separate from and was checked and balanced by the legislative branch. Bagehot looked at the evidence and submitted a new report. The "secret" of the British Government, he said, was the "close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers." The Cabinet was the buckle which joined them. The primary function of the House of Commons was not to legislate, but to choose a committee which was responsible to it and which was in reality the executive. And he pointed out that the founders of the American Constitution had erred in their analysis of the British system, misled by the reactionary but transient power of the Crown under George III, and that in their effort to bulwark in their new government what they thought was a weakness of the British system and a possible source of tyranny — the domination of the legislative branch by the executive — they had in fact failed to perceive the secret strength of the British Constitution and its demonstration that executive efficiency is compatible with freedom.

All this is now familiar. There can scarcely have been a book on parliamentary government published in the last 75 years which has not taken "The English Constitution" either explicitly or by implication as a major point of reference; and though, in the United States at any rate, Bagehot has been chiefly the property of specialists, the relevancy to our present problems of the questions to which he addressed himself has brought his ideas, if not his name, on the front pages and into the editorials of daily papers.

Bagehot, designedly writing "for the world at large and for coming times," did not only ask: How does government work under the British Constitution? He likewise asked: What makes elective government possible — or, as he put it, what are the "prerequisites" for successful Cabinet government and for representative government in general? A headline question today. He described the prerequisites of elective government in various ways. They were "mutual confidence of the electors," a "calm" national mind, and "rationality" — by which he meant not so much the power to reason as the ability to listen to the point of view of other people. These qualities stemmed from two simpler preconditions. Elective government, he said, demands an educated people and a people "comfortable" economically. So far as

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Britain was concerned, he elaborated his answer with qualifications which today seem odd. Since it seemed to him unlikely that the "lower orders" of Britain would, in the discernible future, either be educated or be in comfortable circumstances, Cabinet government would be possible only so long as they remained "deferential." Bagehot saw nearly everything save the possibility of democracy in his own land.

That there should be a blind spot somewhere in this keen eye is scarcely cause for astonishment, and its presence adds interest to the aspect of Bagehot's writing which will remain uncatalogued. The provocative question which his work raises for our time is not so much the change that has taken place in the British system since he wrote, as the nature of the mind that was able to produce the first revealing analysis of the nature of the British system of government. This flair for the fresh approach was evident in nearly everything that Bagehot wrote and — we are told — in his conversation as well. His "Lombard Street," an analysis of banking reserves, scored a success comparable to that of "The English Constitution;" its findings were equally to the point, though its subject matter was less grand. And his "Physics and Politics," a search for social laws stimulated by Darwin's recently published "Origin of Species," seemed to many of the best minds among his contemporaries to break new trails. Nearly 40 years after Bagehot's death, James Bryce, not a man given to uncritical enthusiasms, remembered him as "the most interesting man in London to meet." Bagehot, he said, had the power of making a "new cut" in things.

What makes a fresh eye? These men who possess it — whether an artist noting a shadow in a corner of a room or a political scientist analyzing the governmental machinery of an empire — who report so accurately that the thing described becomes new in our sight, eternally puzzle us. The achievement seems so simple and is so rare. So many writers have consciously striven to duplicate Bagehot's feat of political observation — Wilson, for example, who came closer than most with his "Congressional Government," written under the spell of Bagehot's great work. And what would we not give today for so fresh an eye as Bagehot's, preoccupied as we are with politics, yet aware as we are of the need for the new cut?

Those who are destined for the great active rôles in politics seem equally likely to come from places far outside the favored society of their time, or from the center of it. The great reporters,

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however, as a rule are men who almost, but not quite, "belong." They are sufficiently discontented to take up an issue, but do not identify themselves with it emotionally. In short, they observe affairs with a critical eye, but, in the main, are content to observe.

Bagehot was wonderfully favored by circumstances of birth and early life for the work of political analysis which he was to perform. He was born outside the ruling class in England, but near enough to see in. He was born into the rising governing class. His father came of a family which at one time appears to have held a position among the gentry, though Thomas Bagehot describes himself modestly and somewhat wistfully as educated only sufficiently for "my station." He was a well-to-do businessman — the managing director of the Stuckey bank, the largest private bank of issue in England. Walter Bagehot's mother, a Stuckey, was the niece of the founder of the firm. Bagehot was in direct line of succession for a place of power in the expanding financial world. And it was natural enough that, after he had gone to work in the Somersetshire bank, and had published papers on economic subjects, he should come into the orbit of one of the most influential members of the new class, James Wilson, who had founded *The Economist* in 1843 to propagate the new gospel of free trade. Wilson, a self-made man, was a power in London — once Financial Secretary of the Treasury and later Financial Member of the Council of India. Bagehot married his daughter.

But Bagehot was shaped by factors which prevented him from identifying himself wholly with this world, humming with business and politics, in which doors were so readily opened to him. He was his father's only child; his mother, by a previous marriage, had had three sons, two of whom had died and the third of whom was born feeble-minded. His parents were enormously ambitious in his behalf. Walter Bagehot was gifted with a good mind, and he was made to understand that mind was the vehicle which would carry him to the heights of honor and power. It was sound Victorian doctrine, though the heavy doses of it, such as Bagehot received from early boyhood, could have complex results. Bagehot's home life was happy, but at school he was an outsider, suffering kicks and pummeling (seemingly with fatalistic equanimity) for his refusal to participate in schoolyard games and his intense determination to win supremacy in academic competition. And at the University of London (where much talk of science and of the new "scientific attitude" was in the air) he

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tormented himself with his striving for honors. He gained them, but he became best known for the ironical "Hear! Hear!" with which he would deflate the enthusiastic assertions of his fellows in argument. That was his line. He was something of a prodigy and no little of a solitary — a youth of the type which he described so well in later essays: Hartley Coleridge, Shelley, the younger Pitt. But in Walter Bagehot this pleasure, and even arrogance, in the consciousness of mental power took the form of an odd Philistinism. Then, and always, he liked to develop the paradox that the dullness of the English people was their political virtue; and he favored the intellectuals with his sharpest jibes. The ideal life, he said, was that of the "enjoying" English gentleman.

But there was more to Bagehot's detachment than the mere reaction from a valuable, if excessive, youthful intellectualism. Perhaps the single sharpest influence in his life was his relationship with his stimulating and unfortunate mother. She was subject to periodic fits of insanity. Bagehot never permitted himself to be far from her, and his devotion was unflagging to the time of her death, only seven years before his own. The relationship seems to have been the most important one in life for them both. There is no doubt that this tragic responsibility affected Bagehot's character and point of view, and that it set him apart from the "normal" world at the same time that it heightened his determination to win power in it. Perhaps one reason that sustained objectivity is unusual in any field is that, in the last analysis, no man really chooses to be objective. Detachment is isolation — usually a product of necessity, not an act of choice.

Precisely to what degree it was so with Bagehot we can only surmise.[1] It is clear that he wanted to be more than an observer in political life, and four times he attempted to enter Parliament. On three of these occasions he obtained the Liberal Party nomination and stood as candidate; each time he was defeated. The contrast with his great American disciple, Woodrow Wilson, is striking here. Wilson seems to have tried to model his career on Bagehot's during the Princeton period, when an active part in politics seemed closed to him and he wanted to convince himself that the rôle of critic and publicist was the right one for him. He made heavy weather of it. Then the road opened to political life. Three

[1] The official biography, the "Life of Walter Bagehot" (London, Longmans, Green, 1914), written by Bagehot's sister-in-law, Mrs. Russell Barrington, is uncritical and in some respects tantalizingly incomplete. Professor William Irvine's more recently published "Walter Bagehot" (New York, Longmans, Green, 1939), however, contains valuable excerpts from unpublished letters.

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times he offered himself at the polls as a candidate for public office and with spectacular success: once he was elected Governor of the State of New Jersey and twice President of the United States. In his crucial decisions, he acted from his heart's need — and thus he spoke for all. Bagehot simply worked it out with his brain.

If Bagehot's fresh eye was the product of a trained intellect, shaped by circumstances which gave him uncommon objectivity and unusual opportunities for obtaining first-hand information, one more factor should be noted in an attempt to account even summarily for the triumph of political observation of his mature years. There is, of course, a detachment of indifference; no man is so sure of his impartiality on an issue as the man who has never thought about it. But political intelligence begins with an interest in politics. When he had left the University of London, Bagehot studied and abandoned law, wrote essays on literary figures, very serious essays on religion (like a good intellectual of his age), and meanwhile took the job in the Stuckey bank. He was to maintain his connection with the bank all his life, later becoming vice-chairman. He proclaimed that "business is really more agreeable than pleasure," and, once he was past bookkeeping, he plainly enjoyed it. But like every ambitious and promising young Englishman, he was the beneficiary of a greater tradition — the aristocratic British tradition of interest in and respect for politics.

The tradition pulled Bagehot's mind as a magnet draws a knife. In his writings, the import of such a phrase as "the great Whig families" echoes the suggestion of all desirable things — the enjoyment of the countryside, the exhilaration of sports, the companionship of congenial men and beautiful women, wit, learning, wealth and power. All were epitomized by "politics." It was a worldly tradition; there was an honored place in it even for man's weakness, as Fox — that "grand, kind, human creature" (in Professor Trevelyan's splendid words) — was honored for his defects as for his virtues. The book "The English Constitution," no less than the actual arrangements which provided Bagehot with the material for his famous analysis, was created by the men of many generations for whom political thought and political activity were the breath of life. The British aristocracy, unlike the aristocracies of most European nations, was never "a caste apart;" and it took the British people to school, politically, over a period of centuries.

It is worth remembering how deeply we ourselves, no less than

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Bagehot, are in debt to this tradition, and what its implications are for our own time. Representative government is not, as sometimes suggested, a system devised in the mid-nineteenth century to fit the needs of a special class and a particular economic situation. The Victorian issue was not whether representative government should be established, but to what degree it should be extended, now that the English nation was patently no longer the upper class only. As a long-practised system of representation had enabled the king to govern with privileged commoners, it likewise enabled aristocracy to govern with a new class. And the tradition of a shaping of interests, through a system of representation, made possible democracy: in the rock-bottom definition, government by all the people, as contrasted with government by one "élite" or another. And thus it made revolution unnecessary.

The term "democracy" has become clouded in infinite confusion, since both capitalistic and Socialistic economic systems now identify their objectives by this word. That they should use much the same set of terms even in describing their ideals in detail — maximum development of industry and agriculture, maximum distribution of products, and hence maximum opportunities for the development of individuals — is, surely, one reason for believing that the two can get along together. But, in the light of a Second World War, fought to repel the claim of one part to rule the whole, the earliest and plainest definition of democracy has acquired a luster that it once seemed to have lost. And the traditional coupling of democracy with representative government gains corresponding relevancy. Representative democracy and its primary machinery — free universal suffrage — has, in point of fact, proven to be the one method of government by which conflicting interests can be shaped without warfare. And if, as seems possible, the atomic bomb has destroyed accepted conceptions of national power — it certainly has made the prospect of a trial by arms uninviting even to the greatest nation — the instrument of democratic representative government seems especially useful in the international sphere, to say the least. This practical instrument of government which the Anglo-Saxon people evolved still seems to point the line of the advance for the future. Recalling Bagehot's "prerequisites" for successful elective government we may, however, as we push for the goal, guard ourselves against expectations of making it in one jump.

Government by all the people was, indeed, an advanced idea in Walter Bagehot's day; and, as we have noted, he himself had

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little sympathy for it, not from hostility toward the masses of the people but from skepticism about them. He addressed to them the worst term of reproach in his vocabulary — "incurious." The warmhearted John Morley, to whose *Fortnightly* he contributed, relates that "I often ventured to say to him, 'You have only one defect; you do not feel the inherent power and glory of the principle of Liberty.'" One can imagine that Bagehot smiled good-humoredly. By temperament and by profession, Bagehot was averse to capital-letter enthusiasm for any cause; his special job was to take apart the enthusiasms of others, not to compound them. Of course Morley was right; it was a defect, and it has diminished Bagehot's reputation. If politics is the art of the possible, in its greatest figures — a Wilson or a Masaryk, for example — it becomes the art of extending the limits of the possible. Bagehot lacked this greatness. But by the same token, though he could not feel the charm of a vaster Liberty, he could report with exceeding acuteness on the nature of the liberty that he saw. And though he did little directly to bring representative democracy into existence, few men have told us as much as he about how to make it work.

To make it work, he said in a word, examine it; and begin, not with the examination of the machinery, but with the analysis of men. Here is his description of the ideal intelligence, seen in the guise of a constitutional monarch — a constitutional monarch of his own devising, such as surely has never lived on earth, but who certainly would be the ideal citizen of any democracy:

> Perhaps such powers as these are what a wise man would most seek to exercise and least fear to possess. To wish to be a despot, "to hunger after tyranny," as the Greek phrase had it, marks in our day an uncultivated mind. A person who so wishes cannot have weighed what Butler calls the "doubtfulness things are involved in." To be sure you are right to impose your will, or to wish to impose it, with violence upon others; to see your own ideas vividly and fixedly, and to be tormented till you can apply them in life and practice; not to like to hear the opinions of others, to be unable to sit down and weigh the truth they have — are but crude states of intellect in our present civilization. We know at least that facts are many; that progress is complicated; that burning ideas (such as young men have) are mostly false and always incomplete. The notion of a far-seeing and despotic statesman, who can lay down plans for ages yet unborn, is a fancy generated by the pride of the human intellect, to which facts give no support. The plans of Charlemagne died with him; those of Richelieu were mistaken, those of Napoleon gigantesque and frantic. But a wise and great constitutional monarch attempts no such vanities. His career is not in the air: he labors in the world of sober fact; he deals with schemes which can be effected, schemes which are desirable, schemes which are worth the cost. He

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says to the ministry his people send to him, to ministry after ministry, "I think so and so: do you see if there is anything in it. I have put down my reasons in a certain memorandum, which I will give you. Probably it does not exhaust the subject, but it will suggest materials for your consideration." . . . A sagacious and original constitutional monarch might go to his grave in peace if any man could: he would know that his best laws were in harmony with his age; that they suited the people who were to work them, the people who were to be benefited by them. And he would have passed a happy life: he would have passed a life in which he could always get his arguments heard; in which he could always make those who had the responsibility of action think of them before they acted; in which he could know that the schemes which he had set at work in the world were not the casual accidents of an individual idiosyncrasy, which are mostly much wrong, but the likeliest of all things to be right — the ideas of one very intelligent man at last accepted and acted on by the ordinary intelligent many.

Balfour, in a later commentary, was amused at Bagehot's fantasy in imagining himself king. But there would be less blood and tears if all who dreamed of power dreamed so wisely.

Bagehot died suddenly, in 1877, at the age of 51. We are the losers that he stopped work so soon, for as a writer he was only approaching the summit of his skill. His opportunities for first-hand observation of events at the center of London's political world were steadily mounting; and his critical instinct, so innately a part of his whole being, would never have deserted him. He had driven himself cruelly — as practising banker and as editor of *The Economist*, for which he wrote two leading articles weekly; and his output of longer essays and of books was constant. He was occupied with a major book on political economy when he died; he was full of plans for further work. His last published magazine article — "Lord Althorp and the Reform Act of 1832" — was one of his best. His journalistic training had perhaps given him a tendency to repeat his "points;" yet in the exposition of complicated ideas, that has its necessary place — and Bagehot's exposition was masterful. In his mature work he dropped the mannerisms of earlier days — the balanced adjectives, the series of semicolons, the long and sometimes unsuccessful animadversions. His thesis, political or economic, would develop with wonderful ease and clarity. His ability to give even the most complex material an air of narrative, and his trick of interposing snatches of dialogue, made him one of those of whom it is just to say that his work "reads like a novel."

Paradoxically, though he closed his eyes to the significance of the largest theme of his time, he is preëminently of our day. There are those who set the goal, and those who take the reckon-

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ing which tells if a given course is being kept. Political intelligence is not an abstract quality, and its elements vary, no doubt, as the concrete problems on which it must be exercised vary. But may we not say that, in the light of our given problem of the shaping of interests among nations, political intelligence is the exercise of the critical spirit? Bagehot's method was the method of reason; even in this matter of democracy, which troubled him so much and to which he returned again and again in papers of his final years, he never departed from the method of reasoned analysis. He called the English people too "unintelligent" and "incurious" to enjoy the full franchise. That education, leisure and comfort might be extended to all were solutions which seemed not to occur to him. Yet what gentle adjectives these are indeed, by the standards of unreason to which the enemies of democracy of recent years have accustomed us! Bagehot's method of conducting political controversies, in short, left the door open for a revised estimate in the event of error in judgment. Surely that is not the least of its virtues.

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TOWARD ARAB UNITY

By H. A. R. Gibb

THE question so often asked, "Can the Arabs unite?", has a theoretical and unreal ring. The true problem is a quite different one: on what terms and in what relation to the outer world will Arab unity be realized? The preparatory conference on Arab unity held at Alexandria in October of last year showed that the range of possible coöperation between the Arab states was greater even than some of the participants themselves had perhaps expected. The Arab leaders wisely lost no time in consolidating the ground there gained. A second series of conferences, held in Cairo in February and March of this year, drafted and signed a covenant outlining the institutions in which the will to unity was to be expressed.

The new covenant has been well termed "a model of Dumbarton Oaks propriety." The seven signatory states — Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, 'Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen — bind themselves to coördinate their political action, to take common measures of defense, and to resort to arbitration and conciliation in case of conflicts. The Council which was established is charged, among other matters, with deciding the means of cooperation with future international organizations. Flexibility is safeguarded by making decisions of the Council binding only on those states which accept them, by providing for closer associations between two or more member states, and by allowing for accessions and withdrawals. Intervention in the internal régimes of member states is prohibited. Alongside these political clauses, the signatories envisage close coöperation in economic and financial matters, communications, and cultural, social and health questions; and for each of these categories a joint commission is to be set up. Of the two annexes which register the still unfulfilled aspirations of Arab nationalism, more will be said later.

Since the provision of machinery for common action is an essential step toward the achievement of Arab unity, these conferences marked a significant advance; but they do not in themselves supply a final answer to the problem. Everything depends on how the new institutions work. What are the principles which underlie them? What will be the spirit in which the organs for mutual consultation are operated? What is the capacity of this machinery

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to expand in response to a growing range and complexity of needs and purposes?

All of these questions, it will be observed, relate primarily to the internal evolution of the Arab movement. The answers which may be given to them will not, of course, be reached independent of external influences and pressures. But the Arab movement as a whole has its own raison d'être, its own principles, coördinates, complexes and aspirations, and is working itself out along its own lines. It is not a mere copy of western nationalist movements, still less is it a purely negative reaction, driven this way and that by the manœuvres of imperial Powers, by Fascist propaganda, or by blind hatreds. Any presentation of either long-term or short-term issues in the Arab world in such terms is superficial.

II

History and common sense show that the achievement of unity requires three main preconditions. In the first place, there must be natural ties, strong enough and widely enough shared to take the strain of the multiple petty conflicts of daily life and of occasional major differences. No community can be enduring if important sections of it are so obsessed by grievances or so absorbed by private interests as to destroy their sense of partnership with all the members of the community in the basic issues of social and political life.

In the case of the Arabs, the emotional loyalty evoked by those common possessions which create a sense of community is exceptionally strong and solid. The Arabic language, rich and flexible, with a great tradition of literature and thought, is a heritage of which every Arab, nomad, peasant, or townsman, is intensely proud. Even though the great majority are illiterate, in the sense that they have never learned the complicated rules of Arabic writing, their keen feeling for their language and their emotional response to its rhythms could with difficulty be paralleled in any of our literate western societies.

The common Arab tradition is equally important. The Arabs of today are the product of a fusion of races along the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea and in the Near and Middle East which took place during the Middle Ages. To deny that they are Arabs because a part of their ancestry can be traced back, a thousand or more years ago, to other Asiatic stocks, is either wilful blindness or ethnographical pedantry. More important and relevant is the fact that the populations of the various

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Arabic-speaking countries have been exposed to different external influences down the centuries, and show in consequence many local differences which extreme enthusiasts for Arab unity are apt to underestimate. Yet these scarcely affect the deep sense of kinship engendered by the social and historical background of Arab life, with its memories of the desert, of the Arab Empire, of triumphs and humiliations shared in common.

Added to this is the unifying force of the religion of Islam and of its social culture. Not all Arabs are Mohammedans, and among the Arab Mohammedans there are sectarian schisms. But to all Arabs Islam is their own possession in a particular sense. Mohammed was an Arab, the Koran was revealed in Arabic, the immense Arab Empire was an expression of the Islamic movement. Christian Arabs too share the sentiment of pride in this achievement, and are sometimes foremost in proclaiming it. Islam, through its structure of law, knit together the fabric of Near Eastern society; confronted with racial, religious and economic differences, often of great complexity, it succeeded to a remarkable extent in coördinating them without destroying diversity. The religious bond is important for other reasons also. Moslem tradition has given a distinctive character to the national movement of the Arabs, and the strength of Moslem feeling in imparting depth and intensity to the reaction against western penetration can hardly be overestimated. Certainly no other factor has so powerfully contributed to the fulfillment of the second precondition of Arab unity — the will to political unity.

Yet with all these ties to bind them, the Arabs have not been politically united for a thousand years. The reason is not far to seek. Common ties do not of themselves create political unity. It must first become an objective upon which the emotional loyalties can be focussed. Unlike the men of the west, the medieval Arabs gave little thought to politics. Their efforts were concentrated upon fashioning a society, and it scarcely mattered to them who ruled the state so long as society was firmly established upon the bases of law and social ethics. As the noise and dust of the early conflicts died away, the task of maintaining the supremacy of the religious law came to be accepted as the true function and significance of the Caliphate.

Of all the later Moslem states, the Ottoman Turkish Empire came nearest to realizing this principle; but after the sixteenth century, it degenerated and dragged Islam down with it. When the impact of the European Powers and western civilization cre-

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ated new problems in the nineteenth century, it had no solutions to offer. Its bankruptcy widened the fissures which were being forced open under the new stresses. An attempt was made to bridge them by the Pan-Islamic movement, with its doctrine of loyalty to the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph of Islam. When this failed, the Arabs were for the first time faced with the problem of their future political status and organization.

For this reason, it was only in the present century that the ideal of political union began to emerge as a general Arab aspiration, although it had been formulated in Christian Lebanon earlier. An aspiration does not immediately become a purpose. So long as it is framed in general terms, it can scarcely gain a strong enough hold on the wills of men to overcome the force of inertia. Some irritant, some stimulus of opposition is needed to give it a hold on deep-seated feelings and instincts. In the Arab world, the first stimulants were supplied by the extension of European control, the reaction against Turkish centralization, and the new nationalist ideas that were spreading into the east.

But the whole Arab world was not affected by these stimulants at the same time, in the same way, or to the same degree. The aspiration toward Arab unity remained on a purely emotional level, and was therefore unstable and easily confused in the complex of subjective desires and personal aims. Before it could acquire the toughness necessary to overcome both internal and external obstacles, the emotional incentives needed reinforcement by a texture of reason appealing to the intellect and by a definition of its ideals and objectives in practical terms. Political maturity in the Arab national leaders was required to meet this demand; and this is the third precondition of the achievement of unity. In view of the long stagnation of political thought among the Arabs, their leaders could hardly possess sufficient grasp of social and economic realities or breadth and clearness of political vision to enable them to meet this need and to use their opportunities to the best advantage.

III

The program which the nationalists of Syria furnished to the leaders of the Arab revolt in 1915 was an improvised one, demanding only the independence of the Arab lands under a single government and the abolition of the capitulations. In the enthusiasm of the moment, all the inner tensions in the Arab countries seemed to have been swept away. But no sooner were the new

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Arab states and mandates established than these tensions began to reassert themselves and, if anything, to grow in strength.

The task faced by the Arab leaders was twofold. They not only had to find and elaborate the principles of unification but also to apply them in the midst of a social revolution. In the old Moslem structure, where the social unit was the group, Arab society had been built up as a system of interrelated groups. During the nineteenth century, both in Egypt and in the Turkish Empire, the old system gradually broke down, and with the disruption of the social groups the old society began to disintegrate. The Arab states thus inherited an incipient social anarchy, made worse by the impact of western institutions, techniques and theories. Wide social and economic differences were separating the various occupational groups — nomads, semi-sedentaries, cultivators and tenants, landowners, artisans, and the new bourgeoisie, between whom there were many and sometimes bitter conflicts of interests, often intensified by communal and religious hostility.

Those who were called upon to meet these problems were for the most part the new intelligentsia created by the spread of western education and the introduction of western methods of administration. It was natural that they should grasp at the western liberal democratic order as a means to national emancipation and unity. As they obtained political power, they endeavored to govern in accordance with these principles; but because in so doing they implicitly accepted European ideas of sovereignty and the state, their policies inevitably tended to build up separate and self-contained national communities. The process had begun in Egypt where, especially after the British occupation in 1882, the political aspirations of the new intellectuals were centered on Egyptian independence and fostered a separate Egyptian nationalism. The same tendency showed itself later in 'Iraq and more recently in Syria and Lebanon. Although they continued to acknowledge the ideal of Arab unity, they were unable to control the drift toward separatism, which was still further strengthened by the dominant position gained by the old governing class of landowners in the national legislatures.

More immediately obvious and dangerous was their helplessness in the face of the social problems. The world was not standing still. Between the two wars the population of all of the Arab countries increased at a phenomenal rate. Their resources and revenues were expanding even more rapidly, yet economic inequalities were becoming more and more glaring and the standard

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of living of the poorer classes was steadily going down. Industrialization and the drift to the towns were creating an urban proletariat, for whose grievances the local governments had no remedy. Political parties were fertile in promises, but indistinguishable and commonplace in performance.

In these circumstances it would have been natural for the Arab leaders to look to the democratic Powers for guidance and, if necessary, assistance. Indeed, the two western European Powers, Great Britain and France, under mandates and treaty commitments, had assumed a legal and moral duty to guide and assist the Arab states in their reconstruction. But from the first, coöperation was hindered by misunderstandings and failures. The western Powers failed to perceive the depth and force of the Arab movement. The shortsightedness which beset the policies of all the democracies in the inter-war years governed their relations with the Arab states also. There was plenty of goodwill, but it was lamed by a cynicism and lack of vision which stood in the way of positive action except under the stimulus of an emergency.

On the Arab side, the relationship was more complex, and can hardly be summed up briefly without oversimplification. On the one hand, increasing experience and grasp of political realities made the leaders more aware of the advantages to be derived from coöperation with the western Powers. But on the other hand, a succession of political disputes embittered relations with Britain and France; and the presence of the western Powers only served to inflame nationalist feeling by stimulating jealousy of foreign tutelage, suspicions that Arab interests were being subordinated to power politics, and fear on the leaders' part of appearing to be simply the instruments of imperialist designs.

These failures and resentments, the rising tide of popular discontent and disillusion as "democracy" failed to produce the expected benefits, the self-seeking of the political parties, the growing social stresses and political tensions, all combined to alienate large sections of the public from the constitutional leaders and drive them to support the more extreme wings of the nationalist movement. The extremists were in part the heirs of the earlier Pan-Islamic movement, the place of which had been taken among the Moslem Arab masses by Pan-Arabism. The old Moslem loyalties and ideology and the old hostility to western Christianity, which constituted the driving forces of Pan-Islamism, had been carried over into the Pan-Arab movement. But the western idea of nationalism had entered into it also. Ever

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since the aspirations generated in the Arab revolt of 1916 to 1918 had been disappointed, this newer yeast had been infusing its own highly sensitive ferment into the popular consciousness.

The conflict and combination of these different currents gave outside observers a confused and dubious impression of Arab nationalism. Ideally it might be possible to distinguish the reactionary and revolutionary sentiment of the Pan-Arabs and the sectional interests of local nationalisms from the desire to build up a united Arab nation on western political and economic lines, but in practice they intertwined and interacted in different degrees and at different levels. More especially, the Arab leaders had to work with and through Pan-Arab sentiment, and all sections and groups were united and keyed up to a high emotional pitch by Zionist aspirations in Palestine and by French policy in Syria. These circumstances tended to maintain the Arab movement as a whole at the stage of feeling rather than of reasoning, and did much to blur the distinctions between its various elements.

In the years immediately preceding the Second World War the drift toward extremism became more marked. The first cause was the intensification of the conflicts in Palestine and Syria, the second the weaknesses which forced the political leaders to bid for popular support. German and Italian agents played their part in exploiting the bitter feelings aroused by British and French policy, but they did not (as is sometimes asserted) either create them or to any material extent exacerbate them.

In the light of these facts, it is even surprising that the opportunity offered by the outbreak of the war was not more widely seized by the extremists. The political tensions were naturally increased by the war, especially when the Arab lands came within the zone of military operations. In Egypt there were underground movements of opposition to Great Britain, and a rising hostility to all forms of western enterprise. But it was only in 'Iraq that matters were forced to a head. There the inner conflicts had proved too much for the civil governments, and ever since 1936 the effective power had been passing into the hands of army officers, whose ambition was to build up a militant organization for the achievement of Pan-Arab union by force. After two years of intensive propaganda, seconded by the Mufti of Jerusalem and encouraged by hopes of German support, they thought in the spring of 1941 that the moment had come. The officers struck their blow, only to find that they had totally misjudged both the situation and the temper of the people. The other Arab countries

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remained passive or actively hostile, and even in 'Iraq itself the response was limited to relatively small extremist circles. After a brief resistance, the leaders of the revolt fled or were captured, and the movement collapsed.

It seems strange that the 'Iraqi officers should have fallen into the same delusion as those westerners of all nations who rely upon the power of propaganda. The Arab peoples, although liable like all other peoples to gusts of emotional feeling, are in the mass exceedingly shrewd and keen-eyed in perceiving where their own interests lie. No people can more quickly or unerringly detect humbug or more cynically discount fervent protestations. Whether, if they had been put to it, they would have preferred German to British or French control is a question whose answer anyone may guess but nobody will ever know for certain. What is sure is that the 'Iraqi rising administered a shock which for the moment tilted the balance against extremism and gave a new chance to the constitutional leaders.

But the situation confronting the parliamentary leaders in both 'Iraq and Egypt, and after 1943 in Syria and Lebanon as well, was difficult from the start and became more and more so. In the immediate outlook, political problems were overshadowed by social and economic perplexities. War scarcities and increased dependence upon local produce brought new wealth to landowners and even to small proprietors. War contracts and the huge expenditure of the troops filled the pockets of the merchants. Prices skyrocketed. The townsmen, both workers and fixed-income classes, suffered severely from the shortages and price inflations; the living standards of the rural population (other than proprietors) were depressed even below the former marginal levels. The already grave social unbalance was still further accentuated, and at the same time industrial development was injecting a new source of unrest.

In most western countries the natural consequence of such social grievances would be the growth of Socialism or Communism. In the Arab countries these, like the other western "isms," appeal only to small and unrepresentative sections of society, and social unrest goes to swell the forces of Pan-Arab extremism. It seemed clear on the face of things to the Arabs that all their troubles were due to Europe: to the war between the European nations, to the closing of export outlets, to the restriction of imports, to their dependence upon European shipping. The conclusion seemed as plain. Why should not the Arab countries assert their independ-

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ence, keep clear of European entanglements, organize their own life and exploit their own resources in their own interests?

Inevitably, the sense of grievance was focussed on the Middle East Supply Center, originally a British and later an Anglo-American organization to control and allocate imports and supplies to all Middle Eastern countries. That the Middle East Supply Center had narrowly averted actual famine in more than one country on more than one occasion was an argument that carried little weight in face of the daily struggle to get the necessities of life and to make ends meet. Yet all the time the Middle East Supply Center had been setting a practical example and inculcating valuable lessons which were not lost on the political leaders. By organizing the whole of the Middle East as a single economic unit and by fostering and coördinating industrial expansion, it had not only taught them to view their own economic problems in a wider regional setting and shown them the possibilities of regional collaboration. It had also brought into the open the resistance of private interests and the need for educating public opinion. And, most important of all, it had carried forward the educational process by bringing the local governments together in agricultural and financial conferences and setting before them the advantages of large-scale planning, investment schemes and exploitation.

Both of these wartime developments stimulated the movement toward Arab union. The climax came with the Franco-Lebanese crisis in November 1943 and the removal of all fears of direct involvement in the war in consequence of the Allies' successes in the Mediterranean theater. There were indications that the emotional currents of mass feeling might at a critical moment override all reasoned considerations of issues and policies. The political leaders, fully sharing the national aspirations to complete independence and conscious that they could not hold public support without a new and more broadly conceived program, finally committed themselves to holding a conference on inter-Arab relations. The preparatory conference at Alexandria, spurred on by the pressure of public opinion, produced results which exceeded almost all expectations. It remained to translate these into a formal agreement, and although four out of the seven original signatory governments had in the meantime been changed, the unanimity of feeling was such that the second conference at Cairo carried on from the point at which the preparatory conference left off.

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IV

The importance of the new pact needs no stressing, but perhaps its chief significance lies in its proof that the Arab nationalist movement has at length attained to political maturity. Its political aspirations still stand in the foreground, and are made more explicit by the two annexes to the covenant. In the first, the signatories asserted the juridical right of Palestine to independence, and provided for its temporary representation in the union; by the second, they bound themselves to strive for the realization of the aspirations of all Arab countries which could not yet qualify for membership. But it is in the economic and social clauses that the real crux of unity lies.

For the covenant is still only a program. The Arab nations have still to meet and to solve two sets of problems: their relations to the outer world and the pull of opposing forces within. In contrast to the extremist dream of cutting the Arab world clean off from the western world, the present political leaders are aware that the Arab countries are enmeshed in world politics and unable to hold themselves aloof. Their more limited and realistic aim is to find a substitute for the system by which separate and individually weak countries are tied to foreign political structures. By forming a political bloc and building up its economic strength, they hope to reach a point at which they can stand on their own feet in a world at peace, co-equal and co-sovereign with other national states; and they will strive for such strength that, if war comes again, they can determine their own policy and protect their own interests. At the same time, though they are aware that this program cannot be accomplished except by coöperation with friendly and democratic Powers, they are perhaps less conscious of the necessity of foreign coöperation in the solution of their internal problems. Political rivalries still smolder beneath the surface and may wreck the pact if they are exploited by competing foreign interests. Moreover, skilled advice and capital are indispensable to assist in overcoming the three main economic weaknesses of the Arab countries — the unbalanced social structure, the retarded economic development caused by lack of capital and skills, and the backwardness of administrative technique.

But there are two reasons which make the Arab leaders hesitate to look to foreign help in meeting their internal difficulties. One is obvious: the natural pride which resents any suggestion of tutelage, combined with a suspicion that foreign help is seldom given

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without ulterior motives. The other is more obscure, but still more fundamental. The Arabs do not wish to become pseudo-westerners, dressed up in the second-hand garments of our civilization. Some of the ardent defenders of the Arabs in western countries, by their efforts to present a picture of an up-to-date liberal Islam and a bourgeois Arab nation, are involuntarily doing the Arabs as much injury as those opponents who present them as a nation of raw bedouins and grasping pashas. Islam is not just a different kind of Christianity nor a perversion of Judaism. It stands — and the Arabs stand — for a view of the universe and a social ethic which differ from those of Judaism and Christianity and which, in a democratic world system to which each nation brings its special contribution, have their own place and proper function.

In the final resort, the movement for political and economic unity in the Arab world cannot succeed unless it is based upon stable moral foundations; and in the Arab world the only moral foundations which can possess any stability are those cemented by the faith and ethic of Islam. The duty laid upon the Arab leaders is, in its essence, closely parallel to that laid upon the leaders of the United Nations. In their respective spheres both must stimulate and mobilize the moral forces which will transform a negative and defensive union into a creative enterprise. Both have to surmount similar obstacles to moral unity set up by forces from within and without, and to meet and overcome attempts from different quarters to exploit the existing causes of disagreement and conflict. And in both cases the penalty of failure will be the same. The ideal will not be destroyed, but the hope of attaining it by peaceful means will be weakened. Failure means for the Arabs that the leaders of the constitutional forces will be discredited in favor of extremists who will lie in wait to pay off old scores against the west.

It is likely enough that the new Arab League will from time to time meet with reverses in handling some of its internal or international problems. The failures will not mean that there is no reality behind the sentiment of Arab unity, but only that the leaders still have much to learn from experience. The spirit in which the western nations assist or hinder them in learning from their experience will in large measure determine whether Arab national unity will be achieved on rational, constructive and co-operative bases, or by the irrational and destructive pan-Arab method of violent revolution.

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EDUCATION FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT

By Margery Perham

THE core of the difference between the American and the British approach to British colonial problems lies in the American belief that the interests of the colonies require that they be given self-government either immediately or in the fairly near future in accordance with a stated schedule. The British answer is an invitation to look more closely at the colonies, to observe the obstacles in the way of their acquiring full nationhood, to estimate the various distances they have already advanced toward self-government, and to study the active processes of education for further responsibilities that are now being pursued. Thus, I tried in a former article[1] to state some of the reasons why complete self-government could not be given tomorrow to the African colonies. I also stressed the perplexing constitutional problems that arise where European colonies have been planted among primitive African tribes, and pointed out that some British colonial problems have analogies with the situation of the Negroes in the American South. I do not wish to repeat any of these points in this article but rather to carry a little further the attempt to bring about a meeting of minds, to ask what self-government for colonies means and to give some examples both of the achievements and of the difficulties of the British in the sphere of colonial government.

Let us first consider the misconceptions which, in British eyes, seem to lead some critics of British policy onto the wrong road from the very start. The great majority of human beings have two standards in such matters, one highly indulgent, by which they judge the acts of their own nation, and the other an exacting perfectionism by which they judge the deeds of other nations. Nor is even this perfectionism wholly rational; it is often colored by subconscious prejudice and jealousy. The British are, of course, as prone to this dualism of judgment as other peoples, but criticism of America by Britain is small and intermittent in volume compared with the stream that flows in the opposite direction.

A thoughtful American writer has bidden us consider the contrast between moral man and immoral society, and it is well to ask ourselves at the outset of our discussion, "What is national virtue in international affairs?" In the absence of a comprehen-

[1] Margery Perham, "African Facts and American Criticisms," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1944.

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sive and generally accepted law of nations and an effective machinery for its enforcement, each nation has pursued and will pursue its own interests according to its own point of view. Can any nation afford to take a purely unselfish action that damages its own position in order to forward the interests of another country? If not, then the relative virtue of nations must depend upon the degree of restraint with which each promotes its own objectives; and this in turn depends upon its own social and political character. A mature, educated and democratic nation is likely to take long views and, to the utmost extent that is consistent with its own interests, to understand and allow for the interests of other nations: the frankness, tolerance and habit of compromise practised within the borders of a nation will be reflected in dealings with a neighbor. By the same token, an ill-adjusted dictatorial state will perhaps take short views and use violent methods.

But this conception of degree of restraint, or of the difference between an enlightened and an unenlightened self-interest, is not sufficiently flattering to nationalist sentiment which, when passing judgment, demands that the particular line of self-interest which the accidents of history and geography have marked out for its own nation should be accepted as the universal ideal. It is scarcely a rational standard. Let us, for example, imagine that the Alleghenies were an impenetrable range and that the vast tribal hinterland upon which the American people expended their energy and built up their power had to be reached not by horse and wagon and railroad but by ship. Would this have changed their expansion into an act of questionable morality and rendered vulnerable their tenure of this territory? Was the overrunning of the Matabele by British colonists in Central Africa in an entirely different category from the destruction of the tribes which stood in the path of American colonists? And when Americans reached their marine frontiers and overleaped them to seize colonies and strategic bases in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, was there then something more sacred in the idea of American security than in the idea of British security which dictated similar annexations? The main difference, suggested by British self-righteousness, is that a small trading island needed more overseas bases than a vast, almost self-sufficient continental nation. And when it comes to domination short of annexation, is there not a reasonably close parallel between the motives and methods by which one Power gained control over the Suez Canal and the other over the Panama Canal?

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One effective American reply to this might run as follows: "Yes, we agree with this in the main as regards the past. But it so happens that American self-interest, unlike that of Britain, does not now prompt her to hold any large, populous, and civilized or semi-civilized countries against their will. She is, even in the uncertainties of war, carrying out her promise to give the Philippines independence, and it is possible that Puerto Rico may be allowed a referendum to decide between independence and some form of connection with the United States." It is true that the United States has shown the greatest political generosity toward her two main colonies. But she has not and could not give the same treatment to the Samoan or Virgin Islands. In other words, the necessary complement to the liberalism of the imperial Power is the strength and political maturity of the dependency.

In the British Empire, of course, India stands alone in size and importance. The Indian question has been canvassed from both sides in these pages and this article is not about India. We must consider the British colonies and ask whether any of them are ready for self-government and even full independence — in so far as any but the greatest Powers can be independent today. Again, it is not easy to get the comparison between the United States and Britain on all fours. Outside the small strategic Mediterranean colonies, there are not any states in the British Empire closely comparable with the Philippines and Puerto Rico, both of which knew centuries of European government and were endowed with Christianity, Spanish culture and a very large measure of European blood before the United States took possession. The Puerto Rican political leader, Muñoz Marín, recently stated before a Senate Committee that his country was "part of western civilization and of Christendom." To visit Puerto Rico, to meet the Spanish professors and officials and to visit the farms and plantations is to realize that dependencies of this type are more comparable with South American states than with any British colonies of similar size, with the possible exception of Ceylon. And Ceylon has made very substantial progress toward self-government, with further extensions of self-rule in view.

From a constitutional point of view, perhaps the nearest rough approximations to the American dependencies — in spite of striking cultural dissimilarities — would be 'Iraq and Egypt; and, except for certain security privileges granted by treaty, both of these, after a period of protection, were recognized by Britain as independent some years before the war. The emancipation of these

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two nations, in regions of the highest strategic and political interest to the British Commonwealth, is too often forgotten.

It might be noted at this point that Ethiopia is another state which has a very strong physical and moral claim to independence. Her ancient culture and sovereignty and the intelligence and high spirit of her ruling class may be held to outweigh her great economic backwardness and the treatment which she accords some of her many subject peoples. Twice, in 1867 and again 74 years later, Britain had Ethiopia in her military power, and both times, though it would have been arguable that a period of sympathetic European protection and development might be in the interests of the mass of the people, the British armies marched away after a brief occupation. It thus appears that where the situation warrants it, Britain, like America, is capable of renouncing imperial rule.

These situations warranted such renunciation because, however possible and desirable the subordination of weak territories of this kind may seem to some Great Power, the territories themselves can gain only temporary and limited advantages from the status of protectorate or colony. If they have fallen into a state of disorder, or like 'Iraq and the Philippines had been freed from an unconstructive domination, a period during which order and economic development are supplied from outside may have a steadying and unifying effect. It did, for example, in Egypt. But in so far as such territories, in spite of many weaknesses, possess at least some of the elements upon which an ordered state can be built or rebuilt — a measure of unity in tradition or in constitution, an educated class, a historic culture and religion and a lingua franca — then their peoples will be able to absorb only a measure of direct help from alien rulers and will quickly develop a resentment against subordination that may seal their minds against further influence of this kind. Peoples in this category can best be helped through treaty relationships, through the services of an international organization, or through the formation of regional groups like that of the League of Arab States. The most suitable methods for this purpose must be developed by experiment in the next two or three decades.

II

But it does not seem to most of the British that this kind of independence is the only goal. There are peoples unready for anything approaching independence, and a tutelary power has much

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to give them: they need it and will accept it. In the course of a prolonged connection, such a dependency partakes deeply of the culture of the ruling power, including its language and political traditions, and develops close ties of interest and sentiment. The two may thus become so fully integrated that as the dependency approaches maturity it may see that its best and most secure destiny lies in free partnership with its former rulers. Dominion status in the British Commonwealth offers a terminal point of equality and dignity which is not inferior to, but merely different from, independence. "Commonwealth status," as Mr. Amery defined it, "is not one of independence *minus* certain rights and privileges but of independence *plus* the rights and privileges and the practical advantages accruing from a world-wide free partnership. It is, in fact, the status of this country."

The practical — and, admittedly, interested — British mind is not convinced that any good purpose would be served by wrenching even the more advanced colonies from their setting in an Empire which in the last six years has proved its moral and physical value not only to its constituent parts but to the world. Were they thus cut loose, they would presumably be set up as very weak units under an experimental world organization. As colonies within the Empire, or — as they make the grade — dominions, they can have all the certain advantages of the imperial connection, without forfeiting any of the still uncertain benefits to be conferred by the international organization. It is worth remarking that, as Britain is never likely to continue to hold a territory by force, her hope and interest that colonies will wish to become dominions give her a far more positive impulse to serve them than could be imparted by the knowledge that her actions were being supervised by an international agency. The publicity and general stimulus such supervision could provide have a marginal value even to a humane and liberal Power, however.

But Americans who are still convinced that complete independence must be the ultimate destiny of colonies may be comforted by an investigation of British colonial policy as regards training in self-government, since this training will be equally valuable whether it eventuates in independence or dominion status. We may therefore now consider some of the achievements and discuss some of the problems of the widest, most variegated and most conscious experiment in political education that the world has known.

Britain's greatest achievement in this field has undoubtedly

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been her success in laying a strong foundation of local government, upon which central government can be built. This British method of teaching self-government — one might almost say this habit — sprang from many causes. The use of such political machinery as existed in dependencies was, first of all, an obvious convenience and economy, where staff and revenue were short. But to the British, the harnessing of existing societies to the purposes of modern government became much more than an initial convenience. Especially in Nigeria, under the inspiration of Lord Lugard, new principles of government and education were woven into accumulating experience to make a philosophy of "indirect" government. It included the new respect for primitive institutions taught by anthropologists and the findings of modern psychology on the superiority of evocative as against repressive influences. The policy also drew upon the two main streams of British political thought. On the conservative side was the surviving aristocratic tradition with its sense of the necessity of organic growth, and, on the other, the liberal abhorrence for arbitrary interference with or intolerance toward the rights of groups or individuals. The result of this approach was that "native administrations," as they were called, were given real powers, with an almost unbroken upward curve of increase in responsibility.

Let us take some concrete examples. The delegation of responsibility has, perhaps, been most complete and successful in matters of justice. The vast mass of litigation — and tribal people are highly litigious — is settled by native judges in their own courts according to their own laws. Only barbarous laws, procedure and punishments have been interfered with. Powers of local courts vary according to the experience and advancement of the different communities. Some of the Moslem courts in Nigeria have power of life and death, and from this summit the powers range downward through authority to imprison and fine to the petty powers of a clan or village court. Appeal, generally through one or two grades of native court, go to the British magistrate or administrator, but the number of appeals is generally a minute fraction of the tens of thousands of cases that pass through the native courts of any sizable colony. Inspection and review provide an additional check. I have myself listened, with the help of interpreters, to scores of cases in native courts, and have nearly everywhere been impressed by the independent bearing of the accused and other principals in criminal cases, and also with the way in which public opinion in these always-crowded court rooms

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plays openly and often very vocally upon the process of adjudication.

The native administrations have executive, financial and legislative as well as judicial powers. If authority is in the hands of a hereditary chief, he exercises it nearly always in conjunction with ministers or assistants, or with a council, though much still needs to be done to "democratize" some native governments. Councils are formed in various ways. In some places they are partly elected and partly nominated; in others, constituent tribes or clans or even "extended families" select their own representatives according to their own custom. Often, where custom tends to create a gerontocracy, the government has persuaded the authorities to add members of the younger, educated group, which is often organized into a "progressive union." The form of selection, the procedures and the powers of those in authority are everywhere in process of active development.

There cannot be any easy way of measuring the success of a policy which shows all the varieties of form both within and between dependencies which the indigenous realities demand. Finance, however, which, in British eyes, is the essential element in local government, offers a fairly solid yardstick. In nearly all colonies the figures show a rapid rise in the proportion of taxes levied by local authorities or in the amount retained by them as a rebate from the general tax. Thus in Nigeria, out of a total revenue in 1938–1939 of 5,811,000 pounds, 1,580,000 pounds are retained and expended by native local governments, many of which have very wide powers. At the top of the list of Nigerian local governments comes Kano, an ancient Moslem emirate with a highly organized system of ministers and district heads, and a revenue of more than 250,000 pounds. In the Sudan, where local governments were launched only a few years ago, nearly 500,000 pounds are spent by the local governments, out of a total revenue of about 5,000,000 pounds and out of the 1,000,000 pounds spent on the provinces.

III

It might be illuminating to look a little more closely into the administration of one of the most politically backward and primitive groups. (To use such terms of description, incidentally, does not mean that the individuals composing the group are not highly educable and vigorous.) We shall take a district in the pagan bush country of the southeast of Nigeria. Here direct taxation was

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introduced only about 1930, because the political system — or lack of it — was so atomic, and because British officers found the tonal language almost impossible to learn. At that time, the fear that women might be taxed led to widespread and serious disorders, and the system of local government could be begun only about ten years ago. In 1944 a report upon one of these districts containing about 200,000 people showed that adult males paid the modest sum of four shillings sixpence a head in direct taxation. Of the total, 40 percent (13,178 pounds) was retained by a council which represented a large number of small clans which had never coöperated for any purpose before. With this sum the local government maintained 207 miles of local roads (trunk roads are a central responsibility), five medical dispensaries with their native staffs, five leprosy inspectors and 19 leprosy clinics. It had built and maintained 124 buildings, courts, rest houses, treasuries and staff quarters, and had on its payroll 146 salaried employees and an average of 167 employees paid by the day. Moreover, in its enthusiasm for progress it had refused to allow the African clan-heads to keep the 10 percent allowed them by the central government for their services in collecting the tax. Stimulated by the organized Christian and educated groups, the council insisted upon paying this money into a special fund to finance scholarships to the secondary schools.

In this district, especially among the "progressives," resistance to taxation has given way to the desire for an increase in the present low rate, while the keenness to make the money go as far as possible caused many of the public works to be carried out at about a quarter the cost that the central government expected. So intense is the local patriotism that all posts under local government are kept for local men and are shared out in elaborate equity among every village and clan. When we note that the older generation can remember the days when almost every group of a few hundred families was ready to fight its neighbors, and that ritual murder and cannibalism are even yet not completely stamped out, it is proper to conclude that an astonishing apprenticeship to self-government is being served in this part of Nigeria.

The foregoing describes in barest outline the achievements of a federation of native local governments in a single district which represents only one-three-hundredth part of the total population of the British colonies. Many other widely differing instances could be given. Their common features are that government is molded as far as possible upon the tribal institutions, but with

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progressively more modern procedure and functions. I think it may justly be said that the powers conferred, however limited in some cases, are real. Local government is probably weakest in the West Indies. Among other reasons, this is because most of the Islands were so small that central government tended to fill the whole stage, and partly because slavery was a far less promising foundation for local government than a vigorous tribalism.

Municipal developments in the colonies have not, on the whole, kept pace with progress in the rural areas. In most dependencies, towns are the mushroom results of European intrusion. Municipal administration demands high standards and a grasp of new techniques, yet the shifting and heterogeneous crowds attracted to the urban centers have least solidarity and political tradition. Even in this sphere, however, and even in Africa, there have been important recent advances as the educated and professional groups in the towns begin to show increasing interest and ambition. Those who charge Britain with following a dilatory policy may note that in some places the opportunities offered appear to have run beyond the capacity of the people to make use of them. The Governor of the Gold Coast, for example, recently chided the people of Accra and Kumasi for not making use of their franchise, pointing out that in the latter city at the recent municipal elections only 828 out of 14,000 voters came to the polls.

IV

The control of central government, which seems to raise a clear-cut issue between independence and subjection, inevitably attracts more attention from America than the essential, multiform foundations upon which central government must be built. Unfortunately a closer view shows that there is nothing clear-cut even about the central machinery. True, in every colony the ultimate control of affairs is reserved by Britain, and that control is expressed in the strong, formal and discretionary powers of the governor. But, as with local government, there are all degrees of delegation of authority, not only in the forms of the constitutions but still more in the spirit in which, under the varying conditions, they are worked.

The institution most relevant to our inquiry, the legislative council, comes down (with much metamorphosis) in direct descent from the first colonies in America. There is almost every conceivable variety of legislative council, from the type which is wholly an official body to the type which is almost wholly elected

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and unofficial. The composition of the councils is in a state of constant revision and, except in very rare cases, the development is in the direction of including a greater proportion of "unofficial" members, and of electing rather than appointing them. In practice, the legislative council almost always operates more liberally than the form itself seems to imply. This is because, though the governor and his officials must have in reserve the power to put through the policy of His Majesty's Government even against opposition, the precondition of a happy and effective tenure of office for a governor is the fullest harmony between him and the community under his charge.

Only by reading the debates of these councils, which are published in full, is it possible to realize how completely all the business and finance of government pass under the public criticism of representatives of the people and how large a measure of influence and even of control they exert over the affairs of the colony. Wherever an active public opinion exists, it never ceases to play continuously upon the governor and his staff through a dozen different channels. The House of Commons institution of questions has spread to the colonies; and all colonial governments are open, during sessions, to a rain of interrogations. There was, for example, an African elected member in the Nigerian Chamber whose questions, arraigning the conduct of government departments, used to run into hundreds during the brief sessions of council. And he got his answers, which fill many pages of the records.

Most of the councils have finance committees with heavily unofficial representation, and these examine every item of the budget and summon heads of departments to defend their estimates. Select committees are appointed, again with strong and sometimes predominant unofficial representation, to work over all important bills put forward by the government. These bills, in turn, are often the outcome of earlier discussions with unofficial groups, such as chambers of commerce or professional associations, which may originally have proposed them. Nor is the committee system confined to the limited circle of legislative councillors: there is an ever-increasing tendency to set up standing or special boards and committees, some advisory and some with executive powers, which are largely staffed by other unofficial members and which do an immense amount of work. This development has been much accelerated by the war; colonial governments could not have carried through the heavy tasks of pro-

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duction of food and other supplies without the unqualified support of the leaders of the peoples. No official staff was available to administer all these tasks and the solution was to entrust an important part of them to unofficial administrators. The plans for postwar development, which are to be financed largely from imperial funds, are being built up with the advice of central and provincial planning boards with strong unofficial representation.

The true picture of a colonial government does not, therefore, show an autocratic governor and his henchmen standing in lofty detachment above his resentful subjects, but rather a wide diffusion of political functions and an intricate dovetailing of official and unofficial activities. Even when, from the far distance, the ear catches nothing but the clamor of one of those constitutional clashes which inevitably break out from time to time where complete self-government is withheld, the actual situation may be very different from that evoked by the echo. The same man, white or black, who makes a resounding speech that will please his constituents and attract attention in Westminster, quoting, it may be, fiery tags from the days of the American Revolution, may very well be an influential member of the councils of the colony, working all other days of the week in effective partnership with the official side. It would, of course, be a great mistake to assume that his speech has, therefore, no reason or significance: it may indeed be a kind of formal announcement, like a notice put up to prevent the formation of a legal right of way across private property, to make plain that a working partnership for the present does not mean renunciation of the demand for self-government in the future. However valuable the training given by membership in the legislative council, however large a measure of coöperation may be attained, there must be a point, so long as a territory remains a colony, at which full responsibility is denied, and since man is a political animal, that will always be a potential point of friction.

The existence of this point does not turn the legislative council into the "farce" that angry colonial officials sometimes call it. I have had the opportunity of attending sessions of councils in a number of colonies and of discussing their affairs with councillors; and, during the last few years, as editor of a series of studies of the working of colonial councils, it has been my task to read many volumes of their debates. In all of these debates, and especially, of course, where there are politically apt and virile British groups, as in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, there is a fairly constant

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pressure upon the government to advance the pace of constitutional development. Similar ambitions and pressures are found among the non-European groups, especially in Jamaica, Ceylon and the Gold Coast. It would indeed be a sad comment on the political vitality of the colonial peoples and of their constitutional training at the hands of Britain if this were not so. But to assume that because, *when a certain stage is reached*, good government is no alternative to self-government, is not — as I read the evidence — to say that until that stage is reached, there are not many effective and educational compromises on the way.

V

"On the way." That is the keynote today in the Empire. Colonial policy is being continuously woven from many strands: the warp is drawn from the ideas and experiences of the colonies overseas and the woof from the varied interests and opinions in Britain — commercial, strategic, humanitarian, religious. Who is to pronounce whether in each case these most difficult decisions which determine the pace of the journey and its direction are just? When the United States conquered the Philippine Islands was it right to refuse the Filipinos the independence for which they were then struggling, and to keep repeating that refusal until a few years ago? The United States refused because it thought that it had not yet trained the Filipino people sufficiently in self-government. Is it right to give them full self-government now, at the moment of liberation from the Japanese? Americans would reply, "Who has the right, the knowledge or the power to decide these issues except ourselves?" So Britain has made her own decisions for her Empire, delegating responsibility stage by stage. There are no precedents to guide; each dependency is a case by itself. Every large delegation is an act of faith, and to go too fast may be more harmful for the people and for Britain than to go too slowly, since it is almost impossible to retrace a step.

Much more could be said of this process of political training. I have considered here mainly the local government and the central legislative side. There is also the question of the infiltration of the colonial peoples into the executive ranks of the central government in replacement of metropolitan officials, a process which has gone very far in Ceylon and the West Indies. This in turn leads on to the question of higher education, which is closely bound up with training for self-government and upon which three important reports are now due from commissions of in-

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quiry. But that is a subject which would demand an article to itself.

For all that could be written of Britain's colonial achievements, as much or more could be written, by those with first-hand knowledge, of mistakes due to lack of knowledge or sympathy, to bad timing by this governor or a repressive action by that. But these criticisms would be directed to the working of the system and would be made with the hope of improving it. There are now very few in Britain, even on the left wing, who do not recognize that the best way in which certain parts of the world can come to unity and civilization and release their latent powers is through a period of tutelage by a mature and democratic nation. When, for example, we in Britain contrast Liberia with the Gold Coast, or Haiti with Jamaica, we believe that the peoples of the two states which have been under steady tutelage are nearer the goal of a civilized and sound self-government than those who never knew such tutelage or who lost it too soon.

When attempts are made by Britishers like myself to answer American criticism of the colonial Empire it is because we so deeply regret a misunderstanding which impairs the coöperation essential to the interests of both Powers, not because we feel that the existence of this colonial relationship needs any excuse. If Americans are to understand us they should ask themselves what it is in their own national life that calls up a sense at once of pride and energy. Is it that expansion across a great continent and the exploitation of its natural riches into the world's greatest industrial system? The British feel much the same about their own expansion and their founding of dominions and colonies all over the world. Do Americans feel proud of having drawn men from so many foreign and often unhappy countries, of having assimilated them and given them freedom and unity in their melting-pot? So do the British feel pride in having carried all over the world a flag that stands for the rule of law and constitutional government. Britain is proud that men of very diverse races have received these liberties, proud that they eagerly demand more; and she is proud that they have shown themselves ready to fight beside the mother country from which those ideas of freedom are derived. We do not know yet if these people will always wish to remain with us. We have made many mistakes and may make a good many more. But Britain is not in doubt or in retreat about this question. She is resolute to show that the imperial bond can be made of equal service to herself and to the dependent peoples.

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RUSSIA AND CHINA IN OUTER MONGOLIA

By Fedor S. Mansvetov

THE international status of the Mongolian People's Republic, situated between China and Russia and better known as Outer Mongolia, which for many years has been singularly indefinite, is in process of being clarified. In notes exchanged on August 14 between the Foreign Ministers of Soviet Russia and China, the two countries agreed to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia within her existing boundaries, subject to a plebiscite of the population involved. This settlement will remove a point of contention between China and Soviet Russia. As for the Mongolian people themselves, their ordinary way of life will not be much changed. The population, small in proportion to the size of the area and the richness of its natural resources, both agricultural and industrial,[1] have long enjoyed only nominal independence; yet they did possess a real and cherished autonomy. Their paramount concern has always been to avoid colonization by either of their two great neighbors. The arrangement just announced would seem to remove at any rate the threat of Chinese colonization. It also provides the rest of the world with a significant clue to the nature of Soviet foreign policy.

To understand the importance of the present development, we must go back some distance into history. The Mongolian People's Republic is the last remnant of the huge empire of Jenghiz Khan, which at one time encompassed almost all Asia and a great part of Europe. Its inhabitants, like those of the neighboring Chinese provinces, as well as the nomadic cattle-raisers of Russian and Chinese Turkestan, have changed their citizenship from time to time simply by wandering across boundary lines. It will be recalled, for instance, that the so-called "Sinkiang incident," which got into the newspapers in 1944, centered about the efforts of Chinese troops to turn back bands of roaming Kazakhs who had crossed over the border from Chinese Turkestan into the Mongolian People's Republic. According to Soviet sources, the Chinese soldiers invaded the Mongolian People's Republic and fired at the Kazakhs from airplanes. There have been numerous similar incidents in recent years.

[1] For an analysis of the economic resources of Outer Mongolia, *cf.* I. I. Serebrennikov, "A Soviet Satellite: Outer Mongolia Today," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1931.

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At times the various territories with legal systems of their own which were founded throughout Russian and Chinese Turkestan, Inner and Outer Mongolia and the southern part of Siberia after the downfall of Jenghiz Khan's empire, were independent; and at other times they acknowledged the sovereignty of China or Russia. Chinese sovereignty was usually nominal; the amount of tribute collected depended on the decision of the governor-general rather than on a policy of the central government. For centuries the Mongolian people practised a system of dual-citizenship, considering themselves citizens of their own state and likewise subjects of China, Russia or any other country on whose territory they happened to find themselves — for example, Dzungaria, which ruled over a part of western Mongolia and present-day



Russian and Chinese Turkestan until 1757. The amount of tribute was often regulated by treaties. Such a dual-citizenship also existed in the Altai district until 1865, when borders were more or less definitely set, and is still practised in the region of the Upper Yenisei, now "independent" Tannu-Tuva.[2]

The first international recognition of Mongolian allegiance to China was given in the Russian-Chinese treaty of 1689, whereby Russia renounced her claim to the Amur Valley, already penetrated by her settlers. This treaty referred only to eastern Mongolia, but it held an important rôle in the subjugation of Mon-

[2] Today, Russians living in the Tannu-Tuva Republic bear allegiance to the Soviet Government and abide by the laws of the Soviet Union; while certain citizens of the Tannu-Tuva Republic who habitually wander to the northern reaches of Sayan, within the borders of the Soviet Union, nonetheless remain under the jurisdiction of the Tannu-Tuva Government.

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golia to China, as from that moment the Mongols lost hope of playing their powerful neighbors off against one another. Gradually China took possession of Mongolia, but until the middle of the nineteenth century she thought of it only as a buffer between herself and Russia and showed little interest in the internal affairs of the Mongols or in the exploitation of the material resources of their territory.

During the reign of the Emperor Tsiantsin (1796–1820), a lengthy code was drawn up which purported to regulate all aspects of Mongolian life as well as the relations between Mongolia and its suzerain, China. Though the Code of Tsiantsin was a one-sided edict of the Chinese emperor, both China and Mongolia looked upon it as an act with international validity, binding upon both countries and subject to change only by mutual agreement. And down to the present time, in spite of the many alterations in Mongolia's political structure, and the subdivision of her land by China and Russia, she has continued to regard the Code as her basic constitution. In theory, it regulated relations of the Mongolian lords with one another and with the Chinese Government. In practice, the only live issue was Chinese emigration to Mongolia. The Code declared emphatically that "All Chinese . . . who are situated within the borders of China, are forbidden to cross over the border and to plow and farm Mongolian land. . . ." And it enumerated the penalties for violation of this rule and for lax enforcement by civil officials.

Down to the present, the question of immigration has been the one major international issue in which the Mongolian people in every walk of life felt concerned. They know that free entry of either Chinese or Russians to their land means the end of their national existence. As a result, whether Mongolia is pro-Chinese or pro-Russian, or becomes either in the future, depends upon the attitudes taken by the two Powers on the subject of colonization. True independence will be most difficult for Mongolia, situated as she is between Russia and China. The Mongols have always been willing to accept help from any neighboring nation if that would ensure them against an influx of colonists. This is the basic factor on which hinges the settlement of all Mongolian problems.

II

Russia's construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway brought a change in Chinese policy toward Mongolia. As this whole northern region began to be developed, China ceased to think of Mon-

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golia as a buffer state, and began to look upon it as a land for settlement of surplus population. She also decided that only by populating the border regions thickly could they be saved from colonization and seizure by Russia. In consequence, Chinese emigration was greatly increased in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Chinese settlers flooded Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and began to penetrate the eastern *khoshuns*, or counties, of Outer Mongolia.

The response of the Mongols in 1907 was a series of revolutionary riots with the slogan "Independent Mongolia." The rioting, which began in Inner Mongolia, was at first directed against the Japanese; several Japanese surveyors were killed. From 1907 to 1910, local uprisings spread throughout all of Inner and Outer Mongolia. In 1911 a general uprising drove the Chinese garrisons and Chinese officials out of the country. Chinese shops were looted and destroyed; farms of Chinese colonists were burned, their animals were killed or confiscated and their planted fields were cut down. In 1911 a convention of lords and high lamas proclaimed the independence of Mongolia, and set up Khutukhta, "the Living Buddha," as the head of a new government which embraced both Inner and Outer Mongolia.

This new government was nevertheless so weak that China might easily have reëstablished her position in Mongolia in spite of her own internal disturbances. Now, however, Russia entered the picture decisively. Her pact with England in 1907, which led to the Anglo-French-Russian entente, had freed her hands in the Far East. Japan immediately came to terms with her, and in the ensuing Russo-Japanese treaties the two countries bound themselves to decide together all questions threatening the status quo in the Orient. The treaties were accompanied by secret protocols fixing spheres of influence in China. All of Outer Mongolia and parts of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria were included in Russia's sphere.

At the first sign that China intended to attempt to regain control of Mongolia, Russia officially recognized Mongolian autonomy and on November 3, 1912, concluded a treaty with the government of Khutukhta. Significantly, the first article of the treaty dealt with the question of Chinese colonization: "The Imperial Russian Government shall assist Mongolia to maintain the autonomous régime which she has established, as also the right to have her national army, and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonization of her land by

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the Chinese." In this and subsequent treaties the Russian Government was rewarded by many privileges, including virtually exclusive rights to construct railroads. However, in all of these treaties, Russia scrupulously avoided claiming privileges of Russian colonization of Mongolian soil. Boundary lines were not defined.

There followed a Sino-Russian treaty of November 5, 1913, in which Russia recognized China's "sovereignty" over Outer Mongolia, and China recognized Outer Mongolian autonomy. A proviso of the treaty stated that "China binds itself not to intervene in these matters and consequently will not send troops into Outer Mongolia, nor will it keep any civil or military official there, and it will abstain from colonizing in that country." Russia bound herself to abide by these same restrictions. In this treaty the boundaries of the newly autonomous state were described as those of Outer Mongolia, where they merged with the Chinese Altai district, subsequently included in Sinkiang Province (Chinese Turkestan).[3] This treaty was confirmed by a tripartite agreement of China, Russia and Mongolia. Preservation of the fiction of Chinese sovereignty served to avoid the ticklish problem of obtaining recognition of Mongolia's new status by other Powers.

After the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the temporary collapse of Russian authority in the Far East, Mongolia was plunged into chaos. One régime followed another. First, the Mongolian Government, with Khutukhta's sanction, petitioned China to reëstablish "the old bonds of friendship, and to revoke the autonomy." The President of the Chinese Republic immediately proclaimed the revocation of Mongolian autonomy (November 1919), declaring: "Five races of our land have equal rights in the Republic, and the Mongolian territory . . . has become a part of the Chinese Republic." A large army under the command of General Hsu Shi-chen quickly occupied Outer Mongolia except for the western section. General Hsu, who belonged to the Japanophile club, *Ahn Foo*, established a purely Chinese administration which began to settle great masses of Chinese peasants in Outer Mongolia. The effect of this land policy and of repressive military rule was disastrous to Chinese prestige in Mongolia.

[3] Inner Mongolia was detached at this time, but during the turbulent revolutionary years of 1917–21 some of the many different governments in Outer Mongolia claimed Inner Mongolia as part of their territory. China at the time was too weak to act against them. The final division came in 1921, when the Mongolian People's Government claimed as its own the territory of Outer Mongolia only.

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Riots and uprisings took place throughout the country. By the latter part of 1920, Chinese troops were holding only the capital, Urga (later re-named Ulan-Bator), and a few other points; the rest of the country was in a state of anarchy.

In 1921 the "white" general, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, who had been defeated in Russia by Soviet troops, captured Urga. He was driven out by Mongol-Soviet troops and a People's Government was set up. In the treaty signed in November of that year between the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (one of the seven republics which then constituted the Soviet Union) and the People's Government of Mongolia (under the nominal leadership of Khutukhta), the U.S.S.R. formally recognized the People's Government as the only legitimate government of Mongolia. The agreement contained disclaimers of extraterritorial rights, provided for the return to Russia of rights to postal and telegraph services and established a mixed committee for delineating boundaries.

According to the treaties between China and Russia, and the subsequent tripartite treaty with autonomous Mongolia, the Province of Uryankhai — later called Tannu-Tuva — was considered part of autonomous Mongolia. This province takes in a great basin at the source of the Yenisei River and is surrounded by the mountains of Sayan and Tannu Ola. It is rich in natural resources, both agricultural and mineral. The mountain ranges just named have almost no passes, and the control of this territory by Russia makes the southern borders of Siberia practically impregnable to attack by any possible enemy land forces. Its strategic importance had been recognized by the government of Peter the Great. In those days the Russians had not yet penetrated the Uryankhai Province, and had only a few settlers along the northern parts of Sayan — the southern reaches of present-day Siberia. Yet in 1715, the Russian Government, in treaties with the Dzungarian Government which laid claim to the Uryankhai Province, asserted: "The Siberian rivers Ob, Yenisei and Lena have been Siberian since time immemorial, from their mouths, where they flow into the sea, to the mountains from which they came. Whatever rivers flow into them, and the surrounding lands from which these rivers derive, are lands of His Tsarist Majesty."

At the close of civil war in Siberia, the Soviet Government turned its attention to Uryankhai. First the name itself was changed to Tannu-Tuva, in accordance with latest ethnographic researches. A Congress of the People of Tannu-Tuva met August

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13, 1921. A plenipotentiary delegation from the Soviet Government attended, as did a delegation from the People's Government of Outer Mongolia. The Congress declared Tannu-Tuva independent, drew up a constitution and established a government. The Soviet Government speedily recognized its independence (September 9, 1921), repudiated its own rights as protector and established permanent diplomatic relations. In December, a parliament, called *Khuruldan*, held its first session. The People's Government of Mongolia, and its successor the Mongolian People's Republic, followed the example of the Soviet Government and recognized Tannu-Tuva's independence, exchanged diplomatic representatives and set definite boundaries. If we remember that the position of the Tannu-Tuva Republic was of great strategic importance to Russia, that its population did not exceed 75,000 and that it covered an area greater than that of prewar Czechoslovakia, we shall realize how important these diplomatic successes were to the Soviet Government.

In 1925, after negotiations between Sun Yat-sen and the Soviet representative, A. A. Joffe, a pact was signed by China and Soviet Russia. The latter therein declared: "The Government of the U.S.S.R. recognizes that Outer Mongolia is a part of the Chinese Republic and honors the sovereign rights of China. The Government of the U.S.S.R. declares that as soon as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia . . . is practical . . . all troops of the U.S.S.R. will be withdrawn. . . ."

Less than a year after the conclusion of this treaty the Soviet Government, through its ambassador to Peiping, officially informed the Chinese Government that Soviet troops had left Outer Mongolia. But at the same time, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, made the following statement to the press: "The Soviet Government recognizes Mongolia as part of the Republic of China, enjoying, however, an autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with its internal affairs. . . . After several crises the internal situation in Mongolia has settled down and been consolidated on a basis somewhat similar to the Soviet System."

These documents evidently were interpreted differently by China and Soviet Russia. Once the first phase of the Russian Revolution was over, the Soviet Government seems in practice to have taken the position of the Tsarist Government in regard to Mongolia, and implied in several treaties that Mongolia was not a part of China. The Chinese Government protested these trea-

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ties. However, none of the protests made any specific mention of the Tannu-Tuva Republic. Apparently the Chinese Government considered the establishment of that state as only a phase of the Mongolian problem.

Border incidents between Mongolian troops and those of Japan and "Manchukuo" began in 1936. Eventually the Soviet brought troops into Mongolia, and the ensuing conflicts with the Japanese at times assumed the proportions of major battles. The Chinese Government did not protest the reëntry of Russian troops, at that time preferring Soviet occupation of Mongolia to Japanese occupation.

The Chinese Republic has been unable to enter into direct relations with the Mongolian People's Republic. All borders of the Mongolian People's Republic and of Tannu-Tuva remained closed except those contiguous to Soviet Russia. Despite these difficulties, several contacts were made through the mails between the Chinese Government and the Mongolian People's Republic, and some mention of such contacts appeared in the official Mongolian press. Although they failed to establish legal relations between China and Mongolia, they did succeed in throwing some light on the basic differences in position of the two governments. Apparently the Chinese Government always underlined the equal rights and duties of all "five nations" (Chinese, Manchurian, Tibetan, Mongolian and Moslem) in the Chinese Republic. The Mongolian People's Republic, while not taking issue with this point of view, invariably countered by saying, in effect, that a real republic should be established in China and that this reform must be carried out so as to give each of the five races a chance of being blessed with peace, liberty and equality. Otherwise, it concluded, each of them must retain the authority to settle its own affairs.

III

Let us now recapitulate. Until the signature of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty on August 14 of this year, China's position was that the territory of Outer Mongolia, as comprised by the boundaries that existed before the Mongolian revolution, was, at any rate technically, part of China. Millions of Chinese waited only the lifting of boundary barriers to flow into the country, to farm its fertile plateaus and sloping hills and to exploit the wealth hidden in its earth.

Mongolia's own position was no less clear. It was the same under the government of the Mongolian People's Republic, or-

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ganized by Soviet Russia, as it was under the autocratic government of Khutukhta, controlled by princes and high lamas. The Mongols stood firm for the provisions of the Code of Tsiantsin, which guaranteed against an influx of Chinese settlers. They were ready to accept any protectorate whatsoever, by any country at all, which would safeguard their land from colonization.

The Russian position in regard to Mongolia was considerably more complicated. Under the Tsars, Russia followed a policy of colonization in Siberia and other open territories. Although in appearance Soviet Russia broke with the foreign policy of Tsarist Russia, she continued in practice to follow the doctrine of expansion. But in the case of Mongolia the advocates of moderation in expansion appeared in the main to be victorious, as indicated by the following evidence:

(1) The Mongolian People's Republic was not incorporated into the Soviet Union. When we recall the fate of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and remember that the inclusion of Mongolia in the U.S.S.R. would offer no material difficulties, we perceive unmistakable evidence of Russian self-restraint in this case.

(2) There was no Russian colonization within the Mongolian borders. Even more significant, the number of Russian agricultural settlers, never large, decreased. Russians in Mongolia have been army instructors, employees of the government, specialists in the newly-developing industry, doctors, veterinarians, and so on. Every effort was made to replace this temporary Russian population by Mongols.

(3) There was no contact between Chinese Communists and Outer Mongolia. Journalists representing the Soviet point of view emphatically reiterated in recent years that the Soviet Government sent supplies and ammunition to China only through the Central Government in Chungking. This statement may have been an exaggeration, but not a great one. In the writer's opinion, what little help has been given to Communist China and the Manchurian partisans has gone around Mongolia and not through it. The strategic position of the Mongolian People's Republic made it a logical arsenal for Communist China and Manchuria; but in actuality the Russian Government deliberately refrained from using it for this purpose.

(4) Pan-Mongolism was suppressed in the Mongolian People's Republic and in the Buriat-Mongol Republic of the Soviet Union. Pan-Mongol propaganda, backed by the Soviet Union, would

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have been a strong weapon for wresting Inner Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet outright from China, and annexing them to the Soviet domain, had that been the Russian objective.

(5) Increased Russian colonization in the Republic of Tannu-Tuva points the contrast to the Soviet policy toward the Mongolian People's Republic. The Russian population in Tannu-Tuva was about 25,000 before the Russian Revolution; it now surpasses the native population. Apparently the Soviet Government intends to maintain close control of this rich and strategic territory, and now has a much firmer claim there than did Peter the Great.

The above facts could be enlarged upon. They were sufficient, however, to make apparent that although the Soviet Government was for all practical purposes free to follow whatever policy it wished toward the Mongolian People's Republic, it in fact carefully avoided doing anything which might cause hostile relations with China.

Now comes the publication of the treaty negotiated in Moscow by Premier Soong and Foreign Commissar Molotov, and of the text of two accompanying letters referring specifically to Outer Mongolia. In one of these letters the Chinese Government declares its readiness to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, within its existing boundaries, provided a plebiscite indicates that this is the desire of the people of the area. In the second, the Soviet Union takes note of China's readiness to do this and states its own intention to respect Outer Mongolia's independence and territorial integrity. The phraseology might not preclude the eventual absorption of the independent Mongolian People's Republic into the Soviet Union, composed as it is of at least technically independent republics. But for the purposes of the Mongol inhabitants the guarantee will be judged chiefly by whether or not the Soviet authorities continue, as they have done up to now, to limit emigration into Mongolian territory.

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A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR CEYLON

By Amry Vandenbosch

THE British Crown Colony of Ceylon is in the throes of constitutional change. Many people think that this great island is part of India. In fact, its administration is wholly separate from that of India and its status is quite different.

Communal differences are not as sharp in Ceylon as in India, but they are serious; and the prospect of the virtual disappearance of British control over the internal administration has produced vociferous demands from the minority groups for constitutional safeguards. According to racial origin, the population of Ceylon was classified by the 1931 census as follows: Sinhalese, 3,473,030; Tamils, 1,417,477; Moors, 325,913; Burghers and Eurasians, 32,315; Malays, 15,977.

The Sinhalese — descendants of warriors from the north of India who overcame the aborigines of the island — are seen to comprise roughly two-thirds of the population of approximately 6,000,000. The Tamils, who came from south India, are divided into "Ceylon Tamils" and "Indian Tamils." The former, numbering now about 700,000, have been in the island almost as long as the Sinhalese, and centuries ago had their own kings. They have eagerly taken advantage of educational opportunities and are strongly represented in the learned professions and the public services. Of the Indian Tamils, the majority are estate laborers; the remainder are found in nearly all walks of life — skilled labor in factories and workshops, domestic servants, contractors and financiers.

The Moors, the most numerous of the smaller communities, are probably the descendants of Arab traders who intermarried with the Moslems of south India and Ceylon. They are engaged in trade and agriculture. The Malays are descendants of the soldiers of the Malay regiments employed by the Dutch and the British. The Burghers — descendants of the officials and employees of the Dutch East India Company — were until recently predominant in the professions and in the government service. The British community controls the larger commercial, financial and industrial enterprises. Exclusive of the members of the armed forces temporarily stationed on the island, the British community numbers about 15,000.

No less important than the racial communities are the religious divisions. The 1931 census classified the population of Ceylon according to religion as follows: Buddhists, 3,267,500; Hindus, 1,158,500; Christians, 523,100; Moslems, 356,900. The great majority of the Sinhalese are Buddhist, but among them is a large Christian minority. The Ceylon Tamils are predominantly Hindu, though among them, too, are many Christians. The Indians are mainly Hindu. The Moors, Malays and a small number of Indians constitute the Moslem community. The larger part of the Burghers are Protestant Christians.

II

The present constitution, which came into force in 1931, has some unique features especially designed to train a people for complete internal autonomy. It provides for a State Council composed of 50 elected members and eight

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nominated by the Governor. There is also a Board of Ministers — a "Cabinet" in embryo — chosen by a somewhat complicated process from among elected members of the Council and appointed officials, in a way which gives several places on the Board to racial minorities. The Board of Ministers has no collective responsibility except as a finance committee. While the 1931 constitution gave the Governor substantially the powers he enjoyed under the previous constitution, namely, the power of veto, and of referring bills back for further consideration or reserving them for the Crown, it was expected that his rôle would be supervisory rather than executive. And indeed, Sir Andrew Caldecott, who served as Governor from 1937 to 1944, tried to act in this spirit, giving the Ministers a rather free hand and speaking of them as "my Ministers," as a constitutional governor would do.

However, shortly after this constitution went into effect, the Ministers and the Council of State demanded dominion status and a new constitution based on the principle of Cabinet responsibility. The Ceylonese members of the Board were not unanimous in this demand; three Ministers, members of minority communities, objected to the change. When the Secretary of State for the Colonies replied that he would favorably consider a request for a new constitution only if it were made by a united Board of Ministers, the Ceylon National Congress (composed almost exclusively of Sinhalese and Buddhists) resolved to obtain a Board composed wholly of Congress members. It achieved this object in the 1936 general election. In 1937 Sir Andrew Caldecott recommended the establishment of a government with "a Cabinet of the normal type." But the formation of a homogeneous ministry had greatly alarmed the minorities, and their representatives began to demand even more safeguards than the present system provides. The pan-Sinhalese finally saw the wisdom of a different policy. In 1942, the Sinhalese majority of the Executive Committee of Home Affairs elected a Tamil as its chairman, thus automatically making him Home Minister. But since this Minister has frequently taken positions unacceptable to the Tamil community, he no longer possesses its confidence.

The outbreak of the war eclipsed the question of constitutional reform, but only temporarily. Colonel Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, assured the Board of Ministers that the British Government fully recognized "the urgency and importance of reform of the Constitution." He added, however, that "before making decisions upon present proposals for reform, concerning which there has been so little unanimity but which are of such importance to the well-being of Ceylon, His Majesty's Government would desire that the position should be further examined and made the subject of further consultation by means of a Commission or Conference. This cannot be arranged under war conditions, but the matter will be taken up with the least possible delay after the war." Soon the Board of Ministers raised the issue again, and on May 26, 1943, the Secretary of State for the Colonies made another declaration giving "greater precision" to the 1941 assurance. The reexamination of the constitution, he said, would be directed toward the grant of "full responsible government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil administration."

The declaration in effect gave the Board of Ministers permission to proceed at once to the drafting of "a complete constitution scheme," but it also made it very clear that such a document as the Ministers might draft would be accepted by the British Government only if it were satisfied that the scheme

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complied with requirements laid down in the declaration, and that the Ministers' proposals had received the approval of three-quarters of the members of the Council of State. The constitutional draft proposed by the Ministers would then be examined, after the war, "by a suitable commission or conference."

The Ministers lost no time in acting on the invitation of the Secretary of State. An exchange of statements between the Board of Ministers and the British Government followed. There were differences about the interpretation which the Board had put on the Colonial Secretary's declaration, but the various communications eventuated in another statement by the Secretary, in which he assured the Ministers that he had not found in their interpretation "anything which must be regarded as essentially irreconcilable with the conditions contained in His Majesty's Government's statement." He expressed the hope that the Ministers would not delay formulating a draft constitution.

But the new constitution which the Ministers then drafted satisfied no one. The Secretary of State for the Colonies noted that the Ministers contemplated "a radical departure from the Declaration of His Majesty's Government" of May 26, 1943, in that the Ministers had left "crucial questions" to be considered otherwise than by the commission or conference required by the declaration. The crucial questions are whether the new legislature shall have a second chamber, instead of one only as at present, and the knotty question of the method of representation. These are the issues in dispute between the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority and the racial and religious minorities.

The question of including a second chamber in the new legislature is so controversial that the Ministers later confessed that no plan which regulated its composition could be expected to receive a three-fourths majority in the Council of State. They evaded the issue by proposing a unicameral legislature, but added the proviso that the constitution would authorize the new legislative body to establish a senate by "ordinary" legislation, *i.e.*, by a simple majority vote.

The problem of representation revolves about the effort to avoid a return to communal representation, which prevailed before 1931, and yet meet in some fashion the demand of the minority communities for representation greater than they would be entitled to on the basis of population. The Ministers tried to solve this problem by giving representation to areas as well as to population. But they apparently had little hope that their scheme would prove acceptable, for they proposed that if the articles embodying this plan failed to receive the three-fourths majority, or if this majority could not be obtained for any alternative proposal, they would move in the State Council that a commission be appointed by the Governor to determine the electoral districts. Mr. Mahadeva, the sole non-Sinhalese member of the Board of Ministers, asked to have this question in its entirety settled by a Royal Commission.

The Ministers' constitutional draft contained no provisions relating to the franchise, another controversial topic. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1930, and many in Ceylon assert that the premature enfranchisement of the uneducated masses has been responsible for an alarming growth of corruption in public life. However, few believe that universal suffrage can be withdrawn now that it has been granted.

In July 1944, the British Government announced that a Commission would be appointed to visit Ceylon toward the end of the year for the purpose of providing "full consultation to take place with the various interests, including

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minorities, concerned with the subject of constitutional reform in Ceylon and with the proposals which the Ministers have formulated." Disgruntled at the decision that the Commission would consult with various interests, including the minorities, the Ministers withdrew their proposed constitution. But then a little later they reintroduced it, with important modifications, for acceptance by the State Council. In the new draft all safeguards stipulated by the declaration of 1943 were removed, and some of the Ministers now began to talk of independence and "severance from the British Empire."

On September 20 the appointment of a Royal Commission was announced, under the Chairmanship of Lord Soulbury, the former Mr. Herwald Ramsbotham, President of the Board of Education, with these terms of reference: "To visit Ceylon in order to examine and discuss any proposals for constitutional reforms which have the object of giving effect to the Declaration of His Majesty's Government on that subject dated May 26, 1943, and after consultation with various interests in the Island, including minority communities, concerned with the subject of constitutional reforms to advise His Majesty's Government on all measures to attain that object." The Commission arrived in Ceylon on December 22, 1944 and began to hold public hearings a month later. It was well received in spite of an early effort by some Sinhalese political leaders to start a movement to boycott it.

Meanwhile, the Sinhalese political leaders had put through the Council of State, by a vote of 26 to 3, a resolution directing the Board of Ministers to bring in a draft bill providing for a free Ceylon with a constitution of the recognized dominion type. This action, however, would have been impressive only if accompanied by an agreement with the minorities on representation. No such agreement was achieved. An informal conference of Ministers and State Councillors broke up in failure on November 9. Later, an All-Parties Conference called by the Ceylon National Congress was no more successful.

III

The Soulbury Commission returned to London in April of this year, and has not yet published a report. It will not be easy for the Commission to find solutions acceptable to both the majority and the minority communities. The minorities fear enlargement of the powers of the government. Their attitude was clearly stated by Mr. Ponnambalam, political leader of the Tamils, as follows: "If there is to be a transference of power we would like to know how precisely that power is likely to be distributed." He expresses little faith that the reserve powers of the Governor will fully protect the rights of minorities, as he does not believe that governors will act. He, and all the leaders of the minorities, are convinced that the only safeguard against domination of the legislature by any one community is weighted or balanced representation. They speak of this as "the principle of democratic equality." Specifically, Mr. Ponnambalam demands a fifty-fifty ratio; that is, 50 percent of the seats in the Council of State to be reserved for and distributed among the minority communities. The Sinhalese have, of course, not been slow to point out that a principle which assigns 50 percent of the seats of the legislative body to 35 percent of the people, and limits 65 percent of the population to only half of the seats, is hardly a democratic principle.

While the minorities are united in their fear that the major community wishes to make Ceylon a Sinhalese and Buddhist country, the influence which

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the minorities might exert is sadly weakened by internal divisions. There are, in nearly every case, minorities within the minorities. The Tamils are divided into Ceylon and Indian Tamil groups and also into religious and caste groups. There is, for example, the All-Ceylon Minority Tamils Congress, which demands full rights for the depressed classes. It asserts that it is "illogical and unreasonable" for the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress to raise the cry of "Sinhalese domination" and demand equal representation while they continue to oppress a large section of their own countrymen. It declares that so long as the high-caste Tamils continue oppressive practices, the depressed classes will stand aloof as a separate body and fight for emancipation. The Catholics are likewise indifferent to balanced representation, since as a minority in the majority and a minority in the communities, communal representation based on race would not safeguard their rights.

The position of the Indians in Ceylon is peculiar, and in some respects not too happy. The Sinhalese fear Indian domination and are determined to restrict Indian immigration as much as possible. They complain that though Indians have obtained a leading rôle in the island's commercial life, they do not become assimilated, even after they have lived in Ceylon for decades, but continue to feel that their permanent interests lie in India. Whatever the justification for the Sinhalese attitude, it has produced serious friction within Ceylon and has caused Indo-Ceylon relations to deteriorate. The Indians already suffer certain civic disabilities under existing legislation: the Sinhalese say that full citizenship rights should be accorded only to Indians who have proved a permanent interest in Ceylon. For all these reasons, the leaders of the Indians in Ceylon demand a guarantee of "the equality of civic and political status of Indians resident in Ceylon," and protection of "the vested interests of non-resident British subjects."

Most of the plans put forward by the minorities involve a return to communal representation. The earlier national leaders desired its abolition, as they believed that it tended to perpetuate racial cleavages. The Donoughmore Commission, which visited Ceylon in 1927–28 and laid the basis for the present constitution, was aware that the representatives of the various communities did not trust one another, but believed that the only way to create mutual confidence was to abolish communal representation. However, the minority leaders contend that 14 years of experience with territorial representation has demonstrated that it leads to "the most arrant communalism" in the form of Sinhalese domination. Yet not all minority leaders desire a return to outright communal representation. Sir Mohammed Macan Markar, for example, a leader of the Moors, favors a system of "reserved" seats, with representation on a territorial basis from multiple-member constituencies.

Ceylon has enjoyed a large measure of prosperity during the war. Ceylonese products, such as tea and rubber, have been in great demand, and the prices have been high. The government has had no difficulty in balancing its budgets. Moreover, the large British expenditures in the island, and the lesser American ones, have developed considerable foreign exchange credits. But with the end of the war, Ceylon, like every other nation, faces difficult economic adjustments. Since it is likely that the Soulbury Commission has helped prepare the way for a much-increased measure of autonomy for the country, the Ceylonese people will be faced with a test on both political and economic fronts in the years immediately ahead.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

NATIONAL SELF DETERMINATION. By ALFRED COBBAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 186 p. $4.50.

This is an important study in the area where political philosophy and international relations meet and overlap, and is based upon a careful historical analysis of the relevant documentary material. It is published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

CHARTERS OF THE PEACE. By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER. London: Gollancz, 1944, 133 p. 6/.

In this "commentary on the Atlantic Charter and the declarations of Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran," the author has sought to determine how far they have helped prepare the way for peace, and what remains to be discussed and settled.

THE ANATOMY OF PEACE. By EMERY REVES. New York: Harper, 1945, 275 p. $2.00.

The author argues passionately that the root of the world's political evil is nationalism and that nothing short of a world government operating under a universal set of laws will bring about peace. Though he offers no clear suggestions as to how this goal is to be reached, he is quite positive that those who advocate such steps as were outlined in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are on the wrong road.

THE MIRROR OF THE PAST: LEST IT REFLECT THE FUTURE. By R. ZILLIACUS. London: Gollancz, 1944, 286 p. 7/6.

This is a review of the origins and course of World War I and of the subsequent settlement, including the establishment of the League of Nations. The author, whose sympathies lie with the Left, has justified his going over this well-trod ground by stressing the manner in which social issues dominated the later phases of the war and the politics of the peace. He warns against a repetition of the mistakes made during those years.

EUROPEAN MANIFESTO. By PIERRE DE LANUX. New York: Creative Age Press, 1945, 162 p. $2.00.

Pertinent remarks on the future of Europe, which the author hopes will be along lines of greater spiritual and political unity.

CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE EL TEMA DE LA PAZ. By JOSÉ MEDINA ECHAVARRÍA. Mexico: Banco de México, 1945, 181 p.

These essays on the problems of organizing peace are the result of a study group in the Banco de México. The author is Director of the Center of Social Studies in the Colegio de México.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. By JOHANNES STEEL. New York: Holt, 1945, 256 p. $3.00.

A radio commentator ranges back and forth across the vast panorama of Europe's problems — political, economic and otherwise. He is nothing if not dogmatic and self-assured.

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THE PLOT AGAINST THE PEACE. By Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn. New York: Dial Press, 1945, 258 p. $2.75.

The German General Staff is the real and enduring villain in the piece and it is now preparing for World War III, state the authors in this "warning to the nation."

COLOR AND DEMOCRACY: COLONIES AND PEACE. By W. E. B. DuBois. New York: Harcourt, 1945, 143 p. $2.00.

Dr. DuBois voices his disappointment over the failure of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to tackle the problem of colonial peoples — a disappointment which the San Francisco Charter can scarcely have alleviated. His survey of the whole question of dependent peoples, among whom he includes almost every country except the Great Powers, is so brief and episodic that his book constitutes little more than an anti-imperialist — especially an anti-British — tract.

FREEDOM IS MORE THAN A WORD. By Marshall Field. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, 189 p. $2.50.

The publisher of the *Chicago Sun* sets forth his liberal creed.

THE STORY OF LIBERTY. By Louis K. Anspacher. New York: Island Press, 1944, 232 p. $2.75.

A rather sketchy and unorthodox interpretation of the conflict between liberty and tyranny.

THE FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR FUTURE. By Clyde Eagleton. New York: New York University Press, 1945, 200 p. $3.25.

Lectures delivered on the Stokes Foundation at New York University and dealing *inter alia* with world organization.

NATIONAL CULTURES, NAZISM AND THE CHURCH. By Andrew J. Krzesinski. Boston: Humphries, 1945, 128 p. $1.75.

A former professor at the University of Cracow examines the effect of Christianity and of certain ultra-nationalist aberrations on the development of nationalism.

CAN DEMOCRACY RECOVER? By Louis Marlio. Garden City: Doubleday, 1945, 190 p. $2.00.

The original French edition of this work — "La Révolution d'Hier, d'Aujourd'hui et de Demain" — was reviewed in the January 1944 issue of Foreign Affairs.

THE AMERICAN ROAD TO PEACE: A CONSTITUTION FOR THE WORLD. By Mario A. Pei. New York: Vanni, 1945, 168 p. $2.00.

Another plan for an international government.

LOOK TO THE FRONTIERS. By Roderick Peattie. New York: Harper, 1944, 246 p. $3.00.

A highly literate geographer discusses the principles of boundary-making and its importance in preserving the peace. Some of his suggestions may seem somewhat impractical, but on the whole his approach is sensible and quite removed from the absolutism of geopolitics.

BOUNDARY-MAKING. By Stephen B. Jones. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1945, 268 p. $3.00.

This scholarly treatise is an important addition to the literature of political geography. In it the author discusses, with a wealth of concrete detail, such matters as the classifications and functions of boundaries, the human and physical factors in their making, and the technical problems involved in delimitation and demarcation.

FOREIGN MAPS. By Everett Olson and Agnes Whitmarsh. New York: Harper, 1944, 237 p. $4.00.

This volume — in "Harper's Geoscience Series" — is a valuable reference work concerning the language and symbols used on topographic maps published by foreign governments. Numerous illustrations exemplify the various cartographic techniques.

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THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS. West Point (N. Y.): United States Military Academy, 1945, 252 p. $1.00.

The 1945 edition of a well-organized text on the governments and recent constitutional histories of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, U.S.S.R. and Japan. Considerable attention is given to wartime developments.

TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES. By Lt. Col. Robert J. Icks. New York: Duell, 1945, 264 p. $4.75.

The profusely illustrated story of how modern armored weapons and warfare have been developed by the prinicipal military Powers.

INTERNATIONAL LAW. Volume I. By Georg Schwarzenberger. London: Stevens, 1945, 645 p. £3.

This first volume in a proposed three-volume treatise by a noted European scholar deals with law "as applied by international courts and tribunals."

General: Economic and Social

A PRICE FOR PEACE. By Antonín Basch. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 209 p. $2.50.

A wise and balanced statement of the tremendous economic problems now faced by Europe, with suggestions as to what policies must be pursued — by the United States among other countries — if prosperity, and thus social and political tranquillity, are to return to the war-torn Continent.

LIBERAL PLAN FOR PEACE. London: Gollancz, 1944, 126 p. 3/6.

Herein are set forth the principles which British Liberals believe should govern international relations in the future, notably in the field of trade and finance. By and large one cannot but feel that their plan takes too little account of the heavy legacy of trade barriers inherited from autarchic practices of recent years.

TIME FOR PLANNING: A SOCIAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND PROGRAM FOR THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Lewis L. Lorwin. New York: Harper, 1945, 273 p. $3.00.

Dr. Lorwin is a leading interpreter of economic trends and is the founder of the National Economic and Social Planning Association. He has here brought together a number of articles published over the last 15 years and revised them to make an organic discussion of the place of planning in the democratic scheme of things, national and international.

THE ECONOMIC LESSONS OF THE NINETEEN-THIRTIES. By H. W. Arndt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 314 p. $3.75.

This searching report is the result of group discussions held under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF THE PEACE. By Walter Padley. London: Gollancz, 1944, 164 p. 6/.

The author's solution for our troubles is a World Socialist Union, toward which a preliminary step would be a Socialist United States of Europe.

THE ECONOMICS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT. Oxford: Blackwell, 1944, 213 p. 12/6.

These six "studies in applied economics" deal with both theoretical and practical aspects of the problem, including its international ramifications. They were prepared at the Oxford University Institute of Statistics.

WORLD GRAIN REVIEW AND OUTLOOK, 1945. By Helen C. Farnsworth and V. P. Timoshenko. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1945, 319 p. $3.00.

This is the first of what is intended to be an annual series replacing, in part, the Institute's "Wheat Studies." The authors examine the world's food grain situation for 1943–44 and the outlook for the future. There is a 50-page statistical appendix.

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FEDERAL FINANCE IN PEACE AND WAR. By G. Findlay Shirras. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 377 p. $5.00.

This scholarly treatise on comparative government deals with the experience of the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa and India.

DEATH PAYS A DIVIDEND. By Fenner Brockway and Frederic Mullally. London: Gollancz, 1944, 158 p. 3/6.

A Leftist review of the arms traffic in which the authors come out not only for state control of the manufacture of armaments but in favor of the international supervision of this business in all its stages.

POPULATION ROADS TO PEACE OR WAR. By Guy Irving Burch and Elmer Pendell. Washington: Population Reference Bureau, 1945, 138 p. $2.00.

A concise, hard-hitting analysis of the population problem in its social and psychological as well as economic and political aspects.

INTERNATIONAL RIVER AND CANAL TRANSPORT. By Brig.-Gen. Sir Osborne Mance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 115 p. $1.00.

A brief, comprehensible and reliable summary of legal and other information, prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

MAN'S FIGHT TO FLY. By John P. V. Heinmuller. New York: Funk, 1944, 366 p. $6.00.

A popular history of the conquest of the air since the Renaissance, stressing some of the spectacular flights that paved the way for further progress.

WAR, PEACE, AND NON-RESISTANCE. By Guy Franklin Hershberger. Scottdale (Pa.): Herald Press, 1944, 415 p. $2.50.

This history of non-resistance gives special attention to the beliefs and practices of the Mennonites.

THE POWER OF NON-VIOLENCE. By Richard B. Gregg. New York: Fellowship Publications, 1944, 253 p. $1.50.

The first edition of this comprehensive analysis of the political and social implications of the weapon of non-violence appeared in 1935. In the present edition eight chapters have been replaced by three new ones.

MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH. By M. F. Ashley Montagu. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 304 p. $3.25.

The revised and enlarged version of a work exposing the considerable amount of nonsense usually introduced into the discussion of racial problems.

JEWS IN THE POST-WAR WORLD. By Max Gottschalk and Abraham G. Duker. New York: Dryden, 1945, 224 p. $3.00.

A review of the status of world Jewry during and after World War I, followed by a survey of alternatives now open to it, in Palestine and elsewhere.

The Second World War

THE WORLD AT WAR, 1939–1944. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1945, 416 p. 25 cents.

This readable, rapid-paced summary of the events of World War II down to November 1, 1944, though primarily intended for the Army Orientation Program, will prove very handy for the layman.

THEY WERE THERE: THE STORY OF WORLD WAR II AND HOW IT CAME ABOUT. Edited by Curt Riess. New York: Putnam, 1944, 670 p. $5.00.

This fat volume contains, in addition to the editor's lengthy introduction, excerpts from the writings of 163 American correspondents, selected to demonstrate their grasp of world affairs during, rather than after, the event.

WORLD BLACKOUT. By Sarah G. Millin. London: Faber, 1944, 269 p. 15/.

A well-known South African writer records her very personal day-to-day reactions

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to the course of events during the first year of the war, including notes on several conversations with Smuts.

AT HIS SIDE. By George Korson. New York: Coward-McCann, 1945, 322 p. $2.75.

A comprehensive account of the work performed on all fronts by the American Red Cross, from Pearl Harbor to the invasion of Germany in 1944.

CONSPIRACY IN ALGIERS. By Renée Gosset. New York: The Nation, 1945, 272 p. $1.00.

Madame Gosset, a French journalist, was in Algiers from the spring of 1941 until after the Allied invasion of North Africa, during which time she was employed by the American Government in various capacities. Her circumstantial story of the negotiations, plots and personalities involved in the North African affair will prove of value to future historians. The original French edition was published by *La Revue Moderne* of Montreal (1944, 373 p. $2.00).

FIGHTERS UP. By Eric Friedheim and Samuel W. Taylor. Philadelphia: Macrae-Smith, 1945, 275 p. $2.50.

A vivid and authoritative description of the important work done by the fighter planes in the European campaigns.

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. By Everett Holles. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1945, 366 p. $2.50.

A skeleton chronicle of military operations in the European and Mediterranean theaters from the Allied landings in North Africa to V-E Day, by a member of the staff of the Columbia Broadcasting System.

WE FOUGHT THEM IN GUNBOATS. By Lieutenant-Commander Robert Peverell Hichens. London: Michael Joseph, 1944, 151 p. 9/6.

The story of the audacious and all-important rôle of the Coastal Forces of the Royal Navy in defense of Britain during the early years of the war. The author was killed in action in April 1943.

SPEAKING FROM THE DESERT. By Godfrey Talbot. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 153 p. 15/.

One of the better books on the campaign waged by the Eighth Army in Egypt and Libya, by a correspondent of the B.B.C.

UNDER CUNNINGHAM'S COMMAND. By Commander George Stitt. London: Allen and Unwin, 1944, 269 p. 8/6.

The story of the Royal Navy's operations in the Mediterranean, notably in such battles as those of Calabria, Taranto, Matapan and the campaign around Crete.

WITH WINGATE IN BURMA. By David Halley. London: Hodge, 1944, 189 p. 7/6.

A first-person account of Wingate's 1943 expedition into Burma.

AMERICAN GUERRILLA IN THE PHILIPPINES. By Ira Wolfert. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, 222 p. $2.75.

A noted American war correspondent relates the dramatic exploits of Lieutenant I. D. Richardson who carried on a highly annoying guerrilla campaign against the Japanese in the Philippines after the fall of Bataan.

ROBINSON CRUSOE, USN. By George R. Tweed and Blake Clark. New York: Whittlesey House, 1945, 267 p. $2.75.

Tweed was the Navy man who, with the help of friendly Chamorros, lived in the Guam jungles two and one-half years until he was rescued at the time of the American reconquest last year. His story, as told to Mr. Clark, throws light on the behavior of the Japanese occupation forces.

MISSION BEYOND DARKNESS. By Joseph Bryan and Philip Reed. New York: Duell, 1945, 133 p. $2.00.

The thrilling story of the closing phase of the First Battle of the Philippines, in which Air Group 16 from the *Lexington* successfully attacked a number of fleeing Japanese battleships and carriers.

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MOB 3: A NAVAL HOSPITAL IN A SOUTH SEA JUNGLE. By Captain Robert P. Parsons. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945, 248 p. $3.50.

A Navy doctor in recounting his experiences on an island (obviously Samoa) shows special interest in the problems of the native and in American colonial methods.

The United States

WOODROW WILSON AND THE GREAT BETRAYAL. By Thomas A. Bailey. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 429 p. $3.50.

No one can predict when, if ever, the historians will achieve substantial agreement about the complex character and policies of Woodrow Wilson. This is particularly true of the great debate over the Versailles Treaty and the League Covenant in the Senate. Professor Bailey of Stanford lines up with those who proclaim their "complete sympathy with Wilson's broad program and with his vision of the future" but who also believe that he erred in not compromising with his senatorial foes in order to obtain ratification.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE PEOPLE. By H. C. F. Bell. Garden City: Doubleday, 1945, 392 p. $3.00.

This life of Wilson is sympathetic but not uncritical. The author has chosen to begin his narrative with the Princeton era and to concentrate his main attention on the presidential years. He has also left several weak, or even blank, spots — such as Wilson's highly significant Latin American policy. All in all, however, this is an honest and valuable appraisal.

AMERICAN CHRONICLE. By Ray Stannard Baker. New York: Scribner, 1945, 531 p. $3.50.

Mr. Baker (who has also written under the pseudonym "David Grayson") was one of Woodrow Wilson's closest confidantes and later became his official biographer. During his long and varied life he has kept copious day-by-day notebooks on which he draws for much of the material in this book — the second volume of his autobiography. For students of international affairs the chapters on the Peace Conference and the League fight in America will prove the most interesting.

WOODROW WILSON: SELECTIONS FOR TODAY. Edited by Arthur Bernon Tourtellot. New York: Duell, 1945, 258 p. $2.75.

The editor has winnowed out from Wilson's state papers and addresses the grains of wisdom which he feels bear a particular message for the world today.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. VOLUME VI, JULY 1943–JUNE 1944. Edited by Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1945, 725 p. $3.75.

The sixth annual volume in this valuable compilation of documents, official statements, and other raw material for contemporary historians.

AND YET I LIKE AMERICA. By James Lansdale Hodson. London: Gollancz, 1945, 302 p. 10/6.

As a visiting lecturer in the United States during the winter of 1943–44, Mr. Hodson acquired a number of impressions of us. Some of them are unflattering and all of them are interesting.

THE AMERICAN STORY: TEN BROADCASTS. By Archibald MacLeish. New York: Duell, 1944, 231 p. $2.00.

The texts of these broadcasts by Mr. MacLeish form interesting evidence concerning the advantages and limitations of the radio.

ONE AMERICA. Edited by Francis J. Brown and Joseph Slabey Roucek. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945, 733 p. $5.00.

A revised version of the authors' "Our Racial and National Minorities," in which several sections of the first edition have been dropped, amalgamated or rewritten.

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BIG DEMOCRACY. By Paul H. Appleby. New York: Knopf, 1945, 197 p. $2.75.

A former New Deal Under Secretary of Agriculture says that, since modern government inevitably requires a large bureaucracy, we should cease railing at it and try to make it as efficient, intelligent and democratic as possible.

BIG GOVERNMENT: CAN WE CONTROL IT? By Merlo J. Pusey. New York: Harper, 1945, 240 p. $2.50.

A member of the editorial staff of the *Washington Post*, desirous of making our federal government operate more smoothly and more efficiently, suggests some reforms, including several constitutional amendments.

POSTWAR FISCAL REQUIREMENTS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL. By Lewis H. Kimmel and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1945, 166 p. $2.00.

A statistical analysis covering anticipated requirements in the United States for national defense, veterans' benefit, economic development, social welfare and security, debt service, etc.

ORGANIZED LABOR. By Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945, 930 p. $6.00.

An objective history and interpretation of the organized labor movement in the United States during the last half century.

THE FOOD FRONT IN WORLD WAR I. By Maxcy Robson Dickson. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944, 194 p. $3.25.

A documented history of how the United States handled the food problem in 1917–18.

AMERICA'S MARITIME HISTORY. By Lieutenant A. C. Denison. New York: Putnam, 1944, 236 p. $2.50.

A brief, and on the whole sound, review of the development of maritime navigation and enterprise from ancient days, with stress on the contribution of the United States in recent decades.

SHALL WE SCRAP OUR MERCHANT MARINE? By D. A. Rathbone, IV. New York: McBride, 1945, 397 p. $3.00.

Mr. Rathbone argues the importance of a strong merchant marine for our economic prosperity and for our naval defense.

TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND FLYERS. By Willard Wiener. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1945, 196 p. $2.75.

This is the remarkable record of the work accomplished, before and after Pearl Harbor, by the Civilian-AAF Pilot Training Program.

FIGHTING LIBERAL. By George W. Norris. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 419 p. $3.50.

The autobiography of the late liberal Senator from Nebraska, father of the TVA. He opposed Wilson on Versailles and the League but in the late thirties became a strong supporter of Roosevelt's foreign policy.

MEMOIRS OF AN EX-DIPLOMAT. By F. M. Huntington Wilson. Boston: Humphries, 1945, 373 p. $3.00.

Prior to 1912 Mr. Wilson served the United States State Department in various capacities. His memoirs consist partly of the usual run of diplomatic chitchat, partly of a defense of the old pre-Wilsonian imperialism and international anarchy.

APAURAK IN ALASKA. By Dr. J. Walter Johnshoy. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1944, 325 p. $3.00.

This illustrated record of the Rev. T. L. Brevig's 24 years of missionary work among the Alaska Eskimos contains useful information about our northern outpost.

Western Europe

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN WESTERN EUROPE 1660–1930. By Ernest Barker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 93 p. $1.50.

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This brief historical monograph originally appeared several years ago as part of a larger work, but its scholarship and the importance of its subject warrant its republication now.

LA FRANCE DEVANT LA RECONSTRUCTION ÉCONOMIQUE. By Robert Mossé. New York: Brentano, 1945, 113 p. $1.00.

The author has had both academic and governmental experience, including wartime service in the United States. He believes that the task of reconstruction demands a judicious combination of state control and private initiative.

L'EFFORT DE LA FRANCE. New York: Maison Française, 1945, 245 p. $1.50.

These factual essays on French political institutions, the army and the empire during the war originally appeared in English in *France Forever* during 1943 and 1944.

AMOUR CHARNEL DE LA PATRIE. By André David. New York: Maison Française, 1944, 171 p. $1.50.

Essays glorifying the patriotism and Catholicism of the French people.

A GIANT IN THE AGE OF STEEL: THE STORY OF DE GAULLE. By Count Alfred A. Hessenstein. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 164 p. 18/.

A somewhat over-enthusiastic portrait of the French resistance leader.

THE DUTCH NATION. By G. J. Renier. London: Allen and Unwin, 1944, 272 p. 15/.

This popular excursion through Dutch history was prepared for the Netherlands Government Information Bureau.

A SHORT HISTORY OF GERMANY. By S. H. Steinberg. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1945, 304 p. $3.00.

A factual history of the German people from Carolingian times to the present. The author has little time for interpretation, so intent is he on presenting a full chronology.

GERMANY AFTER HITLER. By Paul Hagen. New York: Farrar, 1944, 240 p. $2.00.

For some time the author, whose real name is Karl Boromäus Frank, was an underground anti-Nazi leader operating in and out of Hitler's Reich. In the present volume, written in expectation of an Allied victory in Europe, he sets forth what he regards as the necessary conditions under which the democratic element in Germany would have a fair chance to undo the work of Nazism. He is aware of the dreadful obstacles that must be overcome within Germany, and of the necessity for a real, not a "phony," revolution there. He believes that if the occupying Powers will let this revolution take place the democratic-minded Germans can do the job.

PHANTOM VICTORY. By Erwin Lessner. New York: Putnam, 1944, 227 p. $2.50.

A former Austrian officer, more recently a military commentator in America, constructs an imaginative account of the chain of events by which German world power will finally be won by 1960 despite all our proud boasts. Though the story could hardly be expected to unroll in the exact detail predicted by Major Lessner, the broad outlines of this method by which the German military caste might "win the peace" is anything but incredible.

HITLER AND BEYOND: A GERMAN TESTAMENT. By Erich Koch-Weser. New York: Knopf, 1945, 217 p. $2.75.

Dr. Koch-Weser, a member of the German Democratic Party, was one of the creators of the Weimar Republic, was twice a member of Reich cabinets, and became a voluntary exile in Brazil after Hitler took power. In this book he seeks a tenable explanation for the phenomenon of Nazism and for its acceptance by the German people. The conclusions to which he comes agree with neither of the extreme schools of thought on this issue. This is one of the better books on Germany to be written by an exile.

THE MORAL CONQUEST OF GERMANY. By Emil Ludwig. Garden City: Doubleday, 1945, 183 p. $2.00.

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Mr. Ludwig returns to one of his favorite themes — his native country. He delves into the psychological roots of the Germans' behavior in order to prescribe a strict regimen by which he believes they can recover their sanity, and thus a place in the world as a free people.

IN TYRANNOS: FOUR CENTURIES OF STRUGGLE AGAINST TYRANNY IN GERMANY. Edited by Hans J. Rehfisch. London: Drummond, 1944, 364 p. 16/.

The purpose of these 15 essays is to demonstrate that during the last four centuries of German history there have been many voices raised on behalf of the democratic way. Included among the palladins of this tradition are Hegel and Nietzsche!

THE SILENT CHURCH: THE PROBLEM OF THE GERMAN CONFESSIONAL WITNESS. By Julius Rieger. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1944, 96 p. 2/6.

An explanation, and to a certain extent a justification, of the behavior of the German Evangelical Church and of German Lutherans under Nazi rule, by one of its pastors.

CIVIL LIFE IN WARTIME GERMANY: THE STORY OF THE HOME FRONT. By Max Seydewitz. New York: Viking, 1945, 456 p. $3.50.

A onetime member of the Reichstag, writing from exile in Sweden, synthesizes the many reports of conditions in Germany which he has gathered since 1939.

ESCAPE FROM BERLIN. By Catherine Klein. London: Gollancz, 1944, 149 p. 6/.

A personal record of the steadily worsening status of the Jews in Berlin from 1939 to 1942.

JOURNEY INTO CHAOS. By Charles Wollf. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 216 p. 18/.

The author, for 17 years art director of the State Theater at Dresden, was in France from 1939 to 1942, later escaping to Britain. His analysis of the intellectual and moral degradation brought about by the Nazis is penetrating and frightening.

FROM DEMOCRACY TO NAZISM. By Rudolf Heberle. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945, 130 p. $2.50.

A socio-economic survey of Schleswig-Holstein in which the author seeks to explain why the Duchies went Nazi.

TWILIGHT OF THE GLADIATORS: ITALY AND THE ITALIANS 1939–1943. By Frank Heller. New York: Putnam, 1944, 146 p. $2.00.

A Swedish journalist gives numerous interesting sidelights on the last years of Mussolini but reveals little that is new. His own point of view is quite tolerant of Fascism, which he regards as a bulwark against Communism.

Eastern Europe

THESE ARE THE RUSSIANS. By Richard E. Lauterbach. New York: Harper, 1945, 368 p. $3.00.

This young American correspondent represented *Time* and *Life* in Moscow during 1943–44. He improved his opportunities by visiting Leningrad, Odessa, Siberia and other parts of Soviet territory, as well as liberated Poland. He reports on what he saw and heard, not uncritically but with an underlying feeling of respect, even admiration, for the Russian people, their achievements and their aspirations. Some of his best passages consist of material which, for one reason or another, was not used by *Time* and *Life*. This is, without reservation, one of the better recent books on the Soviets.

THE PATTERN OF SOVIET POWER. By Edgar Snow. New York: Random House, 1945, 219 p. $2.75.

Some of the material in this book has already appeared in the author's articles in the *Saturday Evening Post*. Though Mr. Snow does not say much that is new here, his attitude of friendly understanding, if not necessarily complete approval, for what the

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Soviets are trying to achieve in international politics is a corrective to what appears to be an increasingly hostile tone on the part of many other writers on Russia.

THE RUSSIA I BELIEVE IN. By Samuel N. Harper. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, 278 p. $3.50.

The late Professor Harper, of the University of Chicago, had a knowledge of, and love for, Russia almost unrivalled among Americans. In these fragmentary and incomplete notes and other casual writings are recorded his changing reactions to the course of Russian history over the last half century.

STALIN AND ETERNAL RUSSIA. By Walter Kolarz. London: Drummond, 1944, 144 p. 6/.

An interesting interpretation of Russia's return to nationalism in recent years.

THE BASIS OF SOVIET STRENGTH. By George B. Cressey. New York: Whittlesey House, 1945, 287 p. $3.00.

A systematic, comprehensive description of the economic geography of the Soviet Union, of necessity somewhat out-of-date in certain parts due to the changes wrought by the war.

THE FACE OF RUSSIA. By George Loukomski. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 108 p. 12/6.

The author has sought, largely through the medium of more than 200 photographs, to give the reader a picture of Russian life and culture.

OUR SOVIET ALLY. Edited by Margaret Cole. London: Routledge, 1943, 194 p. 7/6.

Four contributors seek to describe and interpret such political and cultural developments in Russia as the Kremlin's policy in regard to nationality. The general slant is decidedly pro-Soviet.

THE PEOPLE'S VERDICT. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 124 p. 7/6.

This is a full report of the proceedings at the Krasnodar and Kharkov German atrocity trials. It does not make for pleasant reading.

RUSSO-POLISH RELATIONS. Edited by S. Konovalov. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945, 102 p. $1.50.

An objective, clearly-presented history of relations between the two countries during the past six centuries, with stress on recent decades. The work was originally undertaken by the late Sir John Maynard.

RUSSIA, POLAND AND THE CURZON LINE. By L. Kirkien. Duns (Berwickshire): Caldra House, 1945, 66 p. 3/6.

This statement of the origins of the Curzon Line and of the ethnic situation in the areas it traverses must be taken as presenting the ultra-nationalist, Polish point of view and not always the objective facts of the case.

POLAND. By Major J. C. Elgoth-Ligocki. London: Macdonald, 1944, 167 p. 5/.

This little volume — part of the "Cross-roads" series — retells Poland's history and reminds us of her considerable contribution to western civilization.

POLAND BETWEEN TWO WARS. By Ferdynand Zweig. London: Secker and Warburg, 1944, 176 p. 10/6.

After a sound analysis of the country's development Professor Zweig discusses the problems of reconstruction awaiting liberated Poland.

THE RISE OF POLISH DEMOCRACY. By William John Rose. London: Bell, 1944, 253 p. 10/.

This history of Polish political ideas and movements since the end of the eighteenth century hardly bears out the author's thesis that this development has been along predominantly democratic lines.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN S. E. EUROPE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 165 p. $3.00.

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A sympathetic survey prepared for P E P (Political and Economic Planning) and covering Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and the Balkans.

EDUARD BENEŠ: A LEADER OF DEMOCRACY. By Philip Paneth. London: Alliance Press, 1944, 127 p. 8/6.

A popular biography of the Czech statesman in which his political philosophy is exemplified by various excerpts from his papers.

GORAL YEHUDEI ROMANIYAH. By L. Cooperstein. Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1944, 108 p.

The author describes what has happened to the Jews of Rumania.

MARSHAL TITO. By Michael Padev. London: Muller, 1944, 126 p. 5/.

A Bulgarian writer exalts the character and policies of the Jugoslav leader.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

PER ARDUA. By Hilary St. George Saunders. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 355 p. $3.75.

The story of the growth of British air power from 1911 to 1939, recorded by a master narrator of military history.

HALF MAST? By Edmund Hannay Watts. Liverpool: *The Journal of Commerce and Shipping Telegraph*, 1944, 86 p. 5/.

A candid examination of the future of the British Merchant Navy.

FRANCIS CARDINAL BOURNE. Volume II. By Ernest Oldmeadow. London: Burns, Oates, 1944, 421 p. 18/.

In this diffuse biography of the British Catholic hierarch, light is shed on many historic events and persons during the opening decades of the twentieth century.

BEST BOOKS ON THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By Evans Lewin. London: Royal Empire Society, 1945, 90 p. 5/.

A selective "bibliographical guide for students" prepared by an outstanding authority on the British Empire.

FABIAN COLONIAL ESSAYS. Edited by Rita Hinden. London: Allen and Unwin, 1945, 261 p. 8/6.

These 15 essays, by 12 contributors, represent the Socialist point of view. It will be interesting to see what resemblance the colonial policy of the new Labor Government bears to the suggestions set forth here.

THE STORY OF THE IRISH RACE. By Seumas MacManus. New York: Devin-Adair, 1944, 737 p. $3.50.

A revised edition of a popular history of Ireland.

EAMON DE VALERA. By M. J. MacManus. London: Gollancz, 1945, 359 p. 8/6.

A eulogistic biography of the Irish leader, by the literary editor of his newspaper, *The Irish Press*.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: TWO YEARS OF WAR, 1939–1941. By Robert MacGregor Dawson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 342 p. $3.25.

A sound, objective review and analysis of Canadian policy — domestic, imperial and international — during the opening phase of the war.

CANADA AND THE WORLD TOMORROW. Edited by Violet Anderson. Toronto: Ryerson, 1944, 159 p. $1.50.

The texts of 13 addresses delivered before the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs held at Lake Conchiching in August 1944.

LEFT TURN, CANADA. By M. J. Coldwell. New York: Duell, 1945, 247 p. $2.75.

A review of the history and program, domestic and foreign, of Canada's principal party of the Left — The Coöperative Commonwealth Federation — by its leader. In the recent Dominion elections the high hopes of the CCF received a setback.

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WARTIME LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA. By Orwell de R. Foenander. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1943, 177 p. 17/6.

A review and appraisal of current experience, together with proposals for reform.

HOME TO INDIA. By Santha Rama Rau. New York: Harper, 1945, 266 p. $2.50.

How India — its problems and its leaders — seemed to a young Brahmin after ten years in Britain.

The Near East

STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. Jerusalem: Aaronson, 1944, 166 p.

This is a valuable compilation of statistics illustrating the economic life of Palestine, Cyprus, Egypt, 'Iraq, the Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Turkey. It was prepared for the Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine by a committee of experts headed by A. Bonné.

HAMESHEK HA'ARAVI B'ERETZ YISRAEL N'BEARTZOTH HAMIZRACH-HATICHON. By Z. Abramovich and I. Guelfat. Tel-Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuchad, 1944, 365 p.

A description of Arab economic life in Palestine and other Near Eastern countries.

JUDAEA LIVES AGAIN. By Norman Bentwich. London: Gollancz, 1944, 191 p. 8/6.

The inspiring story of Zionist regeneration in Palestine set against the background of Jewish history since the Dispersion.

HAKALKALAH HA'ERETZYISREILITH B'ITPATCHUTAH. By D. Horowitz. Tel-Aviv: Mosad Bialik, 1944, 252 p.

A survey of economic progress in Palestine.

WOHIN GEIEN MIR? By Jacob Lestchinsky. New York: Jewish National Workers' Alliance, 1944, 135 p. $1.00.

After a review of the factors that have brought about Jewish migrations during the last hundred years, the author concludes that Palestine is the answer to the problem of how to make the Jews a single people, with their own land and culture.

SOLDIERS FROM JUDEA. By Rabbi L. Rabinowitz. London: Gollancz, 1944, 80 p. 3/6.

A Jewish chaplain recounts the exploits of the Palestine Jewish units that fought alongside the British forces in the Middle East during 1941–42.

FAVORING PALESTINE AS A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH OR STATE. By Judge Jacob S. Strahl. Brooklyn: The Author, 1945, 158 p.

This book was prepared in the form of a legal brief, for presentation to a "Court for Perpetual Peace," by one who describes himself as an *amicus curiae*. It contains a reasoned, if not impartial, statement of the case for a Jewish state in Palestine.

CYPRUS: PAST AND FUTURE. By Doros Alastos. London: Barmerlea, 1944, 75 p. 5/.

A brief survey of the island emphasizing its Greek character.

Africa

THE DYNAMICS OF CULTURE CHANGE: AN INQUIRY INTO RACE RELATIONS IN AFRICA. By Bronislaw Malinowski. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945, 171 p. $2.50.

Dr. Phyllis M. Kaberry has here assembled and, so far as possible, coördinated some of the late Professor Malinowski's articles, manuscripts and notes into a relatively coherent posthumous work. Its integrating theme is the interaction of European and native cultures in Africa.

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MORE ABOUT AFRICA. By Helen E. Baker. New York: Friendship Press, 1945, 122 p. 50 cents.

An introduction to African missionary problems intended for young readers.

The Far East

CHINA'S CRISIS. By Lawrence K. Rosinger. New York: Knopf, 1945, 259 p. $3.00.

The author, specialist on Far Eastern affairs for the Foreign Policy Association, has made a sincere effort to lay bare the real facts necessary for an understanding of the tangled politics and economics of China as well as her rôle in this war. Part IV deals succinctly but intelligently with "China's place in the world."

CHINA TAKES HER PLACE. By Carl Crow. New York: Harper, 1944, 282 p. $2.75.

The late Mr. Crow was an Old China Hand, and author of several popular books on that country. In this volume he looks back at the last two decades of confusion and travail in China, and finds that despite discouraging appearances there is good reason to believe that the not too distant future will bring her peace, unity and prosperity.

THE VIGIL OF A NATION. By Lin Yutang. New York: Day, 1945, 262 p. $2.75.

A popular Chinese writer, for many years resident in the Occident, returns to his native land for a brief visit. In this report on his observations and impressions he denounces foreign critics of Chiang Kai-shek's régime as purveyors of Communist propaganda, though he himself expresses dissatisfaction with the Kuomintang's reluctance to embark on the experiment of democratic government.

CHUNGKING DIALOGUES. By Lin Mousheng. New York: Day, 1945, 149 p. $2.00.

The author has chosen to illuminate the current problems of China by having five Chinese of widely varying outlooks discuss them at a series of ten meetings.

CHINA FIGHTS ON. By Pan Chao-Ying (Stephen C. Y. Pan). New York: Revell, 1945, 188 p. $2.50.

The author has summarized the story of China's struggle against Japan since World War I, with natural emphasis on the thirties. In his interpretations he has some unflattering things to say about American and British policy.

THE CHINESE LABOR MOVEMENT. By Nym Wales. New York: Day, 1945, 235 p. $2.75.

With the victory of the Rightist element in the Kuomintang in 1927, the infant Chinese organized-labor movement was broken up and its surviving leaders went underground, several of them to turn up later with the Communist forces in Yenan. From these and other sources the author, who is the wife of Edgar Snow, has pieced together an account of the vicissitudes which the movement has undergone.

ASIA FOR THE ASIATICS? By Robert S. Ward. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, 204 p. $3.50.

The author, an American consular official, witnessed the fall of Hong Kong and the imposition of the Japanese system for organizing conquered territory and peoples. What he has to say about the legacy which Japanese rule will leave in these regions will not make pleasant reading for those who expect a return to the *status quo ante* — in particular, a revival of the white man's privileged position.

THE JAPANESE NATION: A SOCIAL SURVEY. By John F. Embree. New York: Farrar, 1945, 308 p. $3.00.

This is a very serviceable introduction to the social, cultural and political structure of Japan. The author knows the Japanese people at first hand, and his synthesis combines keen scholarship with an approach and style aimed at the layman. In the appendix he has included the Japanese constitution, a glossary and a bibliography.

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JAPANESE MILITARISM: ITS CAUSE AND CURE. By John M. Maki. New York: Knopf, 1945, 258 p. $3.00.

The author, an American of Japanese ancestry, obtained part of his education in Japan. Though his study does not make for exciting reading, it gives a sound explanation of how the Japanese feudal and military caste came to enjoy their current position of power. Contrary to the title, he does not make clear what remedial measures he thinks necessary except to stress that they must be thorough and drastic.

THROUGH JAPANESE EYES. By Otto D. Tolischus. New York: Reynal, 1945, 182 p. $2.00.

A former *New York Times* correspondent in Tokyo has collected, and interpreted, a considerable number of quotations from Japanese sources to illustrate the objectives and methods of Japanese expansionists, civilian as well as military.

PACIFIC REGION: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE PACIFIC AND EAST INDIAN ISLANDS, EXCLUSIVE OF JAPAN. By Evans Lewin. London: Royal Empire Society, 1944, 76 p. 4/.

Another of the Royal Empire Society's useful little handbooks, prepared for use primarily by students.

PIONEER SETTLEMENT IN THE ASIATIC TROPICS. By Karl J. Pelzer. New York: American Geographical Society, 1945, 290 p. $5.00.

For a number of years the American Geographical Society has sponsored investigations into the problems of the "pioneer fringe." The present volume treats land utilization and agricultural colonization in southeastern Asia. The Institute of Pacific Relations is co-sponsor for the book.

IN JAVANESE WATERS. By H. W. Ponder. London: Seeley, 1944, 228 p. 18/.

Miss Ponder takes us on an instructive tour through the East Indies as they were shortly before the Japanese invasion.

Latin America

OUR AMERICAN NEIGHBORS. By the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1945, 280 p. $3.00.

Popular illustrated descriptions of the history, economy and social problems of each of the 20 republics.

HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAS. Compiled by Ruth D. Masters and Others. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1945, 453 p. $5.00.

A compendium of information concerning the organization and functions of 109 international organizations which have headquarters in the Western Hemisphere.

WHO'S WHO IN LATIN AMERICA. Part II. Edited by Ronald Hilton. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1945, 103 p. $2.25.

The second volume of this revised and greatly enlarged reference work gives relevant information concerning persons in Central America and Panama. Five more volumes, covering other regions of Latin America, are projected.

MAKERS OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA. By Harold E. Davis. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1945, 124 p. $1.90.

Thumbnail sketches of the outstanding Latin American democratic leaders of the last century.

COSTA RICAN LIFE. By John and Mavis Biesanz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, 272 p. $3.00.

First-hand information concerning the land, history, social habits and economic life of one of the most democratic peoples in the Western Hemisphere.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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